Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Writing clearly: some tips

The ideal paper (if it exists) is easy to follow in the sense that the reader never has to wonder where the discussion is going or why something is being said. Therefore, it is good to provide ‘signposts’ to guide the reader along. ‘Signposts’ are indications to the reader of what arguments are about to be made, and where one point ends and the next begins. For example:

“The case law reveals two approaches. The first is… For example… The second, unlike the first, focuses on… For example…”

“What can explain the gradual shift in the case law from X to Y? There are three main reasons. First… However, this reason is of tangential relevance compared to the second… Yet this second reason cannot explain why… The main reason is that… This explains not only… but also…”

Where possible, aim to state the argument upfront and then use sources to support it. Otherwise, the reader may be left wondering why cases and articles are being described or quoted from, and will have to keep wondering until the end of the paragraph/section. (In addition, there is a risk that you will end up providing excess/unnecessary detail about the cases.) Instead of:

“Case A said… Case B said… This shows that X is true.”

Try:

“X is true. This is shown by case A… Similarly, Case B…”

More detailed examples (which I came up with — these aren’t from actual students’ essays)

Consider the following examples of responses to a question about “non-justiciability”.

Avoid the following, which is not good because it does not make the main points clear, and wastes space providing unnecessary (and irrelevant) detail instead of presenting arguments:

In Colin Chan v MITA, the appellants were ministers of the Jehovah’s Witnesses.  The Minister for Home Affairs ordered that their local chapter be deregistered and their publications be prohibited. The appellants sought judicial review of these orders. The Court of Appeal held that “the issue is not justiciable” and “there is very little room (if any) left for any doctrine of proportionality (assuming it exists) to apply, other than the well-established one of irrationality.” However, the Court of Appeal examined the orders and held that there was nothing “to show what might turn out to be an arguable case that the Minister had acted irrationally when he issued Order 405/1994”. [These are just quotations from the case; it is not clear what point is being made.]

However, in Lee Hsien Loong, the High Court said that “Justiciability depends, not on the source of the decision-making power, but on the subject matter that is in question.” Hence, the High Court granted judicial review of a treaty. [Note: this is not only imprecise; it is incorrect.] This was a more flexible approach [more flexible than what?] as the High Court recognised that it was “here concerned with the interpretation of a treaty and a foreign statute in the light of some international instruments”. 

The next case is Yong Vui Kong, where the Court of Appeal held that a clemency decision can be subject to judicial review. The Court of Appeal held that “the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate on every legal dispute on a subject matter in respect of which Parliament has conferred jurisdiction on it” and this included “any constitutional dispute between the State and an individual”. However, the clemency power was “not a matter of legal right”. Thus, “the clemency power is a constitutional power vested exclusively in the Executive, it is not justiciable on the merits“. [This sentence is not grammatically correct.] However, there were ultimately legal limits to the clemency power, namely, bad faith, malice, and unconstitutionality. [At this point, it is not clear why all this detail has been provided.]

Therefore, ‘non-justiciability’ should not be treated as an excuse to avoid engaging in judicial review. [Much more is needed to explain how the above statements of what the law is can lead to a conclusion as to what the law should be. Moreover, this sentence suggests that the courts do avoid engaging in judicial review, which runs contrary to the point that appears to have been made earlier.] The courts do apply a flexible and non-rigid approach toward justiciability as ultimately all power has legal limits.

Instead, consider:

Despite the use of the term “non-justiciability”, the Singapore courts have never deployed a doctrine of non-justiciability to hold that the exercise of some power is not subject to legal limits. In Colin Chan, the Court of Appeal stated that “matters of national security are not justiciable”, and yet went on to perform judicial review on the ground of irrationality. In Tan Seet Eng, the Court of Appeal explained Colin Chan as a case where the national security context called for a “less intense standard of review” — not no review at all.

It is true that, in Lee Hsien Loong, the High Court appeared to suggest that the exercise of power may be rendered non-justiciable by virtue only of the “subject matter” in question. But this must be seen in the light of the High Court’s defining “subject matter” in terms of the particular question at stake in the particular case, not the general topic in question. While one might say that the issue in that case concerned international relations, the High Court defined the “subject matter” in more specific terms, the effect of an international treaty for the purposes of “determin[ing] the domestic legal obligations” as to the manner in which process was to be served. In other words, even as the High Court appeared to use the binary labels of ‘justiciable’/’non-justiciable’, it applied this terminology in a flexible manner by requiring the issue being labelled to be described in specific, granular terms.

This same approach, viz. applying the doctrine of non-justiciablility sparingly by requiring the question before the court to be stated particularly, can explain the courts’ reasoning in other cases even before Tan Seet Engtacitly deprecated the terminology of justiciability in favour of an explicitly “flexible” doctrine of deference. For example, we may reconcile the statement in Colin Chan that “matters of national security are not justiciable” with the court’s performing irrationality review as follows: while the proportionality of the decisions in question was non-justiciable, their rationality was justiciable. Similarly, in Yong Vui Kong, the Court of Appeal did not make a blanket statement that an exercise of the clemency power was non-justiciable; rather, the Court of Appeal said that an exercise of the clemency power is “not justiciable on the merits” (emphasis in original) — in other words, aspects of the exercise of that power other than the merits of a clemency decision are justiciable. (While it is not clear what precisely “merits” refers to, the point for present purposes is that the Court of Appeal did not label every clemency-related issue non-justiciable.)

In short, it should not be thought that, until Tan Seet Eng, the Singapore courts’ use of the terminology of ‘non-justiciability’ had resulted in an unwarranted eagerness to refuse to impose and enforce legal limits to executive powers. Our critical attention therefore ought to focus on what those limits are, and not the question of whether at all there are any limits.

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