Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Bias, apparent bias, and pre-judgment: some notes

The ‘rule against bias’ is sometimes said to be embodied in the Latin phrase ‘nemo iudex in causa sua’, which, translated, means ‘nobody shall be a judge in his own cause’ — in other words, nobody with decision-making power shall act in a self-interested manner. However, the modern law on bias encompasses not only situations in which the decision-maker is self-interested, but also situations where, more generally, the decision-maker is unable to decide impartially. To put it another way, a decision-maker may be biased not only because of partiality toward one party, but also for reasons such as being biased in favour of decisions he has already made, etc. In a previous post, I made reference to the International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants; the more I think about it, the more I see an overlap between those ethical rules and the law on procedural fairness.

The definition of ‘bias’ that I have found most helpful is that provided by Peter Cane, Administrative Law, 5th ed (OUP, 2011) at 70-71: “A decision-maker is actually biased ‘if motivated by a desire to favour one side or disfavour the other’ [R v Gough [1993] AC 646, 659] ‘for reasons unconnected with the merits of the issue’ [R v Inner West London Coroner, ex p Dallaglio [1994] 4 All ER 139, 151], such as ‘prejudice, predilection or personal interest’ [R v Inner West London Coroner, ex p Dallaglio [1994] 4 All ER 139, 162].”

This explains why pre-judgment can amount to actual, not just apparent, bias (Sim Yong Teng v SSC [2016] 2 SLR 489 (CA) at [50] and [52]). The problem with prejudgment is that it is, in substance, a “surrender by a decision-making body of its judgment” (R v SSE, ex parte Kirkstall Valley Campaign Ltd [1996] 3 All ER 304 at 317, cited in Sim Yong Teng at [50]). So the problem with prejudgment is not only that the decision-maker behaves in a manner that would give the impression that he has already made up his mind; rather, it is that the decision-maker has actually made up his mind, and is therefore incapable of making the decision on its merits. 

Similarly, the problem with excessive interference with adversarial proceedings is not only that it may give the impression that the decision-maker is not impartial; rather, it is that the decision-maker will actually not be impartial. See Mohammed Ali bin Johari v PP [2008] 4 SLR(R) 1058 at [175(b)], cited in BOI v BOJ at [111]: ‘descending into the arena’ has the effect of “clouding [the decision-maker’s] vision and compromising his or her impartiality”. As the Court of Appeal put it in BOI v BOJ at [112], the problem with ‘descending into the arena’ is that the decision-maker may end up “slipping into the perils of self-persuasion”, hence “impair[ing] its ability to evaluate and weigh the case presented by each side”.

In both of these situations, the actual bias is inferred from facts, rather than based on an outright admission by the decision-maker that it is biased/unable to make the decision impartially. Apparent bias, too, involves a process of inference from facts. The difference is that, in the case of actual bias, the law aims at rooting out an actual inability to decide impartially, and not merely the appearance of this; consequently, tests for actual bias do not make reference to public perception.

What about the cases on automatic disqualification, which some textbooks refer to as ‘imputed bias’? Some take the view that the cases on automatic disqualification should be assimilated into the law on apparent bias. Harry Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell, Catherine Donnelly, and Ivan Hare, De Smith’s Judicial Review, 8th ed (Thomson Reuters, 2018) states at [10-019]: “it has been queried whether the doctrines of automatic disqualification and apparent bias are actually separate doctrines”. 

The difference between the doctrines is that the cases on automatic disqualification (e.g. Dimes and Pinochet), when describing situations in which a decision-maker is disqualified from making a decision, make no reference to public perception. Of course, you are free to take the view that these cases are about what a fair-minded observer would think, and that they just lay down the rule that a fair-minded observer must think that a decision-maker is biased if he has a pecuniary or (sometimes) non-pecuniary interest in the outcome of the decision. Nonetheless, whatever you think is the theoretical foundation of these cases, the fact remains that, when applying cases such as Dimes and Pinochet, it is not necessary to make reference to a fair-minded observer etc.


Are actual bias and apparent bias merely two points on a scale?

It is not true that, where there is actual bias, there must necessarily be apparent bias. It is also not true that apparent bias and actual bias exist on one ‘scale’ on which apparent bias is ‘lower’ than actual bias. Rather, the two concepts are separate. This is because they aim at upholding different ideals. The e law on apparent bias aims to uphold the ideal that justice is seen to be done. (This remains so even though we may criticise the court’s views as to the type of ‘eyes’ through which decision-making processes are seen.) By contrast, the law on actual bias aims to uphold the ideal that justice is actually done. 

It is true that, in some cases, justice is not seen to be done, which leads to a suspicion that justice has not been actually done. This kind of case is what would lead us to think that the difference between actual bias and apparent bias is merely one of evidence. In this kind of case, apparent bias is merely evidence that there may be actual bias. 

But that is not the only possible kind of case. There may be cases where justice is not seen to be done even though it is actually done: in such a case, there would be no actual bias, but there would be apparent bias. Conversely, there can be a case in which just is not actually done even though a fair-minded observer would think that it is done: in such a case, there would be no apparent bias, but there would be actual bias.

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