Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Feedback on students’ presentations/essays: Should Singapore’s Parliament have a second chamber?

Feedback on essays (in one year)

The question was ambiguous: it could have meant one of the following:

(a) Would Singapore be better off with a bicameral Parliament that is similar to the UK’s? 

(b) Would Singapore be better off with a bicameral Parliament? By the way, the UK has a bicameral Parliament. 

Neither interpretation was necessarily correct to the exclusion of the other. However, either interpretation would have called for a discussion of the possibility that Singapore should adopt something other than a carbon copy of the House of Lords. (Interpretation (a) must have done so because it would have called for a discussion of what characteristics would make something similar to the UK’s Parliament. In other words, a person who says “a bicameral Parliament like the UK’s” is likely to be referring to a bicameral Parliament that shares certain features in common with the UK’s — which raises the question of what these features are.)

Weaker arguments appeared to be premised on the assumption that the person asking the question was proposing to have a carbon copy of the House of Lords in Singapore. For example, some argued that Singapore should not have a Parliament like the UK’s because Singapore is too small to have hundreds of Lords. This argument appeared to be attacking a straw man: is it not more likely that the person asking the question is proposing that Singapore’s Parliament have, say, a second chamber whose functions are similar to that of the House of Lords, or a second chamber the ratio of whose size to Singapore’s population is the same as the ratio of the size of the House of Lords to the UK’s population?  

Similarly, some strenuously argued that there is no space in Singapore for a building for a second chamber of Parliament to meet. Putting aside the question of whether this assertion is true, one wonders whether something as banal as that should be relevant. (What’s next: will someone argue that Singapore should not have a second chamber like the House of Lords because the architectural style wouldn’t look good in central Singapore?)

It would have been useful to distinguish between the costs and benefits of having a bicameral Parliament on the one hand, and the costs and benefits of switching to having a bicameral Parliament on the other.

It was necessary to distinguish between arguments for bicameralism, and arguments in favour of a particular form of second chamber. Some essays confused the two, and fallaciously argued that, because the House of Lords has some feature that would not work in Singapore, therefore bicameralism can never work in Singapore.

It is not true that members of the House of Lords are not subject to party whips.

Some wrote about the possibility of “deadlock” or “gridlock”. It was necessary to distinguish between a “deadlock” or “gridlock” on the one hand, and a delay on the other. The words “deadlock” and “gridlock” connote something that is intractable or, at least, cannot be straightforwardly resolved. So it may be an exaggeration to say that bicameralism in the UK suffers from gridlock. It is true that there are delays(which, by the way, are not necessarily a bad thing), but the effect of the Parliament Act 1911 (as modified by the Parliament Act 1949) is that, if the House of Lords does not approve a Bill, the Bill can still become law if the House of Commons approves it; all the House of Lords can do is to delay the passage of the Bill.

When speaking of ‘checks’ or ‘checks and balances’, it is necessary to consider what risk is being checked against. Some essays did not do so, and hence argued that a second chamber is unnecessary because judicial review already exists as a ‘check’. The problem with such an argument is that judicial review is a check against unlawfulness (including unconstitutionality), whereas unlawfulness is not the only ground on which a second chamber might refuse to approve a bill.

It was useful to consider the potential impact of publicity attending the debates of a Bill in two Houses and the ‘ping-pong’ between the Houses.

Something might be said about the role of legislative debates, including debates involving opposition MPs, in statutory interpretation.

It is possible for both chambers of a bicameral Parliament to be popularly elected, and yet for different electoral procedures to apply to each of the two chambers, or for there to be different pools of candidates for each of the two chambers. 

Feedback on presentations (in another year)

One would think that, for a bicameral arrangement to make sense, there must be some difference between the two chambers in terms of who can be a member; how/when members are selected; what powers they have; etc. Otherwise, there will just be two bodies which are, for all intents and purposes, copies of each other.

This question calls for a discussion of what a second chamber could add to a unicameral Parliament. This, in turn, depends on (a) what shortcomings the existing Parliament has; (b) what changes a second chamber could make to address those shortcomings; (c) how successfully those shortcomings could be addressed.

As for (a), ideally one would avoid generalisations like ‘Parliament can pass laws too easily’. This is somewhat vague: Is the problem that it should take a minimum amount of time for laws to be passed (and, if so, why, and how much time?) Or is it that Parliament may act as a mere rubber-stamp? Is the argument against certain features that Singapore’s Parliament intrinsically has, or against certain features that Singapore’s Parliament happens to have now?

While there was discussion of possible problems with the design of Singapore’s Parliament, a bit more could have been said on whether those problems arise from the fact that there is one chamber or from something else.

In general, when comparing different legal systems, it is useful to think in terms of functions rather than institutions. For example, if you were writing about Singapore’s Presidency, it would probably not be right to draw comparisons with the USA’s Presidency. While the two offices have the same name, their functions are very different. Conversely, when thinking about what a second chamber could do, the group did well in comparing second chambers in other countries’ legislatures to things like the PCMR and NMP scheme. They have different names, but arguably serve similar functions.

In general, when considering the benefits and drawbacks of something, it is useful to interrogate certain assumptions that we may have. Suppose we say that bicameralism leads to inefficiency. But it is worth asking: (a) Must it lead to inefficiency? (b) Is efficiency an unqualified good?

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