Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Why did the Court of Appeal need to issue the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) 1994?

In 1994, Chief Justice Yong Pung How issued the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1994] 3 SLR(R) xcvii, which states:

“With the abolition of all appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the establishment of the Court of Appeal as the final appellate court in Singapore, we consider it desirable that we state the use of precedent in the Court of Appeal in future.

We recognise the vital role that the doctrine of stare decisis plays in giving certainty to the law and predictability in its application to similar cases. However, we also recognise that the political, social and economic circumstances of Singapore have changed enormously since Singapore became an independent and sovereign republic. The development of our law should reflect these changes and the fundamental values of Singapore society.

Accordingly, it is proper that the Court of Appeal should not hold itself bound by any previous decisions of its own or of the Privy Council, which by the rules of precedent prevailing prior to 8 April 1994 were binding on it, in any case where adherence to such prior decisions would cause injustice in a particular case or constrain the development of the law in conformity with the circumstances of Singapore.

Therefore, whilst this court will continue to treat such prior decisions as normally binding, this court will, whenever it appears right to do so, depart from such prior decisions. Bearing in mind the danger of retrospectively disturbing contractual, proprietary and other legal rights, this power will be exercised sparingly.

This statement is not intended to affect the use of precedent in the High Court or in any subordinate courts.”

One of you asked: Why? Wouldn’t Privy Council cases naturally not bind any Singapore court any more, now that appeals to the Privy Council had been abolished? And wouldn’t the Court of Appeal naturally have power to overrule its own previous decisions, simply because it was the highest court? Besides, even when the Privy Council was the highest court for Singapore, why wouldn’t the Court of Appeal have been free not to follow its own previous decisions?

Believe it or not, the law used to be (or at least appear to be) that the Court of Appeal of Singapore was generally bound by its own previous decisions: see page 409 of this article. This followed the position in Young v Bristol Aeroplane, an English case which held that the Court of Appeal of England and Wales is generally bound by its own previous decisions.

In the UK, it was the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court) – the highest court of that land which, since 1966, has not been bound by its previous decisions, as confirmed in the House’s 1966 Practice Statement. In Singapore, before appeals to the Privy Council were abolished, the Privy Council, too – the highest court in Singapore’s hierarchy of courts – was not bound by its previous decisions (see this case at [38]).

In short, immediately before appeals to the Privy Council were totally abolished in Singapore (i.e., when the Privy Council was still the highest court of Singapore), the position in Singapore was the same as in England and Wales: the highest court was not bound by its own previous decisions, but the next-highest court (the Court of Appeal) was.

So when appeals to the Privy Council were abolished in 1994, it made sense for the court to declare that the Court of Appeal – now Singapore’s highest court – was not bound by its previous decisions. You might think that that obviously followed from the simple fact that it was now the highest court. But note that in the UK, for a few decades before 1966, it was thought that the House of Lords – the highest court – was bound by its own decisions. So there may have been some reason to doubt that Singapore’s Court of Appeal could overrule its own previous decisions, and the 1994 Practice Statement put beyond doubt that it could. Besides, one could imagine that there may have been lingering doubts about whether the Court of Appeal would continue to be bound by previous Privy Council decisions; if so, the Practice Statement must also have removed the doubt.

It is also worth pointing out a contemporaneous development: the passage of the Application of English Law Act 1993, and its coming into force on 12 November 1993. Section 3 stated that the common law of England up to that date would “continu[e] to be part of the law of Singapore”, but only “so far as it is applicable to the circumstances of Singapore and its inhabitants and subject to such modifications as those circumstances may require.” We can see the 1994 Practice Statement as a continuation of this trend of putting beyond doubt that the courts of independent Singapore, while building on English legal foundations, were free to develop the law for Singapore as they saw fit.

Note also that, before 1993, the Court of Appeal only heard civil cases; there was a separate Court of Criminal Appeal that dealt with appeals in criminal cases. The latter was folded into the former only in 1993. To the extent that this may have created confusion about precedent, the 1994 Practice Statement must also have removed the confusion.

Comments

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *