Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Feedback on a student presentation about access to a lawyer before/during police investigations

Like all procedural rules, the rule that one doesn’t have immediate access to a lawyer on arrest must be seen in the context of other rules. Even if one doesn’t have access to a lawyer during police questioning, that doesn’t mean that someone can be convicted on the basis of police statements that were unlawfully obtained. We see this from the Kadar case, as well PP v Dahalan bin Ladaewa [1995] 2 SLR(R) 124 (which the Thursday team also mentioned). More generally, the court will not convict a person merely based on what they said to the police: the ultimate question is whether all the evidence convinces the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is guilty.

There is also s 258(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010, which says that statements obtained in certain circumstances are strictly inadmissible as evidence. One could argue that the scope of s 258(3) is too narrow, but that doesn’t mean that there should be a right of access to counsel during questioning: it could just as well mean that s 258(3) should be broadened. Further, as we see from Kadar and Dahalan, the courts can exclude a statement by the accused person on other grounds – for example, because the statement was recorded in an irregular manner that rendered it unreliable, because (as in Dahalan) the person did not understand English well and did not have access to proper translation, or because (as in Dahalan) the person was under the influence of drugs and therefore “not in a fit state to be interviewed” ([77]).

Note also that even if a piece of evidence is admissible, the court might not necessarily give heavy weight to it. I won’t fault anybody for not having known this distinction, but it is one worth noting now. For example, the courts have held that a statement given by a person who is tired is admissible, which means that the court can consider it. But, nonetheless, the court might choose to give it little weight, for example, by holding that it is unreliable.

Conversely, even if there is access to a lawyer before/during police questioning, that doesn’t mean that the lawyer is free to (for example) encourage the arrested person to lie; assist the arrested person in destroying evidence; etc. Those things are crimes, and also go against the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules. 

It would also be helpful to consider possible variants of a proposed rule that one have a right of access to a lawyer during police questioning. In the first place, can the lawyer say anything? Or could the lawyer be allowed only to observe (and note down anything the lawyer thinks is improper, so that the lawyer can mention it in court in due course)? If the lawyer objects to a certain line of questioning, would it follow that the person being questioned does not need to answer it? Who would evaluate the lawyer’s objection?

Note also that – as [one team of students] stated – it’s possible to argue that there should be access to a lawyer during police questioning in certain circumstances but not others, etc.

A right of access to a lawyer wouldn’t necessarily mean that the state is obliged to provide and pay for a lawyer. It could simply mean an reasonable opportunity to find and engage a lawyer at one’s own expense.

I really appreciated [one team’s] discussion of whether the answer to the question should change depending on whether the process of recording the statement is captured on video. I suppose the answer to that question depends on who will have access to the video and when.

Something could have been said about this pamphlet which is given to people who have been arrested.

Both teams cited a few Singaporean cases; here’s a summary of what the courts in Singapore and Malaysia have said:

  • The Malaysian courts, citing Indian cases, have held that the constitutional right to “consult” a lawyer doesn’t refer to having the lawyer with you when being questioned by the police. This, they say, is because the word “consult” means to seek legal advice, and legal advice is by its nature confidential; therefore, a “consult[ation]” with a lawyer can’t possibly take place in front of the police. (I add that the word “be defended by”, in legal parlance, refers to being defended in court, so it’s not relevant here)
  • Moreover, you don’t get a confidential consultation with the lawyer immediately upon arrest. The Malaysian courts have offered two reasons for this: (a) that may, paradoxically, delay your implied right to a speedy trial; (b) that needs to be balanced against the police’s need to discharge their duties efficiently. I’m not convinced by either argument. I don’t understand the first argument: even if you have a right to a speedy trial, shouldn’t you be allowed to waive this right? As for the second argument: while the police’s duties are important, they – unlike the right to counsel – do not have constitutional status.

The Singapore courts have endorsed the second argument. The High Court in Leong Siew Chorsaid that the accused person has the right to consult a lawyer only after a “reasonable time”, and the “reasonable time” requirement is meant to accommodate “the duty of the police to follow up on new leads quickly and to gather swiftly whatever evidence was available lest it disappears or is destroyed”. The Court of Appeal tentatively agreed: it felt unable to express a conclusion given that Leong’s lawyers did not make detailed arguments on the precise benefits that access to counsel would have brought to Leong. (To put it in context: The lawyers argued that the effect of not having access to counsel was that the police statements were unreliable. This needed substantiation, which was lacking.)

The next milestone is the James Raj case, where the High Court reflected on what a “reasonable time” is. The High Court noted that the courts, in previous cases, had assumed that “the rationale for granting a ‘reasonable time’ was to afford the police a degree of latitude in carrying out their investigations.” Hence, the court took the view that the burden of proof is on the police to prove that “giving effect to the right to counsel would impede police investigation or the administration of justice”. Further, the court went into considerable detail in assessing the police’s arguments about what a “reasonable time” was, and concluded that there was no evidence that, here, “access to counsel in this case would have hindered investigations”. In other words, the High Court did accept that there is only a right to see a lawyer after a “reasonable time”, but it suggested that a “reasonable time” is no more than the police can show is necessary. Moreover, the High Court affirmed that the law is not that you only get to see a lawyer once investigations are totally complete (at [14]). It even said that it is “at least arguable” that the “reasonable time” refers only to “any necessary or unavoidable delay occasioned by practical or administrative concerns, eg, having to transport the arrested person to the place of remand or having to contact the counsel of the arrested person’s choice”.

Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal stopped at saying: “With great respect to the Judge, the position on the issues raised in the present application has been clear and settled since the decision of this court [i.e. the court of Appeal] in Jasbir Singh.”

Speaking for myself, I do like the approach of the High Court in James Raj, since it – at the least – recognised that there is a conversation to be had about what is a “reasonable time” and what is not. As Tham Lijing puts it, “access to counsel is not necessarily an ‘all or nothing’ dichotomy”. For example, he says, there could conceivably be “flexible access to counsel depending on the particular circumstances of the case – eg one hour for the lawyer every week to explain to the suspect his basic rights and options”. Professor Ho Hock Lai makes the more general point (in ‘Recent (Non-) Developments in an Arrested Person’s Right to Counsel [2014] SJLS 267 at 281) that the “fairest way forward” would be for the courts to elaborate on what precisely a “reasonable time” is. I would add that perhaps, in certain situations, it might be “reasonable” to allow access to a lawyer even before police statements are taken.

One final thought: There is no law saying that the police must allow access to a lawyer during questioning. But there is no law saying that they mustn’t. In other words, they have the discretion to do so – or, more generally, to allow other persons to be present during the questioning. This must be so; otherwise, it would be unlawful to have the Appropriate Adult Scheme. If – as I have argued – that discretion exists, what might be the legal limits to that discretion?

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