Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

What role do rights provisions in the Constitution play in judicial reasoning?

First, the court has a “duty to declare invalid any exercise of power, legislative and executive, which exceeds the limits of the power conferred by the Constitution, or which contravenes any prohibition which the Constitution provides”: Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209 at [50].

Second, the Constitution can serve as a source of norms used by the courts in deciding how to develop the common law. In Review Publishing Co Ltd v Lee Hsien Loong [2012] 1 SLR 52, one question was whether the constitutional right to freedom of expression was an impetus for the common law of defamation to recognise the ‘responsible journalism’ defence, also known as “Reynolds privilege”. (The court did not provide a settled answer to the question because it was not necessary to decide the case: the defendants in that case were not Singapore citizens, and hence had no constitutional right to the freedom of expression.)

Third, the Constitution can serve as a source of norms used by the courts in deciding how to interpret a statute. Consider Public Prosecutor v Yue Mun Yew Gary [2013] 1 SLR 39, which involved section 267C of the Penal Code:

“Whoever —

(a) makes, prints, possesses, posts, distributes or has under his control any document; or

(b) makes or communicates any electronic record,

containing any incitement to violence or counselling disobedience to the law or to any lawful order of a public servant or likely to lead to any breach of the peace shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 5 years, or with fine, or with both.”

The High Court interpreted section 267C as containing an implied rule that a person could only be convicted if he intended to incite violence (etc.) The reason for this — refusing to hold that a person could be convicted regardless of his intentions — was “the need to give sufficient weight to the value of free expression” (at [38]). 

Note that the judgment in Gary Yue spoke of the freedom of expression, but did not mention Article 14. This illustrates the following broader point: Independent of the Constitution, the common law does recognise certain rights — such as the right to freedom of expression and the right of access to courts. These common-law constitutional rights do not form a basis on which the court can strike down legislation. However, they can play the following roles (which are especially important in the UK, where the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty means that the court cannot declare an Act of Parliament void on any ground or otherwise disapply an Act):

  1. When a statute is ambiguous and capable of being interpreted in one of two ways, the court will choose the interpretation that better gives effect to these rights.
  2. The court will be slow to hold that a statute confers on an executive body the power to derogate from these rights, unless the statute clearly and explicitly confers such a power. The court will be slow to hold that such a power is merely implied by statute. Hence, in R v Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham [1998] 1 QB 575, the High Court of England and Wales held that a statutory power allowing the Lord Chancellor to set court fees did not empower him, as Lord Justice Rose put it, “totally to preclude the poor from access to the courts”. (If you’re interested in a more recent English case on the same issue, consider this blog post: https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2017/07/26/unison-in-the-supreme-court-employment-fees-constitutional-rights-and-the-rule-of-law/)
  3. One ground of judicial review of executive action is that an executive officer, when making a discretionary decision, failed to take into account a relevant matter (the term more frequently heard is “relevant consideration”) which he/she was bound to take into account in the course of the decision-making process. The court may hold that a common-law constitutional right is such a consideration. 

These three points apply a fortiori to rights explicitly set out in the Constitution. For an example of the third, consider the Vijaya Kumar case: at [38], the High Court (implicitly) stated that the police, when making licensing decisions, are bound to have regard to the applicant’s right to freedom of religion.

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