Here are some miscellaneous notes I wrote in response to a class on crime; I can’t remember precisely what we discussed.
Criminal law involves state authorities peering intimately into others’ lives. Witnesses are questioned about whether they can trust their memories of what they think they saw. Victims are asked to narrate, in excruciating detail, traumatic experiences. And offenders’ lives (and those of their families) are put under a microscope as courts decide how they will respond to rehabilitative efforts. None of this is pleasant business.
One might retort that such intrusion is justified on the ground that the prevention of crime is a good thing. But why treat ‘crime’ as a single conceptual category? Don’t many people routinely cross the road at a spot 50 metres of a designated pedestrian crossing, (contrary to rule 3(1) of the Road Traffic (Pedestrian Crossings) Rules? Did you know that it is a criminal offence to bring beer or wine into a public hospital (section 23 of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act)? How many of you have, in your youth, engaged in “disorderly… behaviour in any public road or in any public place”, contrary to section 20 of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act? Can it be said that the very act of smoking a cigarette is an offence under section 278 of the Penal Code? Should the criminal process be set in motion in each of these cases?
One might sometimes get the impression that the law treats crime as though it were a single phenomenon which warrants a single stock set of responses — arrest, investigations, charge, trial, conviction, sentence. But would that be right? The Public Prosecutor himself does not think so, which is why he does not direct that every person who commits an offence under s 377A of the Penal Code be prosecuted despite the fact that he would, in the eyes of the law, be perfectly justified in doing so.
To the contrary, one may ask: if the law has singled out a particular type of conduct for condemnation, then are we not justified in condemning it? But that would be to treat the law as a perfect moral leader of society, ignoring the fact that society (or parts of society), too, shapes the law. Besides, condemnation is only one end which criminal law purports to pursue. The law aims both to condemn and prevent wrongdoing that harms others and to help wrongdoers to stop such wrongdoing. But, putting aside how simplistic it would be to think that there exists a single notion of ‘wrongdoing’, the cases we have studied show that these two aims are often in mutual tension.
This legal difficulty reflects a deeper moral difficulty. Why did some of us in class today respond with much more revulsion to the offences committed by Lim Choon Hong and Chong Sui Foon compared to those of Abdul Qayyum bin Abdul Razak? (This is not to say that we would not have been justified in doing so, but it is worth reflecting on our motives and underlying assumptions.) Why would we be more concerned about procedural fairness (in terms of not being dragged through the criminal process for too long) to, say, a poor individual accused of being a drug mule (which was the hypothetical example I raised) than about fairness to Lim and Chong? (It may be that it is difficult to sympathise with Lim and Chong given that we know what they are guilty of. But what if such concerns of procedural fairness arise at a stage when the court cannot yet tell conclusively whether the accused person is guilty or innocent?)
One reason might be that we have certain notions of what conduct is more deserving of condemnation than other conduct. Another possibility is that we have certain notions of which people are more deserving of condemnation than other people. (I hope this latter possibility is not true; but, by its nature, bias against persons operates quietly and insidiously.) Of course, those in power ought to focus on the former, not the latter; and what a challenge that must be! One function of the law — from step-by-step frameworks such as that set out in Boaz Koh, to tables and charts such as those we see in Takaaki Masui and Kunasekaran (the latter of which was applied in Terence Siow) — is to enable those in power to exercise their power in an even-handed, dispassionate manner. if this is true, then in what sense can it can be said that the law reflects/should reflect the views of society, which are often neither even-handed nor dispassionate?
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