I wrote this note in response to a student who had some questions about Chan Sek Keong SC, ‘Equal Justice Under the Constitution and Section 377A of the Penal Code: The Roads Not Taken‘ (2019) 31 SAcLJ 773.
‘Legitimate state interest’
You rightly note that Chan has applied a “legitimate state interest” test. At [49(e)] and [76(d)], Chan asserts that a “legislative classification (or differentia)” must be “reasonable in that it serves or advances a legitimate state interest”.
To my mind, this test is similar to the ‘legitimacy of purpose’ test that Quentin Loh J attempted to introduce in the High Court’s decision in Lim Meng Suang. I note that Chan appears not to have engaged either with this aspect of the High Court’s judgment nor the reasons why the Court of Appeal rejected it. Therefore, with respect, Chan has not defended the assumption that the court is well-placed to judge the legitimacy of a state interest. Chan purports to draw support for the ‘legitimate state interest’ test from the Court of Appeal’s expanded “intelligible differentia” test. So either Chan thinks that the ‘legitimate state interest’ test is in substance the same as the expanded ‘intelligible differentia’ test, or Chan has not engaged sufficiently with the Court of Appeal’s arguments.
(By the way, at [76(d)], it looks as though Chan has overlooked the fact that Loh J attempted to introduce the ‘legitimacy of purpose’ test. But this does not matter to Chan’s thesis. Chan’s criticism at [76(d)] appears to be aimed primarily at Loh J’s findings as to what the purpose of s 377A was and the reasonableness of that purpose.)
At [49(f)], Chan provides examples of what, in his view, would not be a legitimate state interest to pursue. At [84], as I understand it, Chan is saying that ‘to prevent public health problems’ is a legitimate state interest, but ‘to prevent unseemly/undignified behaviour’ is not. I note that Chan has not purported to provide a methodology by which to determine what state interests are legitimate.
At [83] and [87], Chan moves to making another point. This point is that there is a presumption that there is no ‘legitimate state interest’ in, by way of a criminal law, only persons of one sex from doing something, when in fact persons of any sex are physically capable of doing it. We may read this as either saying that such a law would presumably never serve a ‘legitimate state interest’, or that the differentia behind such a law would be ‘unintelligible’ in the expanded sense. Either way, Chan has not sought to justify this assertion.
‘Equality before the law’ vs. ‘equal protection of the law’
As I understand it, in saying that “males and females” have “equality before the law” [105]-[106], Chan is asserting that there can be no legitimate state interest for criminalising an act when it is done by a man but not when it is done by a woman. At [106], Chan appears to raise the question of whether there can ever be a legitimate state interest for criminalising an act when it is done by a man with a certain sexual orientation, but not when it is done by others. But Chan does not answer this question.
Other issues
I agree with Chan that Art 12(1) cannot be treated as merely “aspirational”. To my mind, if it were possible for any constitutional provisions (at least in Part IV) to be merely “aspirational”, then it would be wholly unclear which provisions are “aspirational” and which are more (and why).
At [79], Chan suggests that a statute can lose a purpose over time: “if the social conditions that caused [the] enactment [of s 377A of the Penal Code] in 1938 no longer subsisted in 2013… there would no longer exist a purpose…” This is interesting, but, on its face, it would appear to contradict the point at [50(a)] that “[t]he purpose of any law is determined and fixed at the time of enactment of the law… and… will remain the same forever”. If Chan wishes to say that s 377A has no more purpose, then I respectfully think that the stronger arguments to this effect are those set out at [50(e)].
The other comments which are to be found in the various sub-paragraphs of [49], [50], [55], and [76] are interesting, but their content is largely covered in either the other materials on the reading list or in what I was planning to say in class. The same applies to the remarks on the presumption of constitutionality at [112]-[125], as well as the remarks on the scope of Art 162 at [126]-[132].
Conclusion
In noting that Chan has made various assumptions which he has not sought to justify in detail, I am not saying that I disagree with these assumptions. There might even be moral arguments for saying that these assumptions are self-evident. But given that the Court of Appeal has very much rejected these assumptions (or similar ones), I think something more than Chan’s reliance on these assumptions would be needed to persuade the Court of Appeal that its approach in Lim Meng Suang is wrong. Perhaps more persuasive arguments are those set out at [49], [50], [55], and [76], as well as his arguments at [8]-[44] as to the true purpose of s 377A.
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