We had an interesting discussion on originalism and dynamism in constitutional interpretation [in class one day]. For example, we considered whether the words “religion” in the Constitution ought to be interpreted to refer to:
- (a) only those religions which existed at the time the Constitution was drafted;
- (b) only religions sharing the characteristics of the religions which existed at the time the Constitution was drafted; or
- (c) anything which falls within the modern understanding of the word “religion”.
(I will use “(a)”, “(b)”, and “(c)” to refer to similar arguments in general terms, not necessarily specifically in the context of religion.)
In this post, I wish to summarise our discussion on these three points; highlight a recent case which adds to this debate; and then, in response to some of your queries, end by distinguishing between two types of question of constitutional interpretation, which might call for different types of approach.
I.
The argument for saying that (c) is wrong is Goldsworthy’s point that, otherwise, the words in the Constitution will be reduced to “almost empty husks” – vessels into which the courts may pour any meaning they like, without giving sufficient weight to the democratic mandate of those who first drafted the Constitution.
Another argument against (c) is Scalia’s argument that the point of the Constitution is to “embed certain rights in such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them away”, hence the meaning of the Constitution must not be allowed to change (Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (1997) at 40, cited in Michael Kirby, ‘Constitutional interpretation and original intent: a form of ancestor worship?’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 1, 2). But this counter-argument, in my view, is not complete, because it says nothing about interpretations that would expand rights.
The argument for saying that (a) is wrong is the fact that the drafters of the Constitution chose to use the general word “religion”. They could have listed specific religions singled out for protection (as in the Constitution of Ireland before the Fifth Amendment in 1972, which provided that “The State recognises the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens.” and “The State also recognises the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, the Methodist Church in Ireland, the Religious Society of Friends in Ireland, as well as the Jewish Congregations and the other religious denominations existing in Ireland at the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution.”); but they did not.
In Re Wakim; ex parte McNally, the High Court of Australia chose option (b) – the middle option. In essence, it said (at [42]), that the court can expand the denotation of words (their application) but not their connotation (their meaning). We can see this in action in Jumbunna Coal Mine.
II.
Now, in Public Prosecutor v ASR [2019] SGCA 16, the Court of Appeal has expressed a similar view. (Although this case involved the interpretation of a statute and not the Constitution, the Court of Appeal said that it was applying the framework set out in Tan Cheng Bock and Lam Leng Hung (at [75]ff) – a framework which applies to the interpretation of the Constitution too.) ASR dealt with the interpretation of section 83 of the Penal Code, which provides: “Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above 7 years of age and under 12, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequence of his conduct on that occasion.” The accused was chronologically 14 years old, but had had a mental age of between 8 and 10 years. Did section 83 apply to him? Did the word “age” include “mental age”?
The Court of Appeal, at first glance, followed option (a): “to determine the ordinary meaning of the word ‘age’ in s 83, the court must begin by considering what that word was understood to mean at the time the Penal Code was adopted, that is, in 1872” (at [79]). But the Court of Appeal then noted the problem with this argument:
“since the concept of mental age did not exist at the time the Penal Code was adopted, it is arguably also not possible to say that s 83 was not intended to refer to that concept, given that such an intention could not have been formed at that time in the first place. By way of analogy, if the question in Lam Leng Hung had been whether a Bitcoin broker was an ‘agent’ within the meaning of s 409, it would not have sufficed to say that because Bitcoin brokers did not exist at the time the Penal Code was adopted, the Legislature could not have intended s 409 to apply to them…” (at [80])
Therefore, the Court of Appeal chose option (b):
“Instead, the court would have had to consider whether the ordinary meaning and concept of the word ‘agent’ in s 409 at the time the Penal Code was enacted could logically extend to Bitcoin brokers. And the court might have concluded, for example, that because a Bitcoin broker is a fundamentally a kind of professional agent, he would be caught by s 409.
In short, where the court is considering new phenomena which did not exist at the time the provision in question was adopted, it must consider whether the ordinary meaning of the provision at the time can logically extend to the new phenomena. Here, we considered that the ordinary meaning of the word “age” in s 83 did not logically extend to the subsequently developed concept of mental age. The former is fundamentally a measure of time, specifically, the length of time that a person has lived since birth, whereas the latter is not. It is instead a measure of a person’s cognitive ability with reference to a specific mathematical formula… The two concepts are therefore qualitatively different, and cannot be reduced to a common denominator in the way, for example, that a Bitcoin broker and a factor might both be regarded as professional agents for the purposes of s 409. In our judgment, therefore, the word “age” in s 83 does not include mental age.” (at [80]-[81])
III.
Can it nonetheless be argued that option (c) ought to be applied when interpreting the Constitution, given that the Constitution, unlike ordinary legislation, is designed to endure over time, etc.? In Review Publishing, the courts commented on such an option, but in the context of a different kind of question of constitutional interpretation. The question was not one of the meaning and scope of a particular word or phrase, but rather one of the effect of an entire provision, namely, “[t]he balance between constitutional free speech and protection of reputation”. The Court of Appeal chose (c), with the gloss that it demanded evidence that the modern understanding of the “balance… between constitutional free speech and protection of reputation” had changed from when the Constitution was drafted, failing which (c) would essentially collapse into (a). All this was obiter. But what is interesting is that the Court of Appeal conceded that the effect of the Constitution could, in theory, change in the light of a “change in our political, social and cultural values”, notwithstanding that the text of the Constitution did not change.
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