Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

“Generous” interpretation of rights provisions in the Constitution

Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319 (UKHL) 328 says that the courts should give the Constitution “a generous interpretation… suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to” therein.

As a number of commentators have observed, the Singapore courts have not engaged in detail with the ‘full measure’ principle. See, for example, Victor Leong, ‘Tan Cheng Bock v AG: Is Constitutional Interpretation As Settled As It Seems?’, Singapore Law Gazette (January 2018) <https://lawgazette.com.sg/feature/tan-cheng-bock-v-ag-is-constitutional-interpretation-as-settled-as-it-seems/> — he says that “the principle of generous interpretation… appears to have all but disappeared in the recent jurisprudence”.

Fisher concerned a provision in the Constitution of Bermuda which stated that “a person shall be deemed to belong to Bermuda” (and, hence, to have the right to live there) if, inter alia, that person was a “child” of the wife of a person who “possesses Bermudian status”. A woman had four illegitimate children, then married a Bermudian. Did the children “belong to Bermuda”? The state argued that they did not because the word “child” in that provision did not include an illegitimate child.

There was a canon of statutory interpretation according to which “child” was presumed to mean a legitimate child (only). This presumption could be rebutted depending on the context of the statute.

But the Privy Council said that that interpretive presumption did not apply at all. Even if it applied to statutes generally, it would not apply to the Constitution because:

“A Constitution is a legal instrument giving rise, amongst other things, to individual rights capable of enforcement in a court of law. Respect must be paid to the language which has been used and to the traditions and usages which have given meaning to that language. It is quite consistent with this, and with the recognition that rules of interpretation may apply, to take as a point of departure for the process of interpretation a recognition of the (a) character and origin of the instrument, and to be guided by the principle of giving full recognition and effect to those fundamental rights and freedoms (b) with a statement of which the Constitution commences.” (emphasis added; indicative letters added in brackets)

Note the two phrases I have bolded. (a) suggests that the method of constitutional interpretation is different from statutory interpretation – more “generous” – because of the very idea of constitutional rights. This is Thio’s argument. (b) suggests that the method of constitutional interpretation is different from statutory interpretation because of the following statement of principle in section 1 of the Constitution of Bermuda:

“1. Whereas every person in Bermuda is entitled to fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, has the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest, to each and all of the following, namely: – (a) life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the law: (b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association; and (c) protection for the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation, the subsequent provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the purpose of affording protection to the aforesaid rights and freedoms subject to such limitations of that protection as are contained in those provisions, being limitations designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.”

According to the Privy Council, the significance of this passage, which corresponds to point (b), was that:

“Prima facie, the stated rights and freedoms are those of “every person in Bermuda.” This generality underlies the whole of Chapter I… When one is considering the permissible limitations upon those rights in the public interest. the right question to ask is whether there is any reason to suppose that in this context, exceptionally, matters of birth, in the particular society of which Bermuda consists, are regarded as relevant.”

Of course, point (a) would apply in Singapore, but not (b).

The Privy Council went on to say that “child” did not mean just “legitimate child” because of, inter alia, the wording of the constitutional provision in question. The constitution provision said that a person who “(a) possesses Bermudian status;… (c) is the wife of [such a person]; or (d) is under the age of 18 years and is the child, stepchild or child adopted in a manner recognised by law of a person to whom any of the foregoing paragraphs of this subsection applies” was a person who “belong[ed] to Bermuda”.  According to the Privy Council:

“In their Lordships’ opinion, paragraph (d) in its context amounts to a clear recognition of the unity of the family as a group and acceptance of the principle that young children should not be separated from a group which as a whole belongs to Bermuda.”

So the Privy Council’s conclusion was based on the preamble in the Constitution of Bermuda, as well as the particular wording of the constitutional provision being interpreted. The Privy Council went on to add that it would be possible for a Constitution to use the word “child” to refer only to a legitimate child, if the drafter had used “express words” to “spell it out”.

Therefore, the foundation of the idea of “generous” interpretation appears to rest, at least in (large) part, on some particular words in Bermuda’s Constitution – which are absent from Singapore’s Constitution. Of course, the counter-argument is that point (a) still remains.  

Now let’s put that aside and focus on exactly how the principle of ‘generosity’ applied.

In Ong Ah Chuan, ‘generosity’ meant interpreting the word “law” to mean something more than ‘something that has been passed by the Legislature’. As I mentioned in class, I am more sceptical of the notion that the right to silence is necessarily not one of the ‘fundamental rules of natural justice’, and I am therefore sceptical about whether Mazlan was correctly decided.

On the other hand, I see considerable force in the restrictive reading of Art 9, and do not necessarily see this as conflicting with the case law on ‘generosity’ and ‘full measure’.

In Fisher, ‘generosity’ meant not applying the normal rules on how to interpret the word “child” in statutes, instead applying the plain ordinary meaning of the word.  (This is similar to what happened in Edwards.) In other words, the idea was to give the word “child” the meaning, out of all possible meanings that would cohere with the context of the provision, that would give the fullest possible measure to the applicants’ rights. This principle would not help one who sought to argue that “life” in Article 9 includes the freedom to make a contract, etc., because (goes the argument) that does not fall within the ordinary meaning of the word ‘life’.

As for “liberty”, the problem lies in Articles 9(2) to 9(4) of the Constitution, which provide for safeguards against unlawful detention (see Lim Meng Suang v AG [2015] 1 SLR 26 (CA) [46]ff). Fisher doesn’t say that words are to be given the broadest possible meaning they can bear in isolation; instead, it emphasis interpretation in context. That is why the Privy Council was convinced that, because the various limbs of the Bermudan constitutional provision in question, taken together, gave citizenship to husbands, wives, and children, the purpose was to uphold the “unity of the family as a group”. By contrast, the various sub-provisions of Art 9, taken together, suggest that the point of Art 9 is to protect our rights to be alive and not to be locked up, and not to protect our freedom to act as we please generally.

A court could, in theory, take the approach seen in India’s law, where “life” has been interpreted to include everything from education to health to privacy. But then where would it end?  The justification for taking this Indian approach may well be the “unique social, political and legal circumstances” of India: Lim Meng Suang (CA) at [48]. But I don’t think the justification can be the ‘full measure’ principle. ‘Full measure of a right’ assumes that we have a clear definition of what the ‘right’ is, and then we are protecting the fullest possible measure of that right. But, by this logic, the ‘full measure’ principle would not justify the courts, in interpreting right A, seeking to give full measure to right B, which is another right.

As for the ‘purposive interpretation’ argument, the simplest possible counter-argument is that the pronouncement in Ong Ah Chuan/Fisher about interpreting the Constitution with “principles of interpretation of its own” is a common-law rule, which can therefore, one would think, be abrogated by statute. But that is not necessarily a bad thing, because I do not think that purposive interpretation is necessarily at odds with ‘generous’ interpretation. This is because one could always say that the purpose of constitutional rights provisions is, at least on one level, to be ‘generous’. I also note that the cases which have focused on the idea of a ‘purposive’ interpretation of the Constitution – such as Const Ref 1/1995, Tan Cheng Bock – involved the interpretation of provisions which were not rights provisions. I have set out some thoughts (somewhat) related to this issue in an old piece, ‘Developments in the law on constitutional and statutory interpretation’, Singapore Law Watch Commentary (Issue 1/Sep 2013). My conclusion then was not entirely clear, but one point I sought to make was that there has been no clear reconciliation between the Fisher approach and the approach in s 9A of the Interpretation Act. On Victor Leong’s account, five years later, the interaction between the two has still not been settled.


When applying a ‘purposive’ interpretation of an enactment, note the potential issue that an enactment may (a) pursue multiple purposes; (b) pursue purposes at different levels of generality. See Tan Cheng Bock  v AG for a view of how the Singapore courts address this issue. Bear this in mind when addressing the idea of a ‘generous’ interpretation.

The view in Ong Ah Chuan, which Thio explains in A Treatise on Singapore Constitutional Law, is that a ‘generous’ interpretation is warranted because the purpose of all rights provisions generally – Thio backs this argument up by reference to the 1957 Reid Commission report.

I would further invite you to consider if we can come up with a more nuanced picture of what exactly the ‘purpose’ of all our constitutional rights provisions is. In general, why might a legal system single out certain rights for protection? To my mind, there can be several possibilities:

  1. For the benefit of individuals: the designers of that system consider that every individual should have and enjoy those rights because they are valuable to individuals.
  2. For the benefit of society: the designers of that system consider that it would be good for society for every individual to have those rights. As Thio points out in ‘Protecting rights’ at 199, the Reid Commission thought that the fundamental liberties included in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia were “essential conditions for a free and democratic way of life”. Note also that the High Court of Australia, in Australian Capital Television (1992) 177 CLR 106 (HCA), justified the implied freedom of political communication on the ground that democracy requires it.
  3. To limit the powers of the state: the designers of that system, motivated by a general wish to prevent tyranny by the state, have noted that those fields are those in which the state’s powers are most open to abuse, and accordingly have singled out those areas for specific protection of persons against the state.
  4. To limit individual rights: as one of you pointed out, perhaps the rights singled out for protection are those which could potentially lead to chaos if everybody enjoyed them to the fullest extent; the rights provisions seek to manage those rights by limiting them. Consider, for example, that Malaysia’s Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 claims, in section 2, to aim to “ensure… so far as it is appropriate to do so, that all citizens have the right to organise assemblies or to participate in assemblies, peaceably and without arms; and… that the exercise of the right to organise assemblies or to participate in assemblies, peaceably and without arms, is subject only to restrictions deemed necessary or expedient in a democratic society in the interest of the security of the Federation or any part thereof or public order, including the protection of the rights and freedoms of other persons.” (On the constitutionality of this Act, see Public Prosecutor v Yuneswaran a/l Ramaraj [2015] 6 MLJ 47 (CA)).

Which of these models (if any) describes rights protection in Singapore?

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