Mr M Ravi once attempted to apply, in his own name, for an order that the execution of Prabagaran a/l Srivijayan be stayed. He was, at the time, not a practising lawyer. Does that mean that someone who is not a practising lawyer (A) can, in effect, represent someone else (B) in court by applying in A’s own name? If so, why bother becoming a practising lawyer at all?
If you want to make an application in court, you can either get a lawyer to represent you, or represent yourself. (By the way, to be a lawyer representing someone in court, one must have a valid practising certificate in force. It is not enough to be called to the Singapore Bar. For example, I have been called to the Singapore Bar, but do not have a practising certificate in force. To get a practising certificate, one must, inter alia, get insurance against the risk of one being liable for one’s own professional negligence.)
To put it another way, if X is (lawfully) making an application in court, either:
- it is Y’s application, and X is representing Y by being Y’s lawyer; or
- it is X’s application.
Ravi was X and Prabagaran was Y.
Situation (a) was not possible, because Ravi had no valid practising certificate in force (and, even if he had, Prabagaran was not his client). So only situation (b) was possible. But, in that situation, the application was Ravi’s application, not Prabagaran’s. Therefore, if (for example) standing was an issue, then Ravi would have to show that Ravi (the applicant) had standing. It would not have been enough for him to show that Prabagaran had standing, because Prabagaran was not the applicant.
None of this diminishes anybody’s right to be a litigant in person. But a litigant in person can only litigate in respect of claims by/against him. So if the law is such that A has no right of action, then A cannot succeed merely by saying that B has a right of action. If the law were otherwise, then just anybody would be able to sue anyone for any alleged wrong; there would be no such thing as standing, or privity of contract. There could, in theory, be such a legal system; but ours is not such a system.
That is why there are debates on whether the law on standing should be changed. Typically, the situation is as follows. A’s right has (allegedly) been violated by the executive. But A is unable/unwilling to apply for judicial review. B, a stranger, is unhappy with what the executive has done. What can B do?
- If B happens to be a practising lawyer, B can represent A in court. That will mean that A is the applicant.
- B can try to persuade A to apply for judicial review, and/or give some money to A to hire a lawyer (which is not always lawful because of the law on champerty/maintenance). That will mean that A is the applicant.
- B could himself be the applicant.
Options 1 and 2 are contingent on A’s consent. If A does not consent, that leaves option 3: B being the applicant. But the law on standing does not allow B to be the applicant. So B would need to persuade the court to broaden the law on standing to allow B, and not just A, to be the applicant. (Often, this takes the form of an argument that B should have standing because any ‘concerned citizen’ should have standing.)
A case study that illustrates all this is Madan Mohan Singh v AG [2015] 2 SLR 1085. That case involved a challenge to a policy that affected certain prisoners. The applicant, who was a volunteer counsellor, sought to challenge that policy. He failed because he had no standing: if any rights had been arguably violated, it was the prisoners’ rights, not the counsellor’s. Moreover, the counsellor could not make the application on behalf of the prisoners.
To my mind, the easiest course of action would have been for him to persuade one of the prisoners to bring an application in his (the prisoner’s) own name. It may well have been that he did not manage to (see [17]).
Does that mean that there was the potential that the prison’s policy was unlawful? In theory, perhaps, (although the High Court said, obiter, that the policy was not unlawful). But even if it were unlawful, as we have been told in Jeyaretnam, the court is there to redress disputes between the parties, and not just to go around trying to fix unlawfulness in the abstract. If the person who was the victim of the unlawfulness did not want to bring an application, why should a stranger be allowed to? If, for example, the victim of the unlawfulness wished to try to settle his dispute with the executive by means of negotiations, why should a stranger be allowed to scuttle those negotiations by going to court?
Similarly, if Prabagaran wanted to have his application handled by Choo and nobody else, and (for whatever reasons, e.g. as part of a broader litigation strategy) mount legal arguments A and B and none else, why should a stranger be allowed to subvert his plans and mount legal arguments C and D instead?
On a tangentially related note: Why did M Ravi make his application for a stay to the Court of Appeal directly, rather than the High Court?
I haven’t seen a copy of the court papers, but I think the explanation is as follows. It seems that the Court of Appeal, having held that it has an inherent power to re-open a concluded appeal, also implicitly held that this power includes the power to stay the execution of a sentence which had been passed at the conclusion of that appeal. These powers are possessed by the Court of Appeal, not the High Court, and are an offshoot of the Court of Appeal’s “full power to determine any question necessary to be determined for the purpose of doing justice”: s 29A(4) of the SCJA, discussed in Koh Zhan Quan Tony v PP [2006] 2 SLR(R) 830 (CA) [18] and Koh Jabing v PP [2016] 3 SLR 135 (CA) [12] and [17]. One would therefore think that one can only ask the Court of Appeal, and not the High Court, to exercise these powers.
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