In class, we discussed the need to apply for (and obtain) leave of the court before one can apply for judicial review. The purpose of the leave stage is to serve as a filter mechanism to filter out certain types of cases on grounds relating to matters such as: the nature of the subject-matter of the claim; who the applicant is; the applicant’s motives; the strength of the applicant’s case. Let us call these the ‘filter criteria’.
There are two ways in which the law can apply a filter.
The first is to require the applicant to show that he meets the filter criteria before he can commence a legal proceeding. This is how judicial review works: the applicant must obtain leave before he can apply for a prerogative order. And the burden of proof is on the applicant to show that he meets the filter criteria.
The second is to let the applicant commence legal proceedings first, but then the respondent may get the court to throw the claim out if the respondent can show that the applicant does not meet the filter criteria. This is how an ordinary suit works. If I sue you for breach of contract, the matter goes to trial unless you successfully ask the court to strike out my claim (under Order 18, rule 19 of the Rules of Court). You can ask the court to strike out my claim on grounds such as that it is clearly factually or legally unsustainable; “scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”; or “otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court”.
Some of you asked whether having a filter makes it easier or harder to apply for judicial review, or neither easier nor harder. A number of you criticised the first type of filter as it is applied in Singapore: for example, the law on standing is unclear. One of you went further and suggested that these criticisms may be addressed if we can move to the second type of filter. I write to respond to these views with some preliminary thoughts, with the caveat that they have not yet been fully formed and I have yet to articulate them in a precise manner.
First, consider the case in which the filter requirements are a subset of what the applicant must show to succeed in the substantive application. In that case:
- The second type of filter is harder on the respondent than the first type of filter if the applicant’s case is unmeritorious: it is the respondent who must bear the burden of proof, not to mention the expense, of applying to strike out the claim. But that doesn’t make the applicant’s task any easier: the applicant still has to prove that his claim is made out, otherwise he will lose. In other words, the second type of filter can disadvantage the respondent (if the applicant’s claim is unmeritorious); it neither advantages nor disadvantages the applicant.
- The first type of filter makes the respondent’s task easier than if there were no filter, if the applicant’s case is unmeritorious. This is because the respondent has to put in less effort resisting an application for leave, compared to resisting the principal application. In other words, the first type of filter can advantage the respondent (if the applicant’s claim is unmeritorious); it neither advantages nor disadvantages the respondent.
All that would be so if, as I have said, the filter requirements are a subset of what the applicant has to prove to succeed in the principal application. For example, imagine that the only filter requirement were that there was a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion that the applicant would succeed in the principal application. With the first type of filter, the arguments used by the applicant to obtain leave would be the exact same arguments used by the applicant at the substantive stage. With the second type of filter, the arguments used by the applicant to resist a striking-out application would be the exact same arguments used by the applicant at the substantive stage.
But matters become trickier when what the applicant has to prove to obtain leave is something additional to, rather than a subset of, what the applicant has to prove at the substantive stage. For example, under Singapore law, the applicant must prove that he has standing. As one of you pointed out, it is, in theory, possible for one or more grounds of review to be made out, and yet the applicant fails for want of standing. So the leave stage makes things harder for the applicant by requiring the applicant to go through the effort of advancing not only the type of legal argument that he would have to advance at the substantive stage, but also another type of legal argument (viz. arguments on standing).
Now, let us suppose that we have criticisms of the filter requirements. Of course, the law could address our criticisms by continuing to use the first type of filter, but by reforming the filter requirements. But could the law address our criticisms by moving from the first type of filter to the second? Not necessarily. It would, in principle, be possible for the law to change to using the second type of filter, but keep the same filter requirements. That would not address our criticisms of the filter requirements.
In more concrete terms: Suppose that we say that the law on standing is problematic. One may say that, as a solution, instead of requiring the applicant to apply for leave before making the principal application for judicial review, the applicant can simply make the principal application but the respondent can apply to have it struck out. But this will not necessarily solve the problems of the law on standing. It depends on the grounds of striking out. For example, if the law on striking out is that the respondent may apply to have the claim struck out if the applicant has no standing, then the problematic law on standing will remain. Sure, a different person will bear the burden of proof. But the content of the law on standing would be no less open to criticism than is the present law on standing.
Therefore, if changing from the first type of filter to the second is to simplify the law, what will really be responsible for the simplification is not the change in the type of filter, but rather the change in the filter requirements. It does not follow from a change in the type of filter that the filter requirements will therefore change.
To put it more concretely: Whatever criticisms we have of the law on what one must show to obtain leave to apply for judicial review, those criticisms would not necessarily be addressed by abolishing the leave requirement and replacing it with the possibility of the court striking out the claim at the instance of the respondent. Such criticisms would be criticisms of what the filter requirements are. The type of filter is a completely separate matter. A change in the latter does not necessitate a change in the former. Therefore, it is possible, and may be desirable, to change the former without changing the latter.
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