Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Feedback on a student presentation about Sentences for Enhanced Public Protection

It is true that – as both teams pointed out – it is the court, not the executive, who gets to decide whether someone is to be sentenced to SEPP. But once it has, it is the executive who gets to decide when they are released.

If a person is sentenced to life imprisonment, and has served 20 years of the sentence, then the Minister must consider whether a “remission order” – essentially, parole – is to be made. (I’m not sure whether the basis for this is, as the Thursday group said, only good behaviour in prison: I’d like to think that the risk to the public is also a relevant factor. In fact, I would go so far as to say that behaviour in prison is relevant only as an indicator of risk to the public if released.) If a remission order is not made, the Minister must re-consider at least once every year after that. (See section 50P of the Prisons Act 1933.) What’s the difference between this and SEPPs? The differences, it appears to me, are:

  • If someone who has been sentenced to life imprisonment is released under a remission order, the only condition is that they must not be convicted of a criminal offence and sentenced to, essentially, anything other than just a fine (section 50S). By contrast, a person serving an SEPP may, when released on licence, be subject to more conditions, such as attending counselling or other activities, mandatory drug testing, curfews, electronic tagging, etc. (section 50ZI).
  • If someone has been sentenced to life imprisonment is released under a remission order, but they breach the condition (by committing the offence), it is up to the court to decide on the consequence – namely, whether to impose an “enhanced sentence”, which may or may not be jail for life (s 50T). By contrast, under the SEPP system, it is up to the Commissioner of Prisons, who has two options:
    • First, the Commissioner may recall the person to prison (s 50ZK). This is only for up to 14 days (but the Commissioner can recall the person earlier for the purpose of investigating – typically, I suppose, when the person is suspected of having committed an offence while in prison – and this investigation period doesn’t count toward the 14 days). (I don’t know whether this option was available in the UK.)
    • Second, the Commissioner may report the matter to the Minister, who may decide to revoke the release order – which means that the person will be locked up indefinitely (s 50ZL).
  • Under the SEPP system, the Minister may release the person unconditionally (s 50ZG(7)). By contrast, it appears to me that there is no such option for people who have been sentenced to life imprisonment but who have been released under a remission order.

As I mentioned to [one team of students]: when comparing two people’s sentences, it is necessary to avoid comparing apples and pears. [The team compared one case where someone was sentenced to indefinite imprisonment of at least 8 years, with another where someone has served 20 years of an indefinite prison sentence.] But the comparison is not between 8 years and 20 years. It is between [8 years to infinity] and [4 years to infinity], and not between [8 years] and [20 years].

A similar point: it is not enough to argue that the SEPP system will not suffer from the same delays as the IPP system in the UK because Singapore’s courts are more efficient than the UK’s Parole Board. The comparison should be between (a) the UK’s courts and Singapore’s courts; or (b) the UK’s Parole Board and Singapore’s Minister for Home Affairs plus Detention Review Board.

Were the problems with the IPP system in the UK mainly because of certain features of the system, or more because of how certain actors behaved? Take, for example, the phenomenon that courts in the UK were too trigger-happy when it came to imposing IPPs. Would you criticise the law in the UK for making it too easy for the court to do so? Or would you criticise the courts for being too keen to do so (when they could have chosen not to)? Or both?

I wonder: When considering whether to release someone, should the Minister start with the presumption that the person is to be released unless he thinks there is reason not to (e.g. evidence that the person has not been rehabilitated)? Or should the starting point be that the person will not be released, unless the Minister thinks there is a positive reason to do so (e.g. evidence that the person has been rehabilitated)?

It would have been good if both teams had considered the differences between the Parole Board in the UK, and the Minister for Home Affairs in Singapore. The latter will take into account the views of the Detention Review Board, but is not bound to follow them.

How will the risk of re-offending be assessed? [One team of students] rightly pointed out problems with certain methods of assessment, especially machine learning-based ones. I’d just like to remind everybody that there has been no public statement on whether such systems are or should be used. I don’t know if COMPAS is used in Singapore; for a view of what is used, see this article.

It may be true that the Minister may naturally have the incentive to err on the side of caution and keep SEPP prisoners locked up for the sake of protecting the public. But that comes at a cost, and the Minister also has the incentive to reduce costs.

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