Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Executive involvement in sentencing: life imprisonment with the possibility of parole

[This post isn’t about Sentences for Enhanced Public Protection.]

Consider the treatment of offenders aged below 18 who commit offences which would otherwise attract the death penalty. In the past, such offenders would be sentenced to detention at the President’s pleasure. Now, such offenders must be sentenced to life imprisonment: Criminal Procedure Code 2010, s 314. But the effect is not very different. This is because ss 50O-50P of the Prisons Act 1933 provide that after a person has served 20 years of a sentence of life imprisonment, the Minister must review his/her case and consider ordering that he/she be released (subject to the conditions set out in s 50S, a breach of which will attract the consequences set out in s 50T); if the Minister refuses, he must review the case again the following year. Is this a breach of the separation of powers?

To answer that question, it would be useful to consider the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in V v United Kingdom (1999) 30 EHRR 121. In that case, Venables argued that the very system of detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure, to the extent that the duration of detention was determined by a minister, was a breach of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 6(1) states, among other things, that in the “determination… of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. The ECtHR held that the task of fixing the ‘tariff’ portion of a sentence of imprisonment during Her Majesty’s pleasure was a “sentencing exercise”, and is therefore part of the process of the “determination… of [a] criminal charge”. The minister was not an “independent an impartial tribunal” as he was “not independent of the executive”. Therefore, Article 6(1) was breached.

R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 AC 837 (UKHL) concerned legislation similar to Singapore’s system of what one may call life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. (The term “parole” isn’t used in Singapore.) The difference was that, instead of a fixed 20-year tariff, it was up to the Minister to decide the tariff period. Again, the House of Lords held that Article 6(1) was breached, for the same reasons applied by the ECtHR in V.

Then, in Director of Public Prosecutions of Jamaica v Mollison [2003] 2 AC 411, the Privy Council, following Hinds, held that legislation similar to that in Venables was unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers: it was “incompatib[le] with the constitutional principle that judicial functions (such as sentencing) must be exercised by the judiciary and not by the executive” (at [13]).

To the best of my knowledge, nobody in Singapore has sought to challenge the constitutionality of ss 50O-50P of the Prisons Act, or any other legislation providing for similar executive involvement in the process of determining the length of someone’s sentence of imprisonment. (The legislation challenged in Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu is quite different.)

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