Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Hearings by licensing authorities, etc.: inherently biased?

(In what follows, references to various textbooks are references to the latest editions available in the Course Reserves section of the SMU law library as of March 2022.)

There are many situations in which you asks a public body for something — say, a licence. The public body has a duty to hear you. But, some of you asked, wouldn’t that make the public body a judge in its own cause? Shouldn’t there be three persons — the applicant, someone to present arguments against the granting of the licence, and a judge to hear both and decide? Why are there so many situations in which there are only two persons involved — the applicant and the public body? I will call these two possible models of decision-making system, for short, the ‘three-body’ and ‘two-body’ model respectively.

I have borrowed this language from Timothy Endicott (at 175). He notes: “Many public authorities, unlike courts and tribunals, do not hear a dispute between parties, but hear responses to their own (tentative, or even concluded) decisions or policies or plans. So they are already involved in the issues, rather than serving as a neutral third party resolving a dispute between two sides.” 

The easiest answer is: even if the public body is a judge in its own cause, the necessity principle demands that that be tolerated. But we can go deeper.

Endicott, like other authors of textbooks, does not take the view that the ‘two-body’ model is intrinsically unfair. After all, the role of the public body is not to oppose the applicant, but rather to decide impartially in the public interest. Therefore, for example, a licensing authority should be thought of more like a judge than like state counsel. (The analogy is not perfect, but the main point still stands: the public body should not be thought of as playing an adversarial role vis-a-vis the applicant”.) For more on this, please see B Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd v Minister of Health [1947] 2 All ER 395 at 399 (cited in Alconbury at [47]).

One may draw a further analogy with a judge’s power to summarily punish for contempt committed in the face of the court. In Wilkinson v Lord Chancellor’s Department [2003] EWCA Civ 95 (cited by Endicott at 183), Wilkinson used “foul and abusive language” and committed acts of physical violence in court; the judge assigned counsel to him, then tried him for contempt in the face of the court and sentenced him to imprisonment. (In Singapore, the court can do this under section 25 of the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016.) On appeal, Wilkinson argued that she should have been tried for the contempt by another judge, not the same judge. The Court of Appeal pointed out that “the power to impose summary punishment for actions which one has oneself witnessed and is oneself the victim does appear to place the judge in the position of being witness, prosecutor and judge” (at [24]). However, the Court of Appeal disagreed that the matter had to have been heard by another judge: “strictly speaking the procedure does not offend against the rule of natural justice, nemo iudex in sua causa (no-one shall be judge in his own case), since the prosecution is not aimed at protecting the judge personally but protecting the administration of justice” (at [25], citing Borrie and Lowe’s The Law of Contempt, 3rd ed (1996) at 522). Therefore, the mere fact that the same judge conducted the summary trial for contempt did not mean that there was apparent bias. (Nor did it render the judge other than “impartial” within the meaning of Art 6(1) of the ECHR.)

There is another case that agrees, though it makes the point slightly differently. In R (Alconbury Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] 2 AC 295 (UKHL), various businesses applied to certain local authorities for planning permission to build certain facilities. The local authorities dismissed the applications. The law was that they had the right to appeal to the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions. The businesses argued that this system was incompatible with Article 6(1) of the ECHR, which provides: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” They argued that the Secretary of State was not “independent and impartial”, because he “lays down policy and directs what he or the department considers to be the most efficient and effective use of land in what he sees to be the public interest”, and would make decisions, not impartially, but instead in line with these views (at [24]).

The House of Lords unanimously rejected this argument. For present purposes, I would call your attention to [48], where Lord Slynn said: “it is not right to say that a policy maker cannot be a decision maker or that the final decision maker cannot be a democratically elected person or body”. Lord Hoffmann agreed for reasons that I will not set out here because they repay reading in full: see [69]-[76], and, if you’re interested, the rest of his judgment. 

The conclusion was that there was no violation of Article 6(1) because, to the extent that the Minister was not “independent and impartial”, the system as a whole was because one could apply for judicial review of the Minister’s decision. 

That is not to say that, under the ‘two-body’ model, the rules of procedural fairness cease to exist, even as regards first-instance decision-makers. Cooper v Wandsworth has clearly put paid to that idea; and in Wilkinson, the court did apply the test for apparent bias. Rather, the point is this: the principles from the cases on procedural fairness — most of which arise in the context of a ‘three-party’ decision-making system, such as a court — must be applied with certain modifications to suit them to the ‘two-party’ model. What a fair hearing requires under one model may be different from what a fair hearing requires under the other. 

Besides Endicott, others make this point. Peter Cane, for example, says (at 75) of the task of fact-finding: “the rules of procedure… will be different according to whether an adversarial or a non-adversarial mode of discovering the truth is adopted”; for example, “under an inquisitorial system, the decision-maker’s input is much greater”. The relevance to administrative law is this: “in many administrative contexts, there are only two parties: an applicant (for a benefit or a licence, for instance) and a decision-maker. In that context, certain procedural steps (such as cross-examination of witnesses) might simply be inapplicable. More generally, investigation by the decision-maker may seem more appropriate and less problematic in two-party than in three-party situations…” 

Paul Craig agrees (at 382), and adds: “We should…. be prepared to think more broadly about what procedural protection connotes. Procedures developed against a backdrop of adjudication may well be the most appropriate in certain areas. They may not, however, be equally suited to all the institutions that comprise administrative law.”

Sorry, I don’t have a conclusion, just as the authors of the textbooks appear not to have one.

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