To my mind, there are at least three possible ways to think of what happened in Tan Gek Neo Jessie:
- The Registrar of Businesses had failed to take into account the mandatory relevant consideration of whether her decision will conflict with the law on trade marks and passing off.
- The Registrar of Businesses had failed to take into account the following mandatory relevant considerations:
- Whether Jessie Tan had used the name “JC Penney” as a trade mark;
- Whether the other business (the American company) had used “JC Penney” as a trade mark in Singapore;
- Whether the American company had any reputation in Singapore.
- The Registrar of Businesses had failed to take into account the mandatory relevant consideration of whether the public would actually be misled by Jessie Tan’s business’s name.
Tan Gek Neo Jessie remains useful to us insofar as it demonstrates certain legal principles relevant to the study of administrative law. However, the correctness of certain aspects of the decision on the facts may be doubted, for reasons that you might find interesting if you are interested in the law of trade marks.
In Jessie Tan, the High Court said that there was no evidence to support the Registrar’s conclusion that Jessie Tan had the “ulterior motive of riding on the reputation” of the American company because the American company did not carry on any business in Singapore. But the High Court took a different approach in R H Macy & Co Inc v Trade Accents [1991] 2 SLR(R) 98 (HC) (cited in Robert G Howell with Khaw Lake Tee, ‘Parallel Importation of Wares and Reputation Spillover: Examples of Transnationalization of Law’, ch 2 in Douglas M Johnston and Gerry Ferguson (eds), Asia-Pacific Legal Development (UBC Press, 1998), at 115-116).
The applicant in R H Macy was an American company which operated a chain of department stores named “Macy’s”. There was a Singaporean sole proprietor who had registered “Macy’s” as a trade mark in Singapore. The Trade Marks Act allowed someone in the applicant’s position to apply to the court to expunge the respondent’s trade mark from the register of trade marks on the ground that it is “likely to deceive or cause confusion”. (This is similar to s 22(1)(d) of the present Trade Marks Act 1998, which allows a person to apply for a trade mark to be revoked on the ground that it is “liable to mislead the public” because of how it is used.) The High Court allowed the American company’s application. This was despite the fact that the American company did not conduct any business in Singapore.
The High Court distinguished Jessie Tan, saying that the crux of that case was that “the Registrar acted on hearsay, exaggerated allegations and inferences not founded on facts” (at [39]). In my respectful view, I do not think that Jessie Tan can be so easily distinguished. That case stated quite clearly that the proprietor of the “JC Penney” and “Penneys” trade marks “could not maintain an action against [Tan] for ingringement of trade marks” (at [19]).
That said, that does not necessarily mean that the ultimate conclusion in Jessie Tan was wrong. After all, the statute in that case allowed a business to be told to change its name if the name was “calculated to mislead”; that is a different test from “likely to deceive or cause confusion”. That said, it appears that the High Court was not correct to say that “to direct the applicant to change her business name on the basis that it so nearly resembles the name of the proprietor of [the] two trade marks, in effect, gives to the proprietor more than what the laws on infringement of trade marks and passing off would provide” (at [19]).
See also Jet Aviation (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Jet Maintenance Pte Ltd [1998] 1 SLR(R) 713 (HC). In that case, the plaintiff sued the defendant for the tort of passing off. To succeed, the plaintiff would have to show that it had goodwill in Singapore. It could not, so it failed. However, the High Court did remark that, in principle, one can acquire goodwill in Singapore even if one does not carry on business in Singapore (at [38]-[42]).
(Sorry, I am not presently qualified to comment on the state of the law in this area other than as it is set out in the cases described above.)
The phrase “calculated to mislead”
In addition, I wish to clarify that the phrase “calculated to mislead” does not necessarily mean that there must have been an intention to mislead; I’m sorry if I suggested that it does. Here, “calculated to mislead” cannot simply refer to one’s intention. We can see this from the wording of the former Business Registration Act 1973, s 11 (which was the statutory provision applied in Tan Gek Neo Jessie). That provision allows the Registrar of Businesses to, in effect, order a business to change its name if the old name “so nearly resembles the name of any corporation or the name under which another person carries on business as to be calculated to mislead”. This suggests that “calculated to mislead” does not refer only to one’s intention, but is instead an objective test of similarity. (If it were only a matter of intention, the words “so nearly resembles…” would not be there, for one can intend to mislead through the name of a business even if the name does not resemble another’s.) We see the phrase “calculated to mislead” being used to refer to an objective test in Caterpillar Inc v Ong Eng Peng [2006] 2 SLR(R) 669 (HC) [17]. In other words, “calculated to mislead” appears to me to mean something more like “bearing features that tend to mislead” or “bearing features that would lead a reasonable person to infer that there was an intention to mislead”.
Anyway, the phrase “calculated to mislead” is not part of the Business Names Registration Act 2014 (which replaced the Business Registration Act 1973). Now, we have s 17(4)(d), which allows the Registrar to order a change of name if one’s business name “so nearly resembles the name of any corporation or limited partnership, or any registered business name, as to be likely to be mistaken for it”. If you ask me, the wording is much clearer now.
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