What is the use of studying prescriptive theories? After all, if someone in power is set in his/her ways, there is no point trying to change their minds by reference to a theory of what he/she should do. In such a situation, we should instead focus our energies on what he/she does do, so that we can predict how he/she will act and plan our lives accordingly.
The answer, I think, begins with the fact that that person appears to be set in his/her ways. Why would we think so? Take, for example, the case of SGB Starkstrom, in which the Court of Appeal expressed scepticism about the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations because it might “require the courts to review the substantive merits of executive action as opposed to questions of process and of legality and jurisdiction” [61(a)] (emphasis in original). Now, the court was not saying that the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations cannot be recognised. To the contrary, it said that it can be recognised if we overcome the merits/legality problem. Far from being set in its ways, one can say that the court was inviting proposals to embrace the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations in a way that responds to the merits/legality problem.
Given the decision in SGB Starkstrom, how should we act if our client wishes to claim that he/she has suffered the breach of a substantive legitimate expectation?
- We could tell our client to give up and abandon the claim. That is not in and of itself wrong: there are sometimes cases where the best advice a lawyer can give is to give up. But if giving up were the default option, the law would stagnate, and lawyers would risk becoming useless.
- We could attempt to reframe the claim in language that avoids that of legitimate expectations. This is slightly more useful advice. But there is always the risk that the court would accuse us of trying to mount a legitimate expectation-based claim by the back door. But this does not mean that we should give up. For, as we have seen, the courts are not opposed to the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations; they are willing to embrace the doctrine if we surmount certain theoretical difficulties. Therefore, in response, we need to adopt one of the following two strategies.
- We could explain to the court why what we are asking it to do does not, in fact, risk taking the courts into ‘reviewing’ the merits of the executive’s decision. And this is where the theory comes in. We will need to explain to the court what exactly a legitimate expectation-based claim entails, and to show the court how we can reconcile our claim with the court’s concerns by presenting to the court a framework which can accommodate our claim while avoiding the problems that the court foresees.
- We could attempt to persuade the court why it is actually OK for the courts to ‘review’ the merits of the executive’s decision. Again, we will need to tap on theory to explain why.
Prescriptive theories can change minds. Consider, for example, the case of Khawaja [1984] 1 AC 74 (UKHL). In Zamir [1980] AC 930 (UKHL), the House of Lords held that it is for an immigration officer, acting in his/her discretion, to determine whether a person is an “illegal entrant”. In Khawaja, the House of Lords changed its mind, holding that whether a person is an “illegal entrant” is a question of precedent fact, on which the courts must have the last word. We are told at 125G that what changed the court’s mind was “the fuller argument [it had] heard in these appeals”. What argument? Not just practical arguments attempting to distinguish Zamir (at, e.g., 84D), but also theoretical arguments based on the importance of fundamental liberties (at 84H and 85A; see the court’s response at 97H, 101A, 105E, 111F, etc.).
Often a person who is, at first glance, hard-hearted and unwilling to change his/her mind is not so, but rather troubled by what he/she perceives as one or two key obstacles. If we use theory to explain how those obstacles can be circumvented or removed, or why they are not truly obstacles, we can pave the way for the securing of a practical outcome.
Of course, such arguments may fail. But one should at least try. If one genuinely thinks the status quo to be iniquitous, one should do what is in one’s power, lawful, and ethical to attempt to change it. The attempt must then (a) fail and expose the iniquities of the status quo for the world to see; (b) fail, but explain why the status quo is not so iniquitous after all; (c) succeed. None of these can be said to be a fruitless outcome. What would be fruitless is giving up easily.
Of course, theory is not an end-point. Consider, again, Khawaja. Lord Scarman said at 111F: “If Parliament intends to exclude effective judicial review of the exercise of a power in restraint of liberty, it must make its meaning crystal clear.” In other words, Parliament could reverse the ratio of that case by legislation. But this would, in turn, begin the cycle anew. How would the courts respond – for instance, by holding that Parliament’s new legislation is not “crystal clear enough? by inventing some new ground of judicial review? Again, theory would have a role to play in assisting the courts in deciding on that novel issue.
What is the use of studying descriptive theories? After all, such theories attempt to model reality. But why model reality, when we can study reality itself? Why not content ourselves with reading the cases to see what the courts do? Take, for example, the problem of constitutional interpretation. There are lots of theories on how to go about constitutional interpretation, and no one seems to be the dominant one.
That argument would be correct if our job, in studying reality, were merely to describe it. But we are more than describers; we are critical thinkers and evaluators. If reality is out of step with what theory, there are two possibilities. First, the theory purports to be a descriptive theory, but is wrong. Second, the theory is a prescriptive theory, and what is done in reality is wrong. Theory is either a useful yardstick, or a useful guide to understanding.
Or both, for, as we have seen, a theory is not necessarily purely descriptive or purely prescriptive. If a series of acts shows such consistency that it may be boiled down to a pattern, then we may be – and ought to be – suspicious when practice begins to deviate from that pattern; and thus what begins as descriptive may become prescriptive. If practice deviates from a prescriptive model and purports to provide a good reason why, we ought to wonder whether we ought to stop condemning what is done in practice for failing to accord with the logic of our theory and instead ask whether what is done in practice has its own internal logic – which may, in turn, form the basis of a new descriptive model which explains why our old prescriptive model is deficient.
A student asked: But do courts paper over theory with a mere appeal to ‘deference’ to other branches of the state? My answer:
The courts rightly do not treat ‘deference’ as an excuse for forsaking doctrinal coherence. For the courts to consider otherwise would be to abandon the very enterprise of law itself.
It is true that courts are generally unwilling to engage in extensive discussion of issues which are not required to be resolved in order to address the concrete case at hand. However, the courts address the case at hand in accordance with law, which in turn calls for sound legal principle. Therefore, the courts often should, and do, go far in laying down a sound legal framework which reaches further than is required to dispose of the case before it. If the common law did not do this, it would be nothing more than thinly veiled palm-tree justice. To the extent that theorists have a role in assisting the court in determining whether a legal framework is sound, the courts do not shy away from taking into account the views of theorists, nor from appealing to arguments from theoretical coherence to develop the law.
We see this in, for example, Ochroid, in which the court laid down a comprehensive set of rules on illegality in contract law including common-law illegality, despite the fact that the facts of the case involved only statutory illegality and not common-law illegality. This, in turn, called for a survey of various academic articles, culminating in the court’s accepting Birks’s ‘non-stultification’ theory (at [145]ff). The court was unwilling to stop at saying that it would defer to the Legislature’s power to make laws regulating contracts, even at the expense of freedom of contract. If the court had done so, it would have, in one sense, performed its duty of disposing of the case before it, but neglected its duty to see to it that the law is developed in a coherent manner.
Tan Seet Eng itself is another useful case study. The court did not need to say anything about irrationality to dispose of the case; yet the court did, drawing on academic writers’ explanation of the difference between illegality and irrationality. The court did this in order to ensure that the law it laid down was sound. The court was certainly not willing to invoke an abstract notion of ‘deference’ to sweep away any need for nuance and doctrinal coherence in the development of the law. To the contrary, the very idea of ‘deference’ which the court espoused was informed by a discussion of why ‘deference’ takes place at all, and hence how it should: see [90]ff.
One might, in response, point to instances such as the Court of Appeal’s discussion of the Hart-Devlin debate in Lim Meng Suang at [162]ff, which concluded at [169] that “there are no clear answers” to the debate and the debate raises “issues that lie quintessentially within the sphere of the Legislature“. But this, too, was itself based on a theory of the proper role of the legislature (at [77]ff).
Of course, the details of the framework created by a court may not be fully formed at the time the framework is laid down. In Ochroid, the Court of Appeal explicitly left open the question of whether the ‘non-stultification’ principle ought to explain areas of law other than unjust enrichment (at [161]-[168]). In Tan Seet Eng, the Court of Appeal deliberately avoided answering various “difficult questions” relating to irrationality (at [149]). But what is clear is that the courts created frameworks into which the answers to such questions may be situated. The courts have never taken the unwillingness to rule on hypothetical issues to the extent of always saying nothing more than is necessary to dispose of the case before it. Moreover, the courts have never sought to justify such a view in the name of “deference”.
This must be so, because the courts are fully aware that a common-law legal system (if not any legal system) must value consistency, which calls for principle, which, by definition, is something (a) of greater application than in any one particular case; (b) justifiable by reference to something greater than any one particular case. One might retort with the observation (and it can only be an observation, not a rule) that hard cases (sometimes) make bad law. But for the courts to shy away from the need for doctrinal consistency/theoretical defensibility is even worse: it would mean that hard cases make no law at all.
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