Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd [2018] UKSC 49 involved a situation where Ashers Bakery had refused to make a cake for Lee with the words “support gay marriage” on it. The UK Supreme Court held that this was sexual orientation discrimination by Ashers: “the objection was to the message and not to any particular person or persons” (at [34]), and so Ashers’ treatment of Lee was not “on the ground of” sexual orientation (as the relevant discrimination legislation required).
There was legislation (known as “FETO”) that prohibited a provider of goods from refusing to provide goods to someone due to, among other things, “discrimination on the ground of… political opinion”. According to the UKSC, FETO could not be interpreted as compelling the supplier of goods to speak, because that would violate:
- (a) the provider’s “freedom of thought, conscience and religion” by “obliging a person to manifest a belief which he does not hold” (at [50]);
- (b) the provider’s “freedom of expression”, by compelling speech.
In class, [a student] said of the bakery: “You’re baking the cake, but it isn’t your cake.” The UK Supreme Court disagreed: “what matters is that by being required to produce the cake they were being required to express a message with which they deeply disagreed” (at [54]). The UKSC appears to have thought that compelled speech is impermissible if you would be compelled to speak, even if the message wasn’t ultimately associated with you or even if you would not be “thought by others to support the message” (at [54]). This is different from the Singapore Court of Appeal’s reading of the doctrine of compelled speech in The Online Citizen, according to which, even if you are made to say A, that isn’t “compelled speech” if you are at liberty to say not-A.
With respect, the Singapore court’s reading of Lee v Ashers Bakery is not entirely correct. According to the SGCA: “if Ashers Bakery had been required to provide the cake decorated with the pro-gay marriage caption, it would have had to advance a message with which it profoundly disagreed, and it did not have the option of expressing its disagreement with that message in the same medium (namely, on the cake)” (at [76]). But the UKSC simply did not say that.
So, in my view, the SGCA’s decision boils down to this: the SGCA distinguished the majority’s decision in Wooley v Maynard on the ground that it concerned a “right to freedom of belief”, which the Singapore Constitution does not mention (at [70]); and it distinguished Lee v Ashers on the grounds that it concerned the “freedom to hold opinions” (at [75], quoting Art 10 of the ECHR).
An interesting thought: Would Lee v Ashers be decided differently if, instead of “support gay marriage”, the order was for a cake that said “QueerSpace supports gay marriage” or “Lee supports gay marriage”? Then, I suppose it could be argued that Ashers wouldn’t be asked to “express a message with which they deeply disagreed”; they would merely be asked to state a fact. If I am right, then it is similarly unobjectionable to compel someone to state a message saying, in effect, ‘The Singapore Government says this is false.’
For further commentary, see this post on the UK Constitutional Law Blog by Jacob Rowbottom: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2018/10/16/jacob-rowbottom-cakes-gay-marriage-and-the-right-against-compelled-speech/
By the way, it is not true that the European Court of Human Rights ruled in favour of the bakery. It did not consider the case on its merits; it summarily held that the case was inadmissible because Lee had failed to exhaust his domestic remedies by raising arguments about the ECHR before the UK courts (Lee v UK, app no 18860/2019, 6 January 2022).
Leave a Reply