Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

‘Deference’ and ‘non-justiciability’

The concept of non-justiciability (as it has traditionally been understood in the UK) has apparently fallen into desuetude in Singapore, as Tan Seet Eng at [106] suggests. Recall also that, in Colin Chan, the Court of Appeal said that the proportionality of the decision was non-justiciable, but the rationality was not non-justiciable.

I am fortified in this view by comments by Menon CJ at the hearing of Nagaenthran last week [in January 2019]. When counsel for the AG described a certain manner as “non-justiciable”, Menon CJ retorted with something like ‘All that means is that we can review less intensively’. This being so, I believe that the concept of non-justiciability has collapsed into the concept of deference, and that the language of non-justiciability has nearly completely fallen out of favour. The Court of Appeal’s judgment in Nagaenthran, when handed down, will confirm whether I am right in saying so.

[I was. In Nagaenthran, the Court of Appeal said that the “merits of PP’s determination… is not one that is capable of being adjudicated upon by a court of law” (at [59]), then later it used the word “non-justiciable”. You may ask: does that mean that if something is not non-justiciable, the courts can consider its merits? In response, I would refer to Garreth Wong’s and Paul Craig’s distinction between the court considering the merits of a decision, and substituting its decision for the executive’s. I suppose that, when it comes to a “non-justiciable” matter, the court may be less competent to even consider the merits of a decision. This might mean, for example, that the standard of substantive review is lowered (i.e. easier for the executive), or even that substantive review is not possible at all.

But even before that case, consider Tan Seet Eng at [98(a)], where the court appears to have been using “justiciability” in a loose sense to refer to the degree of deference to be shown to the executive’s better access to expertise etc. In the chapeau of para [98], the court appears to have been talking about the need to distinguish carefully between a question which is non-justiciable in the strict sense and one that not.]

The traditional view of non-justiciability is, as you say, the court saying “we won’t touch this”.  But the courts came to ask: won’t touch what?  As Mark Elliott and Jason Varuhas put it in Administrative Law: Text and Materials (5th ed, 2017), at 123-124, there is a difference between a “subject-matter-based” and an “issue-based” conception of non-justiciability. An example of this may be seen in Colin Chan, where the Court of Appeal said that the proportionality of the ban on the publications was non-justiciable but the reasonableness was justiciable. To put it another way, in the words of Peter Cane, Leighton McDonald, and Kristen Rundle, in Principles of Administrative Law (3rd ed, 2018) at 65: the old “all-or-nothing approach to justiciability has largely broken down and… certain categories of decisions or issues may be held non-justiciable in relation to some grounds of review, but not others”. So non-justiciability has come to shade into deference.

But there is more to deference, as we can see from how that term came to be developed. In the UK, the expansion of non-justiciability has (roughly) coincided with the development of jurisprudence concerning the Human Rights Act 1998 in the UK, in which the word ‘deference’ was used as follows. The Human Rights Act 1998 calls on the UK courts to scrutinise legislation and executive action for compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. The courts are, in so doing, to apply a ground of review known as ‘proportionality’. On its face, proportionality allows the court to strike down executive action/declare legislation incompatible with the ECHR for reasons relating to the substantive merits of the executive action/legislation, namely, that the action/legislation does not pursue a legitimate aim and/or goes further than is necessary to achieve that aim. To mitigate this risk, the doctrine of deference is applied: even as the courts apply the potentially intrusive concept of proportionality, this potential is mitigated because proportionality is applied in a deferential manner.

This explains how the concept of ‘deference’ is even more flexible than the already-flexible version of non-justiciability. As we have seen, the flexible version of non-justiciability says that some grounds of review may be justiciable but others not. The concept of deference would appear to add even more nuance by, instead of saying that certain grounds of review are not possible, saying that they are possible but the way in which they can be implied can be in a more/less deferential manner.

In the UK, this applies in Human Rights Act 1998 cases when applying proportionality. How about Singapore? There is no case squarely addressing this issue yet. But an interesting potential example is discussed in Calvin Liang and Tham Lijing’s article, ‘Fair Play and Match Fixing’, in which the authors say that Tan Seet Eng has hinted at the possible expansion of error of fact as a ground of review in future, but also that it be applied in a manner deferential to the executive (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original in bold; emphasis added in underline):

“LJ: … The Minister’s justification for detention under the CLTPA (and also, the ISA) has two broad stages. The first stage is where the Minister assesses the evidence against the detainee, and comes to the conclusion that, for example, the detainee is involved in activities X, Y and Z. The second stage is where the Minister then sets out his grounds for ordering detention, which will invariably be based on the Minister’s initial assessment of the evidence (eg You have done X, Y, Z). 

 CL: Perhaps another way of looking at it is to see stage 1 as focusing on the substantive merits, and stage 2 as focusing on the formal grounds for detention.

 LJ: Yes, quite. The ratio of Tan Seet Eng focused on the second stage. On the facts, the Court of Appeal found that the formal grounds set out by the Minister did not satisfy the requirements for detention under the CLTPA. However, what I find interesting are some comments in Tan Seet Eng that suggest the Courts may judicially review not just the second stage, but also the first stage. Now that would be “groundbreaking”. Because it suggests that the Courts might have the power to review the truth of the allegations of fact found in the grounds of the detention (ie in your terminology, the substantive merits of the detention).

 These comments appear at least four times in Tan Seet Eng. The first is at para 54:

 It was not suggested to us that the foregoing analysis in Chng Suan Tze, including its acceptance of the position that Parliament could delegate fact-finding powers to some other branch than the Judiciary, was incorrect and we therefore do not examine this issue here (emphasis added).

 The second is at para 64:

Chng Suan Tze accepts that Parliament may decide to entrust the power and the responsibility to make a decision to a particular decision-maker. This may extend to decisions as to what the facts are, the application of those facts to the relevant rules or considerations, and any consequential exercise of discretion. As we have noted at [54] above, we have proceeded on the basis that this statement is correct since nothing to the contrary was put to us (emphasis added).

Again, at para 74:

The CLTPA vests a potentially draconian power in the Executive. “Public safety, peace and good order” can cover a wide spectrum of possible scenarios. As was pointed out in the course of the oral hearing, even relatively minor regulatory offences could in theory be said to go against public safety, peace and good order. It is true that Parliament has vested this power in the Minister and as we have already noted, we have proceeded on the basis that this is permissible; but as we have just observed, the exercise of the power can and will be scrutinised objectively based on the usual principles (emphasis added).

And finally, almost as if just in case the reader had missed it, at para 129:

 First, as we have mentioned earlier, and subject to the fact that the contrary was not argued before us, as we have noted at [54], [64] and [74] above, the Court is generally not to review the truth of the allegations of fact found in the grounds of detention.

So I wonder, what if the Appellant had argued that the Courts can and should, in certain circumstances, and subject to suitable “deference” to the executive, review the truth of allegations of fact found in the grounds of detention (ie stage 1)?

[…]

LJ: … should the Court of Appeal find, in a later case, that the Courts can judicially review the truth of allegations of fact, it can continue to accord due deference to the executive by, among other things, tempering the intensity of review and the burden of proof. Perhaps the Court of Appeal may adopt an approach similar to that used in the review of the exercise of Prosecutorial discretion. There are many unanswered questions at this stage.”

(By the way, this is an example of the sort of sharp observation that can only be made by reading cases carefully in full!)

Aileen Kavanagh also discusses case studies of deference in her article ‘Defending Deference in Public Law’. One that stands out to me is A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68 (UKHL), also known as the “Belmarsh Prison case”. In that case, shortly after the 9/11 terror attacks, the UK legislature introduced section 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which provided that foreigners who had been suspected of terrorism could be detained indefinitely in the UK in cases where they could not be deported. Besides incompatibility with various provisions of the ECHR, various judges in the House of Lords described this is “irrational”. This was despite the national security context. See https://youtu.be/PZtYENfNa7k?t=2772 (beginning at 46:14) for background; Baroness Hale (beginning at 48:39) explains this view. Note the use of the word “irrational” – irrationality is a recognised ground of judicial review in Singapore too. (And if anybody thinks that the case was decided the way it was because of something particular to the ECHR, I would suggest that a similar conclusion may well have been reached under the equality provision in Article 12(1) of Singapore’s Constitution – compare our Article 12(1) with invite them to compare Article 14 of the ECHR with Article 12(1) of Singapore’s Constitution.)

(By the way, on the topic of videos: you may be interested in having a look at the UK Supreme Court’s YouTube channel at https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCdkf93h71xVAl28v467Hk7w, which contains videos of judgments being handed down; and there are videos of hearings on the UK Supreme Court website: https://www.supremecourt.uk.)

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