In response to a student’s question about what the point is:
You are free to argue that a model is not useful for a particular purpose, and that there exists a more precise way in which to see things.
On the other hand, to quote (out of context) Spandeck v DSTA at [80], might it be that “[i]ts very presence suggests that it has some substantive content that is capable of being expressed in terms of legal principles”? Can we, “[r]ather than denouncing it as a mere ‘label’… strive to infuse some meaning into it, if only so that lawyers who advise litigants and even law teachers [students?] can make some sense of the judicial formulations”?
One might argue that this reasoning is problematic, in that it is premised on a bare appeal to history, and has the effect of entrenching any label that forms part of the status quo. But what this reasoning entrenches is only the label, not what the label applies to. Hence, in Spandeck, the Court of Appeal kept the label “proximity” but redefined its content from the ground up.
So I wonder: Even assuming that the content of the traffic-light model is completely flawed, might there be something useful in at least the outline of the model — the premise that there are, broadly speaking, two types of path that a system of administrative law can take? Might something in the analogy of traffic lights be useful, such as the idea that the purpose of a model is to give directions to someone?
What Spandeck did was to list several factors that tend toward/against the finding that X owes a duty of care to Y and group them all under a category called “proximity”. In so doing, what Spandeck added to the list of factors was the insight that, as they all deserve to be put in the same category, they all have something to do with each other. So the idea of “proximity” ends up not only encapsulating various legal principles, but also reminding us that it makes sense to group these legal principles together. Might the same be said of the various legal principles which, say, Chan CJ has grouped under the label “green light”?
Finally, here are some quotations from Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd ed, 2009) (internal citations omitted) — the book which first set out the ‘red light’ and ‘green light’ theories:
“… the breakdown — or perceived breakdown — of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility… brought cries of ‘elective dictatorship’. It is not surprising, therefore, to find many authors believing that the primary function of administrative law should be to control excesses of state power and, more precisely, subject to the rule of the law courts. Light-heartedly, we have called this conception of administrative law ‘red light theory’ because of its emphasis on control.” (23)
“In the period between the two world wars an alternative tradition grew up, which we have called ‘green light theory’. In using this metaphor, we do not wish to suggest that green light theorists favour unrestricted or arbitrary action by the state; what one person sees as control of arbitrary power may — as Carr suggested — be experienced by another as a brake on progress. But while red light theory… favours strong judicial control of executive power, green light theory sees in administrative law a vehicle for political progress and welcomes the ‘administrative state’. In saying this, we must remember that both red and green light theories originated in earlier eras and try to understand their historical context. Both were, as Taggart reminds us: ‘forged on the anvil of the emerging welfare state…’” (31)
“Because they look in at administration from outside, lawyers traditionally emphasise external control through adjudication. To the lawyer, law is the policeman; it operates as an external control, oft en retrospectively. But a main concern of many green light writers was, as already suggested, to minimise the influence of courts: courts, with their legalistic values, were seen as obstacles to progress, and the control that they exercise as unrepresentative and undemocratic.” (37)
“Red light theory prioritises courts; green light theory prefers democratic or political forms of accountability.” (38)
“Discussing red light theories, we talked of ‘control’ through courts. We did not stop to unpack the word. Control can be symbolic or real; it can mean to check, restrain or govern. Griffith and Street clearly sensed latent ambiguities, remarking that ‘A great deal turns on the meaning which is attached to the word “controls”. Banks control a river; a driver controls his car. The influence of a parent over a child may be greater than the power of a prison guard over a convict.’ Here the ‘controls’ are direct and internal rather than indirect and external. To extend our metaphors, however, a river bank may be inspected by an officer of the water board… to see that it is in good repair; a policeman may stop the driver and caution him for speeding; a health visitor may advise the child’s parents to exert a different kind of influence; and the prison guard may be questioned by the board of visitors. These are all external controls, but they are not judicial.” (39)
Do these quotations (which I have selected in the hope that they capture the gist of what Harlow and Rawlings were saying) set out a more useful distinction than what the red/green distinction has become in Singapore?
Should a court take a different approach to the review of executive power depending on the existence and effectiveness of alternative means of control?
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