No, only a substantive legitimate expectation.
Some students have been confused by the statement at [114] that “there ought to be no difference in principle between procedural and substantive legitimate expectations”, read in isolation. But:
- When the court said “there ought to be no difference in principle between procedural and substantive legitimate expectations” at [114], that was immediately preceded by reasoning from “first principles” about whether legitimate expectations generally should be protected (at [111]-[113]). So it appears that “there ought to be no difference” means that, if one is to be protected, then so is the other, because there is no difference in the reasons for protection – not necessarily that the test is the same.
- True, the court then went on at [115] to cite the part of Mount Sinai that said that “in some cases it is difficult to distinguish the procedural from the substantive”. This was taken from Binnie J’s judgment in Mount Sinai at [35] (https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1879/index.do). But in that case, Binnie J went on to say at [36]-[37] that there can still be a “principled basis” for distinguishing between the two; and at [38] that substantive relief is not available in such cases under Canadian law. In other words, the point was not that it’s difficult to distinguish between procedural and substantive legitimate expectations so we should give up trying to distinguish, but rather that it’s difficult to distinguish so we should be careful to distinguish in a principled manner.
- Finally, when laying down the test at [119], the court said: “… and substantive relief should be granted under the doctrine subject to certain safeguards…” — so the test was meant to apply only to substantive legitimate expectations.
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