Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Would the traditional grounds of judicial review have succeeded in R (Patel) v General Medical Council [2013] 1 WLR 2801?

A student asked about whether, in Patel, the applicant could have succeeded on traditional grounds of judicial review without reference to the concept of legitimate expectations. My response:

In Patel, the court said that the policy was not irrational. The court also said that the application of the policy to Patel was unlawful (or, more precisely, the decision to implement the policy with immediate effect without any transitional framework was unlawful). But it did not explicitly say that the reason for this unlawfulness was irrationality. If anything, it said that a problem was that the General Medical Council had not taken into consideration the (mandatory) relevant consideration of the impact of the policy change on people like Patel: at [81].

(Yes, the court used the phrase “Wednesbury grounds”, but it appears that the court was using the word “Wednesbury” as an umbrella term to refer to all the grounds of review mentioned in the Wednesbury case. This is not the same as Wednesbury unreasonableness, i.e. irrationality as a concept distinct from failure to take into account mandatory relevant considerations.)

It is true that failure to take into account a mandatory relevant consideration was a well-established ground of judicial review even before the courts expressly articulated the concept of substantive legitimate expectations. But it is thanks to the concept of substantive legitimate expectations that the court even thought to consider promises as a relevant consideration in the first place.

The court went on to say that, if it stopped there, then the remedy would only be an order to the GMC to reconsider its decision: at [82]. But the court went on to say that “it was not open to the GMC to change its policy in 2006 or again in 2010 without adopting some transitional provision that would cater for the case of this claimant”: at [85]. Is this irrationality review? The court didn’t use the word “irrationality”. But was it irrationality review in substance?Again, perhaps, but the very reason why the court would have thought to analyse separately the policyand the timeline according to which the policy was implemented is, again, the fact that a promise had been made to Patel (and others). 

Or, of course, we could think of Patel as involving the application of a novel ground which was referred to in Coughlan as “abuse of power”. As you rightly say, we “struggle to define” this. But can we not say the same about many other grounds of review too? Can we not say, as you say, that Coughlan and Patel were decided on the basis that it would be irrational to take a certain course of action given the promise that had been made? After all, we also struggle to define irrationality. Maybe, when the courts in Coughlan and Patel were saying that the decision would not be “irrational”, what they meant was that it would not be “irrational” under the ‘normal’ Wednesbury threshold, but that this threshold would have to be heightened in cases involving the breach of a promise to someone? In other words, may we see “abuse of power” as a specific form of irrationality? Can we say — to use Paul Daly’s method of analysis — that promise-breaking is an indicium of unreasonableness?

In the end, whether we consider substantive legitimate expectations to be a new ground of judicial review or a principle that affects how we apply the traditional grounds, the effect is the same: (a) a promise made to someone matters, in that the lawfulness of executive action stands to be judged in light of the promise; (b) the promise is, however, not determinative of the case. 

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