I cannot at all remember the substance of the discussion in class in response to which I wrote the following.
Should the elderly be disenfranchised?
One argument in favour of disenfranchising the elderly is that they will vote for the incumbent party out of ‘gratitude’ rather than out of a genuine belief that such a vote would be best for the future of the country. One response was that the argument that the elderly will vote on this basis is not necessarily true. I would also like to call into question the assumptions that it is wrong to vote out of ‘gratitude’; that the only basis for voting ought to be a consideration of the future of the country; and, more generally, that it is possible and desirable to formulate rules setting out the permissible bases on which to decide whom to vote for.
Speaking for myself, I do not think that it is necessarily wrong to vote for somebody merely because they have delivered good things in the past. Indeed, one feature of a system of representative democracy is that a party can be incentivised to do well by the possibility of being re-elected. If a ‘gratitude’ vote is a reward for past performance, then we can expect a party to aim to perform well in the present with a view to receiving ‘gratitude’ votes in future, and hence we can expect a party to aim to perform well in the future with a view to receiving ‘gratitude’ votes in the more distant future.
It is also possible that the elderly, in deciding whom to vote for, do not consider the interests of future generations. To the extent that this is merely an instance of the general phenomenon of self-interested voting, it is an inevitable feature of democracy; the solution, to my mind, is a robust system by which the rights of people other than majority voters are protected, and not necessarily a restriction of the right to vote. To the extent that the issue is that nobody should be entitled to vote in a manner that neglects the interests of future generations, the issue is this: can, and should, there be a rule (express or implied) stating what considerations may and may not be taken into account by voters? Short of systems in which people vote on individual issues, I do not know of systems with such a rule.
Are we repressed?
While I was indeed once punched in the face (without my consent) while I was in the UK, the punching took place at the hands of a private individual and not at the hands of the state. Accordingly, the only basis on which I can fault the state is for having failed to protect me from being punched; but I do not attribute especial blame to the state for this, because (a) no state — not even Singapore — succeeds perfectly in preventing crime, and a single anecdote does not constitute data; (b) neither the UK nor England positively encourages such crime. Accordingly, the experience of having been punched in the face plays no part in any comparison I may seek to draw between the experience of living in the UK and that of living in Singapore. In other words, I do not consider that Singapore is necessarily better at protecting the right not to be punched in the face than is the UK.
This incident was brought up in the context of a discussion about whether we felt repressed in Singapore. I agree with [student’s] point that (if I may paraphrase it) to the extent that this is a question of how we feel, we cannot say what it is like being inside or outside Plato’s cave without, respectively, having experienced life outside or inside it. At the same time, I do not deny that it can be possible to formulate an objective basis on which one may seek to compare life in Singapore with life overseas even without having lived overseas. At the same time, I do not deny that such an objective basis will not paint a complete picture, for — and this is a point that lawyers often forget — law is not only a set of rules and principles, but also an experience lived by individuals. (There is a school of thought according to which the effect — if not the purpose — of legal education is to brainwash students into forgetting the latter.)
But even without going so far as to speak of lived experience, I would like to suggest this: that, if we want to paint a complete picture of what life is like under one legal system, we should consider not only what liberties its subjects have, but rather what benefits, more broadly conceived, that its subjects enjoy. For a liberty (according to at least one possible definition) is but an absence of an impediment to doing something (which has sometimes been termed a negative right), or a prohibition of creating such an impediment; whereas a benefit is something positive, and includes a positive right (namely, a duty on the part of the state to do or facilitate something). In other words, I agree with the point alluded to by [students], namely (if I may paraphrase it), that we should be concerned not only with non-repression but also with flourishing.
In this regard, what stands out to me about political life in the UK is not the rights set out in (say) the European Convention on Human Rights, but rather avenues which facilitate democratic participation (whether directly or indirectly), such as access to information through the Freedom of Information Act; accessible avenues of redress (even for perceived wrongs that fall short of illegality) through ombudsmen; and various formal opportunities to make one’s views known on municipal matters (such as one’s right to go to what is literally a town-hall meeting to state one’s views on someone’s proposal to open a pub: see https://www.gov.uk/guidance/alcohol-licensing#community-involvement-in-licensing). One could call these rights, but they are, more precisely, avenues of democratic participation, whose very availability encourages democratic participation. Without commenting on the benefits and/or drawbacks of the availability of such avenues (consider, for instance, the possibility of frivolous Freedom of Information requests), I would like to suggest that such things — and not only the rights enumerated in bills of rights — should be considered to be defining features of a community.
The power of the law over us
[Student] asked about the idea of citizenship and by what rules we decide who is a citizen. The answer I gave is that citizenship is a legal concept and the rules on who is a citizen of Singapore are found in Part X of the Constitution. But the context of this discuission was the issue of democratic participation; so I suppose the question is not who is a citizen, but rather who is part of the demos.
I suppose there are actually two related issues at stake. First, if, as Hart tells us, in the final analysis, a legal system rests on the social fact of the acceptance of some secondary rules by a community of people, what constitutes the community and who is part of it? Second, if this legal system is democratic, i.e. ruled by the people, which people play what role in ruling?
The first question may be one for a sociologist. As to the latter, all I will say is that it is not necessarily the case that one either participates (through voting) or does not. Consider, for example, the case of the student who writes a letter to his/her MP: he/she thereby participates in democracy, even though he/she does not vote. Moreover, it is possible that one’s right to participation is exercised one one’s behalf: consider the adult who, when voting or advocating that the government take a certain policy position, does so with a view to the interests of his/her baby — is that baby not thereby made a member of the demos?
Another, potentially more difficult, issue is this: what justifies the coercive power of law? That is a question that is of particular interest to a non-democracy, but is also relevant to a democracy, for, even though (some of) the people have a say in governance in a democracy, at least one thing is foisted upon people, namely, the very democratic system. One answer may be that, because any legal system rests on the social fact of popular acceptance, any legal system may be changed simply by an alteration of this social fact. But, perhaps, it is more accurate to say that any legal system rests on the social fact of popular acquiescence, for a state, by definition, has a monopoly on the use of violence, which can make it practically impossible for the people to effect regime change. It may be that a legal system contains rules allowing for systemic change (as, for example, the rules allowing Singapore’s Constitution to be amended). But what about the person who does not agree with a particular change: is that person not thereby coerced against his will?
I cannot pretend to have an easy answer to that question. One tempting answer might be the notion of a social contract. But a contract is, by definition, entered into with the consent of the parties thereto; what, then, of the person who has not had a chance to express a choice as to whether or not to accept the system? What of the person who would not accept the system even if asked? And what of the person who has positively chosen to reject the system? Perhaps a more promising approach is simply to accept that law is, by its nature, something foisted upon us. And, given that it is, perhaps the real question is: under what conditions is it justified for something to be foisted upon us? For example, is the fact that we are thereby saved from a life of precariously wandering through the wilderness a sufficient justification?
One last thing: Agreement is not the only thing that can justify one’s coming under an obligation. Another can be the very act of receiving a benefit. That may explain the arguments for why a male Singapore citizen is not allowed to renounce his citizenship before completing his National Service obligations, namely, that he has already received the benefits of Singapore citizenship, so the state is justified in imposing the burdens upon him. (There are other problems with this argument but I shall not go into them here.)
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