What does “discrimination” in Art 12(2) mean?
There isn’t an established definition of “discrimination” in Article 12(2) of the Constitution. Therefore, if you wish to raise an Art 12(2) claim, it will be for you to define “discrimination”. This can be done with whatever aid can be gleaned from Lim Meng Suang.
One would think that Lim provides some guidance, but does it? Consider the following extracts and whether they are consistent with each other. In Lim, at [57], the court appears to use the word “discriminatory” simply to mean ‘tending to differentiate’. And at [88], the court says that Art 12(2) contains the “specific and applicable principles relating to the right to equality”, suggesting that “discrimination” refers simply to inequality – but then at [92] it is said that Art 12(2) “furnishes specific legal criteria as to what constitutes discrimination” (emphasis added; emphasis in original omitted) – read Art 12(2) and see if you can work out what these criteria are.
By way of comparison, I would point you to the following examples of definitions of discrimination:
- Art 1 of CEDAW and Art 1 of the ICERD define “discrimination” in terms of the “effect or purpose” (emphasis added) of “any distinction, exclusion or restriction”.
- Title VII of the USA’s Civil Rights Act 1964 discusses concepts such as “intention to discriminate”, “disparate impact” (as opposed to disparate treatment); etc.
- The UK’s Equality Act 2010 defines “direct discrimination” and “indirect discrimination” clearly and with some precision, although this it not uncontentious: see, e.g., Sandra Fredman’s commentary on R (E) f Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2 AC 728 (UKSC).
- Art 9 of South Africa’s Constitution does not define “discrimination”, but does distinguish between “fair” and “unfair” discrimination; prohibit “unfair” discrimination; and, in the case of “discrimination” on certain identified grounds, raises the presumption that that discrimination is “unfair” and therefore prohibited.
I have included the fourth item on this list because, even though it does not define discrimination and seemingly equates it to unequal treatment, it at least lays down (if I may adapt some words from Lim) some concrete legal concepts, viz. the presumption that such unequal treatment is unlawful if it is on one of a number of specified grounds.
By contrast, what does Art 12(2) add to our analysis? It does tell us that there is a potential issue of causation: “on the ground only”. But (like SA’s constitution) it does not, on its face, tell us what “discrimination” means: does it require malicious intent or is it enough that the thing done has the effect of putting one group at a disadvantage as compared to another? There are also a few activities singled out for protection, e.g. carrying on a trade – but why have these been singled out? Is this singling out merely “declaratory and aspirational”, or does it mean that these activities are to be protected more than others? etc. The point is that, even though Art 12(2) is more specifically worded than Art 12(1), there is certainly much more to be said about what precisely Art 12(2) requires.
Is it a problem that the grounds of discrimination listed in Art 12(2) are limited?
Arguably. But this is a legislative choice with which many jurisdictions around the world have grappled: for a sampling, see Lim at [96]ff, which contains extracts of constitutional/statutory provisions from various constitutions – note how different jurisdictions identify different grounds on which discrimination is to be specifically prohibited, e.g. gender; caste; age; disability; sexual orientation.
One can think of many more: e.g., should the law specifically prohibit discrimination against pregnant women (as compared to non-pregnant women)? What about obesity? Conscience? Culture (see http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2007/21media.pdf – note the reference to “South Indian Tamil Hindu culture”, as opposed to simply the Hindu religion or the Indian race)?
And this is to say nothing about the definition of such grounds: should having HIV be considered a disability? (Note also how different jurisdictions identify different activities/areas of life for especial protection: see, e.g., how India’s constitution specifically mentions access to public amenities.) The wide range of such possibilities explains the court’s conclusion on this point at [185].
Further reading for those who are interested:
- Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (2011) (library call number: K3242.F73 2011), especially chapter 3 (this is quite a readable book that provides an overview of the laws in a number of jurisdictions)
- Advanced reading: John Gardner, ‘On the Ground of Her Sex(uality)’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 167
What is wrong with unequal treatment? — a thought experiment
As we have discussed in class, one problem with the sort of statute that is caught by Art 12(1) is that there is simply too remote a connection (if there is any connection at all) between the object of the statute and the way in which the object is achieved through differentiating between different people. But what else is wrong with unequal treatment? In Ramalingam Ravinthran, we see references to bias, irrelevant considerations, etc. in the discussion of Art 12(1).
In this light, think about the following extract from Baroness Hale’s speech in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza at [130]:
“My Lords, it is not so very long ago in this country that people might be refused access to a so-called “public” bar because of their sex or the colour of their skin; that a woman might automatically be paid three quarters of what a man was paid for doing exactly the same job; that a landlady offering rooms to let might lawfully put a “no blacks” notice in her window. We now realise that this was wrong. It was wrong because the sex or colour of the person was simply irrelevant to the choice which was being made: to whether he or she would be a fit and proper person to have a drink with others in a bar, to how well she might do the job, to how good a tenant or lodger he might be. It was wrong because it depended on stereotypical assumptions about what a woman or a black person might be like, assumptions which had nothing to do with the qualities of the individual involved: even if there were any reason to believe that more women than men made bad customers this was no justification for discriminating against all women. It was wrong because it was based on an irrelevant characteristic which the woman or the black did not choose and could do nothing about.”
Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose one wanted to make such arguments to the Singapore courts. How would one fit such arguments into the scope of Art 12? Consider: would one have more success raising such arguments under Art 12(1) on the authority of Ramalingam Ravinthran; or is it that, following Lim Meng Suang, such arguments, to the extent that they have something to do with the nature of race specifically, are best raised under Art 12(2) (and, to the extent that they have something to do with the nature of gender specifically, are to be pronounced ‘extra-legal’)? Are the courts likely to accept (assuming that Art 12 is held to have horizontal effect) that a prospective tenant’s race is logically irrelevant to the landlord’s decision; or will they require evidence to show that it is irrelevant on the facts of this case?
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