Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

The phrase “improper purposes”

A student identified a possible ambiguity in the phrase “improper purposes”: “purposes” can mean (a) the purpose that the power-holder pursued; (b) the purpose served by the exercise of the power. My thoughts:


The cases (or, more often, textbooks describing those cases) generally appear to use those words (and their variants) to refer to one’s aims, and not the outcome. We see this in classic English cases like Wheeler v Leicester ([1985] 1 AC 1054 at 1081C), Padfield ([1968] 1 AC 997 at 1032E), and Shell ([1988] 1 All ER 938 at 952d). These cases do not always use the phrase “improper purposes”, but that phrase is used by leading textbooks to describe them: see, e.g., De Smith’s Judicial Review at [5-113] and [5-117], which discusses Padfield.

The phrase “improper purposes”, as conventionally used, could refer not only to acting for improper motives (e.g. avoiding political embarrassment, as in Padfield), but also acting for a purpose for which one doesn’t have the legal power to act. Consider the M M Pillay case, in which the argument was that the subsidiary legislation on restricted zones was ultra vires the Act in that the Act “did not confer any power on the Minister to make rules to prohibit, except on payment of a fee, motor vehicles from using any road” [4]. 

You are right to ask whether the decision itself goes some way toward achieving the purpose set out in the statute. To my mind, this could mean one of two things:

  1. A case in which there is no legal power to make a decision (/take some action) that is aimed at achieving a certain purpose — this has been discussed above.
  2. Irrationality, in that, though the decision falls within the range of what the decision-maker is legally empowered to do, it does not fall within the range of what a reasonable decision-maker would do. The argument would be that no reasonable decision-maker would make a decision that goes no way at all toward achieving certain ends, or that no reasonable decision-maker would make a decision that goes no way at all toward achieving its ostensible ends.

While the English phrase “improper purposes” could refer either to (a) improper motives; (b) acting for a purpose not authorised by statute; or (c) a lack of effectiveness in achieving certain ends, the phrase is generally used in administrative law to refer to (a) and (b) only. 

My view is that it makes sense to distinguish conceptually between these three, not least because the justifications for each of them may be different. 

I would use the phrase “improper purposes” to refer to (a) and (b), if only for the sake of convention. As for (c), it is one type of irrationality, but it is not the only one. A lack of logical connection between means and ends is not the only thing that could make a decision irrational.

I do, however, see the problem you allude to with the World Development Movement case. That case is often criticised for drawing a distinction between “sound” and un-“sound” developmental purposes, when the statute (arguably) made no such distinction. Perhaps a more straightforward way to make sense of the case is simply to say that the decision was irrational.

Finally: If there is evidence suggesting that a decision was irrational, it may be that only a statement of the decision-makers’ reasons can rebut that evidence. In the absence of such a statement of reasons, the court may conclude that the decision was indeed irrational. See Craig at [12-041] and De Smith at [7-111]ff, and the cases cited therein (especially Lonrho).

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