Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Some notes on the Liyanage case and judicial independence

[I sent this note to students in a previous run of this course. It was a response to a student who asked: why, in Liyanage, did the Privy Council focus on the fact that, under the statute in question, the executive would have the power to nominate the judges who would preside over certain cases?]

I certainly see the force in your (new) views: why would the specially-chosen judges be less independent than any judge?

The Privy Council appears simply to have assumed that the power to nominate the judges who hear a particular case is part of the judicial power, without explaining why. Indeed, they didn’t need to, because, after the Minister’s power to nominate had been successfully challenged in the Supreme Court of Ceylon, the Minister’s nomination had been nullified by statute and replaced with a nomination by the Chief Justice (see [1967] AC 259 at 282, discussing the “second Act”).

So let’s look at the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ceylon, R v Liyanage (1965) 67 New Law Reports 193 <https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/060-NLR-NLR-V-64-THE-QUEEN-v.-D.-J.-F.-D.-LIYANAGE-and-others.pdf>. Perhaps, on hindsight, we should have put the Supreme Court’s judgment on the reading list. (Perhaps my omission to discuss it indicates a sense of internalised neo-colonialism on my part, in the form of an over-eagerness to privilege the voice over the Privy Council over the voices of local judiciaries. Or perhaps I was merely misguided in my attempt to keep the readings brief.)

The crux of the Supreme Court’s decision is at page 352 onwards. At first glance, it appears to rest on the slender point that the power to nominate judges to hear a case “appears to us to reside in the Court” (at 352) for historical reasons (last paragraph on 358). This is the same style of reasoning we see in 1: that ‘judicial power’ simply means ‘the powers which have traditionally been classified as being part of judicial power’.

But I suspect that, although that’s as far as one needs to go when arguing a case in court, you won’t really be satisfied with that answer; and neither, personally, am I. So we can go on to look at the further points which the Supreme Court made at page 358:

  • Judicial power belongs to judges (see 357: “The right of a judge to exercise judicial power…”). Therefore, whoever has the power to nominate judges has the power to “prevent a particular judge or judges from exercising any part of the strictly judicial power vested in them by the Constitution”.
  • The Chief Justice is the “constitutionally appointed Head” of the court. A power of nomination would therefore create the possibility that the Chief Justice is prevented from acting as the head.

Personally, I don’t agree with the first point: can’t it be said that the Chief Justice (who is normally in charge of nominating the judges) also has the power to never nominate Justice X, and therefore prevent Justice X from ever exercising judicial power? 

To my mind, the strongest point is on page 359: “justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done” (quoting R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy). Specifically, said the Supreme Court:

  • The alleged offences consisted of a conspiracy to overthrow the Government. Therefore, a power vested in a member of that very Government to nominate the judges could raise the suspicion that “the ordinary or reasonable man would feel that this court itself may be biassed” (at 360). 
  • Also, people may think: “Why should the Minister, who must be deemed to be interested in the result of the case, be given the power to select the Judges whereas the other party to the cause has no say whatever in a selection?”
  • It may be that Parliament (which discusses the executive’s conduct) may end up discussing “the merits and demerits of respective Judges” in the course of discussing the minister’s nomination (eventually circumventing restrictions on discussion of judicial conduct in Parliament — for an example of such restrictions, see Art 99 of our Constitution). 

To my mind, these points — the risk of a loss of public trust in the impartiality of the judiciary — may well be enough to justify holding unconstitutional the Minister’s power of nomination.  We can reach this conclusion without asking about whether the fact of being nominated creates even more fear than usual in the judge. 

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