Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Some notes on judicial independence

How a Judge of the Supreme Court (etc.) may be removed

It is not Parliament that has the power to initiate the process by which a Judge of the Supreme Court (etc.) may be removed from office. It is the Prime Minister or the Chief Justice who has the power to initiate the process. Please see Art 98(3)-(5) of the Constitution for details.

What Parliament can do is pass a motion which will allow it to discuss the conduct of a Judge of the Supreme Court (etc.): see Art 99. While Parliament does not have the power to set in motion the process that can allow a judge to be removed from office, Parliament can still play a role in checking judicial power, in that Parliamentary discussion of judicial conduct, like any Parliamentary discussions, attract the glare of publicity. On the other hand, Art 99 itself functions as a check on Parliament’s power to discuss judicial conduct.

Case in which a judge hearing a case had previously allegedly given related advice as Attorney-General

In Yong Vui Kong v AG [2011] 2 SLR 1189 (CA) (which we will discuss later in the course), one issue was whether, in considering whether to exercise the power to grant clemency to a convicted offender (under Art 22P of the Constitution), the President could act in his sole discretion (as opposed to being obliged to act in accordance with the advice of Cabinet). 

Yong’s counsel argued that Chan CJ ought to recuse himself from hearing the case, because, when he was the AG, he had allegedly given advice to the President on that very issue that the President had had no personal discretion in the matter, and therefore Chan CJ would not be able to decide the issue fairly because he might be unwilling to reach the conclusion that his previous advice had been wrong. 

Chan CJ refused to recuse himself, but took pains to explain why. His reasons were that:

  1. Chan CJ had never, in fact, given such advice to the President. [18]
  2. Even if Chan CJ had given such advice to the President, it was correct. [19] Note that Chan CJ did not stop at asserting that he was correct (although he was); he took pains to point out that the other two judges in that case, as well as various other authorities, agreed that he was correct [19]-[20].

The Tan Cheng Bock case

In Tan Cheng Bock, the Supreme Court had asked the parties whether they objected to Menon CJ being one of the panel of judges hearing the appeal, given that Menon CJ had chaired the Constitutional Commission which recommended the legislative provisions and constitutional amendments whose interpretation was in question before the court. Evidently, the perceived potential threat to independence was the possibility that Menon had committed himself to a certain position, and therefore would be reluctant to decide to the contrary even if the law required that he decide to the contrary. The Supreme Court’s letter to the parties underscores that the Supreme Court was aware of the possibility of this perception. (See this Straits Times report: https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/five-judges-to-hear-dr-tan-cheng-bocks-case-in-court-of-appeal, and the Facebook post by Tan linked to therein.) In the event, neither the AG nor Tan objected to Menon CJ’s hearing the appeal. 

The Kho Jabing case

In Kho Jabing v PP [2016] 3 SLR 1259 (CA), Kho’s counsel alleged that Phang JA ought not to have heard the Prosecution’s appeal against Kho’s sentence in 2015 because Phang JA had been one of the judges who had heard and dismissed Kho’s appeal against his conviction in 2011. The argument was that, in 2011, Phang JA had made up his mind, and would therefore now be hearing an appeal against his 2011 decision, which he would not be able to do fairly because he would be biased in favour of thinking that his 2011 decision was correct.

The Court of Appeal unanimously rejected this argument for the following reason. In 2011, the decision involving Phang JA was a decision relating to Kho’s conviction. The present issue was that of Kho’s sentence. In 2011, Phang JA had decided nothing about Kho’s sentence; indeed, he could not have, because, at the time, the law only allowed for one sentence (viz. death) for murder (which was Kho’s offence) [5], and the courts simply had no choice as to what sentence to pass. So it could not be said that Phang JA was, in the 2015 hearing regarding sentencing, hearing an appeal against a decision which he himself had made in 2011. Rather, the decision in 2011 was about a totally different matter than the decision before the court in 2015.

A possible way of thinking of threats to independence in a systematic manner

I would like to suggest that the accounting profession has a potentially useful framework for thinking of threats to independence, which is set out in various parts of the International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants promulgated by the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA) <https://www.ethicsboard.org/international-code-ethics-professional-accountants>. This might be useful because that profession considers “objectivity” to be one of its “fundamental principles”, and defines “objectivity” as not “compromis[ing] [one’s] professional or business judgment because of bias, conflict of interest or undue influence of others” (at [R112.1]). The analogy with judicial independence should be clear. At [120.6 A3], the Code sets out five types of “[t]hreats to compliance with the fundamental principles”, namely:

“(a) Self-interest threat – the threat that a financial or other interest will inappropriately influence a professional accountant’s judgment or behavior;

(b) Self-review threat – the threat that a professional accountant will not appropriately evaluate the results of a previous judgment made; or an activity performed by the accountant, or by another individual within the accountant’s firm or employing organization, on which the accountant will rely when forming a judgment as part of performing a current activity;

(c) Advocacy threat – the threat that a professional accountant will promote a client’s or employing organization’s position to the point that the accountant’s objectivity is compromised;

(d) Familiarity threat – the threat that due to a long or close relationship with a client, or employing organization, a professional accountant will be too sympathetic to their interests or too accepting of their work; and

(e) Intimidation threat – the threat that a professional accountant will be deterred from acting objectively because of actual or perceived pressures, including attempts to exercise undue influence over the accountant.”

It seems to me that, in Yong Vui Kong, Tan Cheng Bock, and Kho Jabing, the alleged/perceived potential threats to Chan CJ’s, Menon CJ’s, and Phang JA’s independence respectively fell into something analogous to category (b): the threat that, because they had previously considered a question and come up with an answer, they may be unduly unwilling to depart from that answer now. Perhaps we can think of some of the other various safeguards of judicial independence as being designed to combat some of the other types of threat to independence.

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