Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Some notes on the Hinds case and judicial independence

In Hinds, the Privy Council held that the legislation creating the Full Court Division of the Gun Court was unconstitutional. This is because that legislation would have required that certain cases, which fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, could only be heard by the Full Court Division and not the Supreme Court. This point was premised on a division of the Jamaican judiciary into the “higher judiciary” and the “lower judiciary” (218B). According to the Privy Council:

  • The Supreme Court was part of the “higher judiciary”.
  • Serious criminal cases must be heard only by the “higher judiciary” (221C).
  • Why? Because:
    • The “higher judiciary” had a “greater degree of security of tenure” than the “lower judiciary” (218F).
    • The more serious the matters at stake, the more strongly protected must be the independence of the judges who deal with these matters. For example, the reason why the “higher judiciary” had a higher degree of security of tenure was that the “importance of the jurisdiction that they exercise” was higher than that of the “lower judiciary” (219C). 

One may ask: How does all this apply to Singapore, where, unlike in Jamaica, the Supreme Court does contain judicial officers who do not have security of tenure until age 65? This difference is indeed important, and I commend all those of you who have spotted it and raised questions about it.

First, though, I would like to say a word about the phrase “security of tenure”. Sometimes, that phrase refers to the idea that, during a certain period of time, one cannot be removed from office (save in certain exceptional circumstances). Sometimes, that phrase refers to the idea that the aforesaid period of time must be very long. Hence, it is no contradiction in terms to say that the security of a Judicial Commissioner’s or Senior Judge’s tenure is protected (in that it is not easy for a JC/SJ to be removed from office: see Art 98(3)-(5)) although that tenure lasts only for a few years. So the fact remains that the security of a JC’s/SJ’s tenure is more strongly protected than that of a Magistrate’s or District Judge’s tenure in both senses: (a) it is harder to remove a JC/SJ during the period of his/her tenure; (b) a JC/SJ does have a fixed tenure in the first place. On hindsight, I should have been more precise in highlighting these distinctions in class; I apologise.

That having been said, to my mind, the following points from Hinds are of enduring relevance to Singapore.

First, the Privy Council appears to have assumed that one defining characteristic of a court is that there are in place measures to safeguard its independence. Sometimes the measures are watertight than in other cases. But that does not change the importance of independence. (See 213B.)

Second, the Privy Council also stated the point, followed in Faizal,that the power to pass sentence according to law in an individual case is a judicial function. The Privy Council added, in a passage that wasn’t on the reading list (perhaps it should have been?), that such a function can only be exercised by one who has certain qualifications (226E, and see Faizal at [17]). Now, it is true that the importance of having certain qualifications was characteristic of judicial power in Jamaica because the Jamaican Constitution said so. But this did not stop Chan CJ in Faizal from drawing from Hinds the broader proposition that having legal qualifications is one of the “characteristics of a court” (at [17]).

Third, there is the broad principle that some matters should be heard by judges whose independence is more strongly protected than others.  According to Hinds, there are certain cases which can only be heard by the Supreme Court and not by a subordinate court because Supreme Court judges have greater security of tenure. While, in Singapore, Supreme Court Judges have more strongly protected security of tenure than JCs/SJs, JCs/SJs do still have more strongly protected security of tenure than DJs/Magistrates. Note also that there are restrictions on discussions in Parliament of the conduct of JCs/SJs, whereas I can find no similar provision that applies to DJs/Magistrates.

Fourth, there is the idea that, even if the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction in certain matters, it must still have supervisory jurisdiction over the courts which do have original jurisdiction. (If it did not, then there would be nothing from stopping the lower court from exceeding its jurisdiction!) In this regard, two commentators have, following Hinds,argued that decisions of the Military Court of Appeal must be amenable to judicial review by the High Court because, inter alia, the Military Court of Appeal’s independence is less strongly protected than the High Court’s is (Victor Leong Wai Meng and Roland Samosir, ‘Forever Immune?’ (1986) 28 Malaya Law Review 303, 311ff). (They argued that Abdul Wahab bin Sulaiman v Commandant, Tanglin Detention Barracks [1985-1986] SLR(R) 7 (HC) was wrongly decided. For reasons which I very briefly alluded to in class today, and which I will seek to justify during our later seminars on ouster clauses, I respectfully agree.)

And, finally, there is Lord Diplock’s explanation that, because our constitutional order is “evolutionary not revolutionary”, we can interpret what it says about certain institutions by reference to the institutions from which they had ‘evolved’, and we can “tak[e] for granted that the basic principle of separation of powers will apply to the exercise of their respective functions by [the legislature, executive and judiciary]” (212C-E). In the next few weeks, we will see how the courts put the separation of powers in action, illustrating our points by reference to English jurisprudence. The aforementioned insight from Hinds explains why that English jurisprudence is relevant.

I would also like to point out, on an unrelated note, that the Chief Justice has the final say on appointments of Magistrates and District Judges, and the Executive doesn’t have a say — see the State Courts Act, ss 9(1) and 10(1).

A final thought: Are safeguarding judicial independence, and public confidence of judicial independence, matters to be pursued at all costs? For example, what would be the costs of requiring all judges in subordinate courts to have security of tenure for life? Would there be enough people willing to take up the job? Would they need to be paid more to be convinced to take up the job?

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