I teach students about the Liyanage case, which most likely represents the law in Singapore. To grab students’ attention, I preface it by showing students the legislation in the Kable case, which is targeted at one named individual. But that’s all I use the Kable case for. I tell students not to read Kable as it will distract them from the point I am making using Liyanage. To elaborate:
A student asked: What in Kable says that judicial power extends to making orders that are dispositive of a person’s legal rights and obligations, and that the legislature cannot exercise this power?
The answer is that Kable itself does not say so. None of the judges in that case thought that the Community Protection Act was unconstitutional merely because it targeted only one person. This was despite their not denying that, as Brennan CJ (dissenting) put it, Parliament’s passing the Act was an “exercise of a power that is not purely legislative”. To the contrary, Dawson J held that under the law of New South Wales (unlike in Ceylon), it is not impermissible for the legislature to exercise judicial power; he distinguished Liyanage on that basis.
Note that this was so as a matter of the law of New South Wales. It is an instance of the fact that, for reasons that need not detain us, the principle of the separation of powers does not apply with full force at the state level, so the judicial power of New South Wales is not necessarily vested exclusively in the judiciary of New South Wales. At the federal level, on the other hand, the rule is — as it was in Ceylon, and is in Singapore — that the judicial power of the Commonwealth of Australia may only be vested in the judiciary of the Commonwealth (specifically, in courts created under Chapter III of the Constitution of Australia). For more on this, see Peter Gerangelos, ‘Separation of Powers in the Australian Constitution: Themes and Reflections’ (2017) 29 SAcLJ 903. He refers to what I have just described as the “‘first limb’ of the separation of judicial power” (at [8(a)]), and elaborates on it at [15]ff.
And that’s why I wanted to discourage everyone from reading Kable in full. All I wanted was to use the statute in issue in that case it as an example of something that, like the legislation in question in Liyanage, would, if passed in Singapore, be an unconstitutional usurpation by the Legislature of judicial power. The Singapore courts have suggested that it would be. We see this from Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v PP [2012] 4 SLR 947 (HC), according to which s 33A of the MDA is not unconstitutional because, “unlike the legislation in cases such as Kable… and Liyanage“, it does not have the “effect of prescribing the punishment to be imposed on particular individuals or of directing the outcome of pending criminal proceedings” (at [47]).
By the way, the reason why the majority in Kable thought that the Community Protection Act was unconstitutional because it forced the courts to perform executive functions — as Toohey J put it, the court was required to “participate in the making of a preventive detention order where no breach of the criminal law is alleged and where there has been no determination of guilt” — whereas the courts can only perform judicial functions. (Specifically, as Gummow J explained, the judicial power to order imprisonment only encompasses ordering detention following a finding of guilt. Only the executive can order that someone be imprisoned for other reasons.)
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