What objections may one have to the idea that the common law of defamation is compatible with Art 14(1) of the Constitution because “Parliament [has] by law impose[d]” it by passing the Defamation Act / by enacting Art 162 of the Constitution?
I.
One argument is that it is quite artificial to say that Parliament has, by passing the Defamation Act, somehow given the legislative stamp of approval to the entire common law of defamation, past and future. Has Parliament really ever directed its mind to each and every rule of the common law of defamation?
Moreover, if it is correct to say that the entire common law of defamation, as of the time the Defamation Act was passed / as of the commencement of the Constitution, is compliant with Art 14, then how can Review Publishing say that it is ever possible for Art 14 to necessitate the Reynolds privilege? If the Defamation Act said that the common law of defamation sans the Reynolds privilege is constitutionally compliant, how could the courts ever say one day that the Constitution requires that Reynolds privilege be available? Indeed, if the courts were to say that (or even if they were merely to say that it is desirable that Reynolds privilege be available), wouldn’t they be going against the intention of the Legislature in passing the Defamation Act, which was to enact the common law of defamation as it was in 1965?
II.
Michael Hor, in his note on JJB v LKY [1992] 1 SLR(R) 791 (CA) (‘The Freedom of Speech and Defamation’ [1992] SJLS 542), addresses a different argument. The argument is premised on the idea that (in Hor’s words) the Parliament of Singapore, “upon separation from Malaysia in 1965… provided for the continuation of both Art 10 [of Malaysia’s Constitution – same as our present Art 14] and the existing rules of defamation” (Hor at 550), and hence intended that the common law of defamation not be incompatible with Art 10. Hor’s criticism of this argument is that it does not follow that Parliament thought that the common law of defamation was compliant with the Malaysian Art 10 (i.e. our present Art 14) – Parliament had simply not directed its mind to the question.
As I understand it, the argument is that Parliament is presumed not to intend that one of its enactments contradict the other. Hor’s counter-argument is that this ignores the fact that one enactment is constitutional in nature and must therefore take precedence over the other, which is not; instead, the argument goes, the courts have in effect held that Parliament intended that the right in Art 10(1)(a) (now Art 14(1)(a)) be attenuated in order to accommodate the common law of defamation.
III.
One might next argue: isn’t Art 162 the means through which Parliament has by law enacted the law of defamation? The problem is that Art 162 provides that laws existing as of the commencement of the Constitution are to continue in force but are to be “construed… with such modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring them into conformity with [the] Constitution”. Therefore, one would think, it does not follow that the entire common law of defamation is constitutional in the absence of such modifications etc. Hor has criticised the courts’ response to this as circular:
“The real issue is whether [the common law of defamation] need[ed] to undergo any change to comply with the requirements of the Constitution. All that the Court has to offer in response (in [paragraph 57 of JJB v LKY]) is a bald assertion that ‘the law of defamation is not inconsistent with the right of free speech.’ With respect, this begs the question and contributes nothing to the argument.”
It appears to me that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Review Publishing contains the same circularity. The Court of Appeal said at [250] that the effect of Art 162 (which used to be Art 105(1) of the State Constitution) was to enact the common law of defamation as it was. Why not with modifications to make it constitutionally valid? Because it was constitutionally valid: “The imposition via Art 105(1) of this restriction on constitutional free speech was permitted by and also consistent with Art 10(2)(a) of the 1963 Federal Constitution (now Art 14(2)(a) of the Singapore Constitution).”
So the Court of Appeal is saying that (a) the common law of defamation is compliant with Art 10(1)(a) because “Parliament [has] by law impose[d] it” via Art 162; (b) Art 162 provides that the common law of defamation was to be modified etc. to make it compliant with the Constitution; (c) there is no need for such modification etc. because the common law of defamation was already compliant with Art 10(1)(a), in that “Parliament [has] by law impose[d] it”.
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