What did the High Court do in Fong Thin Choo? Did it, in substance, decide that courts have the power to review any executive decision for any sort of error of fact?
Preliminary point: even if the answer is yes, that does not mean that the courts will be usurping the decision-maker’s role. Even if the courts had the final word on what the facts are, it would still be for the decision-maker to make use of the facts in his exercise of discretionary power.
The High Court’s initial view is that it was a precedent fact requirement that the cigarettes had not been exported: “The DG must establish the fact of non-export before the exporter becomes liable for customs duty.” There is nothing noteworthy about this. What is noteworthy is that the High Court reached this conclusion based on a certain interpretation of “evidence” and “satisfaction” — evidence “sufficient… to prove that goods have indeed been exported”; satisfaction “not to be measured in terms of reasonableness but in terms of justification on the evidence”. One may wonder whether this is a strained reading of the statute, which used the phrase “not accounted for to the satisfaction of the proper officer of customs”. Taking the statute at face value, and following the reasoning in Chng Suan Tze, once the officer says ‘I am satisfied’ then the only grounds of review would be illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety. Yet the High Court said that it was a precedent fact requirement that the cigarettes were actually not exported, which meant that the High Court had the final word on whether or not they had been exported. True, this is error of law. But the High Court’s pronouncement on what the law said, in terms of the correct interpretation of “evidence” and “satisfaction”, led to the result that the High Court would be free to review the DG’s decision for the correctness of his conclusion.
The High Court also referred to the Tameside case [27] – Chan J seems to have conflated this with the ‘precedent fact’ ground of review. In Tameside, Lord Wilberforce said that even if the precedent fact requirement is ‘that the Secretary of State “is satisfied”‘, that simply means that the Secretary of State is to “evaluat[e]… those facts”; but still “the court must inquire whether those facts exist, and have been taken into account, whether the judgment has been made upon a proper self-direction as to those facts, whether the judgment has not been made upon other facts which ought not to have been taken into account.”
It gets better! The High Court then asked: what would the analysis be if it were not a precedent fact requirement that the cigarettes were actually exported? According to the High Court, even if “the DG has a discretionary power to decide whether the evidence produced by the applicants accounted for the export of the goods”, he had to have a “factual basis for… being dissatisfied”. One could retort that, even if there was some evidence tending to show that the cigarettes had been exported, there was also some evidence tending to show that they had not been exported; and the latter was the “factual basis”. But the High Court rejected this. How? By saying that the respondent had failed to take into account some other relevant evidence [52]; had failed to investigate certain additional evidence [51]; and had placed “undue weight” on some pieces of evidence but not others [53]. Is this review for error of fact in substance, thinly disguised as error of law?
The reasoning is similar to that in Tameside. In that case, the local authority wanted to maintain the old education policy. The Minister (different political party) directed the local authority to implement a new policy immediately. He pointed to a statute that said that the Minister may give directions to a local authority if he is “satisfied… that any local education authority… [has] acted or [is] proposing to act unreasonably with respect to the exercise of any power conferred or the performance of any duty imposed by or under this Act…” He said, ‘I am satisfied’.
This was not a ‘precedent fact’ case. Yet, Lord Wilberforce said that the Minister “was operating under a misconception as to what would be reasonable for a newly elected council to do, and that he failed to take into account that it was entitled – indeed in a sense bound – to carry out the policy on which it was elected, and failed to give weight to the fact that [the old policy] was something which a reasonable authority might accept…”
What did the UK Supreme Court decide in R (A) v Croydon LBC?
The statute said: “Every local authority shall provide accommodation for any child in need within their area who appears to them to require accommodation as a result of…”
The local authorities did not even consider whether the applicants “appear[ed] to them to require accommodation” because they thought that the applicants were not children.
The High Court dismissed the application for judicial review, holding that it was not a precedent fact requirement that the applicants be children. The Court of Appeal agreed.
We can break down the case into three questions.
First: who decides whether the person seeking asylum is a “child”? Answer: the courts. Why? Because whether or not the person seeking accommodation was a “child” was a precedent fact requirement – if the person is a “child”, then the local authority must make some sort of decision. How did the court know that this was a precedent fact requirement? It is a matter of interpreting the statute, but the court was heavily influenced by the fact “whether a person is a ‘child’… is a right or wrong answer”; “The word ‘child’ is undoubtedly defined in wholly objective terms”. [32]
On this basis, the local authorities had erred in law. Strictly speaking, the Supreme Court did not say that they had committed errors of precedent fact (i.e. thinking that they need not exercise their discretion because the precedent fact is not made out, when in truth they had to exercise their discretion because the precedent fact was true). This was because the evidence was not before the Supreme Court as this was an appeal on preliminary points of law only.
Therefore, the Supreme Court remitted the case to (I presume) the High Court, for the High Court to decide whether the applicants were children. [46]
Presumably, if the High Court had found that the applicants were children, then it would have issued an order to quash the local authorities’ decisions not to grant them accommodation, and/or a mandatory order directing the local authorities to decide whether they were “in need” and whether it “appear[ed] to [the local authorities] [that the children] require[d] accommodation as a result of…”
To reach this conclusion, the Supreme Court did not need to refer to Tameside or E, in which the errors of fact were not errors of precedent fact.
Second: if the person is a “child”, is the person “in need”? Who decides? Answer: the local authority. Why? Because the statutory definition of “in need” “requires a number of different value judgments”; “[w]ithin the limits of fair process and ‘Wednesbury reasonableness’ there are no clear cut right or wrong answers”. [26]
Third: if the person is a “child” “in need”, does it “appea[r] to [the local authority]” that the person “require[s] accommodation as a result of…”? The court said this is “clearly left to the local authority” [14]. (That is, subject for review on the GCHQ grounds.)
If the court holds that a decision is unlawful because of an error of fact, what order will the court make?
Generally, a quashing order, and, depending on the circumstances, perhaps a mandatory order to re-make the decision.
Why was a prohibiting order made in Fong Thin Choo? Because that was what was asked for. Why was it asked for? Probably because of what the DG was threatening to do, namely, to deduct money from the banker’s guarantee furnished by the company (see para 4 of the letter reproduced at [11] of the judgment). In these circumstances, a prohibiting order – an order to not do something – would seem to be the most appropriate, given that the DG had threatened to do that thing.
Leave a Reply