Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Where do the legal limits to executive powers come from? Do they all come from legislation?

A student asked about the following line from Short v Poole: “… the Court might well say, ‘Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules [of subsidiary legislation]; they are unreasonable and ultra vires’.” This suggests that the reason why irrational executive action is unlawful is that the Legislature decided to make them unlawful. Is that really so?

My response is as follows. By “[R]”, I was referring to the rule that irrational executive action is unlawful.


The fiction that judicial review is all about enforcing legal limits which the Legislature had (impliedly) intended to put in place is arguably just that — a fiction that is put in place to uphold the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty in the UK. By resorting to this fiction, the courts can avoid being accused of subverting the Legislature’s intention; they claim to be upholding the Legislature’s intention. This is why, in cases like Short v Poole, what we now call judicial review for irrationality was said to be a matter of enforcing an (implied) legislative intention that executive power not be exercised irrationally. Similar, in Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14 (UKHL) at 36, Lord Radcliffe said that, if there is a decision which “no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have come to”, then the court will infer that that decision was the product of some “misconception of the law”. 

But since then, English judicial thinking has shifted away from this fiction, at least when it comes to irrationality. In GCHQ at 410H-411A, Lord Diplock said about irrationality review: “resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe’s ingenious explanation in Edwards v Bairstow… of irrationality as a ground for a court’s reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though unidentifiable mistake of law by the decision-maker. ‘Irrationality’ by now can stand upon its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by judicial review.”

This leads one to wonder whether it can really be said that irrationality review is simply an application of rules created (tacitly) by the Legislature, and gives rise to what, in the English literature, are known as the ‘modified ultra vires’ and the ‘common-law’ theories.

All these are theories of where the legal limits to powers come from. In my article, I did not need to say where [R] came from; it could either come from the intention of the Legislature, or just from the common law. In the latter case, I suppose the question would be: what gives the common law the power to create such rules? 

One possible answer is: the common law has the power to create rules by which the executive must conduct itself, for the same reason that the common law has the power to create rules by which (say) parties to contracts, drivers, and employers must conduct themselves. The common law is a source of law, so why can’t it contain laws about executive conduct? One may retort: it can’t because that would clash with the statute. But is there really a clash? Suppose a statute doesn’t explicitly say that some executive body must give a certain person a fair hearing before deciding to take his licence away. A person who subscribes to the ‘common law’ theory of judicial review would say that the Legislature has had no intention as to whether a hearing must be held; and, therefore, when the court adds the requirement that a hearing must be held, the court is merely supplementing the statute rather than contradicting it. So the answer to the question would simply be: [R] is a rule of the common law.

A real problem for a common-law theorist would be a statute that, for example, explicitly says that X must not be heard before (say) his driving licence is taken away. If the common law introduces a rule saying that X nonetheless must be heard, then the common law would be contradicting the statute, which is forbidden. Sometimes, the courts would be available to wriggle out of this problem by creatively ‘interpreting’ the statute and saying that, on its proper interpretation, it does not really mean that X must not be heard — but, of course, the courts can only go so far in ‘stretching’ statutory language before they end up disobeying it altogether.

But — and this is Prof Kenny Chng’s point (in this article) — we have a way out: it might be the Constitution that furnishes the “justification of the entire practice of judicial review” (at 312; emphasis omitted). While this might not change the fact that the “legal source of the rules applied in judicial review” is “the common law” (311), it would help to answer the questions of (a) why the common law is justified in developing the grounds of judicial review — in other words, the norms that the executive must follow — as they now are, and (b) why these norms may, in certain cases, override legislative intention.


The next question: “where exactly in the Constitution are these norms located?” (312) First, Chng suggests: “Article 93 of the Singapore Constitution can be interpreted as a warrant for the judiciary to draw upon rule of law principles in their exercise of judicial review.” (312) Second, he suggests: “rule of law ideals [are] implicit in the concept of constitutionalism itself”. To my mind, to make these points, he must be suggesting that not acting irrationally is one of the “rule of law principles” —  a proposition that is debatable depending on one’s view of how the concept of the “rule of law” is to be interpreted”. He admits this (at 313), but responds (at 313), citing Luc Tremblay’s work (at fn 123), that there are “antecedent rule of law norms” which are not found in the Constitution itself but which are “required to supply legitimacy for the written constitution”.

To these, I might add a third possibility, which I base on dicta in Chng Suan Tze at [82]: that Article 12(1) of the Constitution requires that the exercise of executive power not be “arbitrary”. Of course, the missing logical link is to say that irrationality is a type of “arbitrar[iness]”; support for this latter proposition may be drawn from Timothy Endicott, ‘Arbitrariness’ (University of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series No 2/2014) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2378858> at 18:

“An arbitrary decision in general is one that is not distinguished, by reasons in favour of it, from an unreasoned choice.”

See also Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v PP [1989] 2 SLR(R) 419 (HC): 

“If the discretion vested in the licensing officer under the Act were absolute and untrammelled, there might be a case for arguing that the licensing scheme is unconstitutional, as then the licensing officer would have been vested with arbitrary power to deprive a citizen of his constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression contrary to the objects of Art 14(2)…”

So the answer to the question might well be: ‘some concept of non-arbitrariness implicit in the Constitution’. Of course, this answer is not perfect — for example, it leaves open the question of how this general concept of non-arbitrariness translates into precise legal rules (is acting disproportionately arbitrary?).

A thinner answer might be that the definition of “judicial power” in Art 93 includes the power to develop English-style common law, which would simply mean that judicial review is justified by (a) the common-law model; coupled with (b) Art 93, which allows the courts to create and develop rules of the common law. 

I could go on and on, but I will end with this: as we will explore in class, it is not necessarily the case that the various theories of why judicial review is possible are mutually exclusive. For example, it might be that the ultra vires model explains some grounds of judicial review; the common law model explains others; and the Art 93 model explains yet other rules of administrative law (e.g. furnishing the basis for courts ignoring ouster clauses).

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