Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

The separation of powers, the Liyanage case, and the Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu case

The separation of powers

In class, I described the separation of powers as being a “value” or a “virtue”. On hindsight, I should have used clearer and less vague language. The point I was trying to make was that the separation of powers is not something that is either absolutely present or absent. Rather, powers can be separated in various ways, to various extents, and for various purposes. Hence, there is (for example) nothing intrinsically wrong with having members of the executive also be members of the legislature; with having both the legislature and the judiciary act as checks on executive power; or with a situation in which the legislature, executive, and judiciary all make law. Rather, I would suggest that we ought to (a) think of the aims of separating powers; and then (b) think about how far the way that powers are separated in our legal system succeeds in achieving these aims. What we should not do is attempt to answer questions like “Does Singapore have a separation of powers?”, because that pre-supposes that there is some ideal archetypal manner of separation of powers, when in truth there is not.

The other point I wished to make by using the word “value” — but I think I will not have made it clearly until we begin Topic 2 — is that the separation of powers is not only a description of how state institutions are designed, but also something which state institutions bear (and must bear) in mind when they go about their duties. We will see this most clearly when we finish our introduction to judicial review, which will illustrate how the judiciary takes stepps to avoid itself violating the separation of powers.

There is a useful book chapter on this for those who would like a more detailed (but still manageable) account of the separation of powers: Aileen Kavanagh, ‘The Constitutional Separation of Powers‘, ch 11 in David Dyzenhaus and Malcolm Thorburn (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (2015: OUP). In short, Dr Kavanagh makes the following points:

  1. It is not true, that one power-holder must correspond perfectly to exactly one function of the state. For example, the courts do not only apply the law, but also make it.
  2. It is not true that each branch of the state is to “confine itself” to one function. “In order to carry out their respective roles, each branch must take account of the role and responsibilities of other branches.” (228)
  3. Rather, the main point behind the separation of powers is “to allocate power and assign tasks to those bodies best suited to carry them out” (230) and to “put mechanisms in place to correct for potential abuse of power and jurisdictional overreach” (230). For example, the courts are the ones who resolve legal disputes because the courts have the features that best suit them to doing so, such as  independence (231).
  4. Both of these tasks are “underpinned by the deeper value of coordinated institutional effort between branches of government in the service of good government” (235). Sometimes, the branches of the state are inter-dependent (235); and they have to show “inter-institutional comity” (235-236).
  5. We must consider that there are different varieties of (for example) law-making power. For example, while both the courts and the legislature make law, they do so in different ways. John Gardner calls them “legislative powers of law-making” and “judicial power of law-making” (quoted at 232).
  6. Instead of striving for a “pure” separation of powers, our account of separation of powers ought to take into account the “necessary and desirable interconnections, interdependence, and interactions between the branches of government” (238): “lawmaking, law-applying and law-executing are collaborative tasks where each organ of government must cooperate with the other organs in an interactive setting” (239). (But Kavanagh does not say that this is to come at the expense of the need for specialism and mutual checks and balances, as described in point 3 above.)

Does Faizal contradict Liyanage?

One of you asked the following question: Faizal says that the judicial power includes to pass a sentence on a particular offender. But that is what the legislation in question in Liyanage did. Is there a contradiction?

My answer is that there is no contradiction.

 The problem with the legislation in question in Liyanage was that it prescribed a punishment to be imposed on specific individuals. By contrast, in Faizal, “[t]he enhanced punishments under s 33A(1) appply generally to all offenders who fulfil the prescribed conditions” (Faizal at [47]). Note that the legislation in question in Faizal did not apply to every drug offender; it only applied to some. This underscores what the Privy Council said in Liyanage: that not every law which is “ad hominem” and/or “ex post facto” must “inevitably usurp or infringe the judicial power” (289G). The Privy Council identified various factors that made the legislation an unconstitutional attempt to usurp judicial power:

  1. The legislation was “clearly aimed at particular known individuals”, as opposed to the “generality of the citizens” (289F).
  2. The motive behind the legislation was to “secure the conviction and enhance the punishment of those particular individuals” (290D), by making it much easier for them to be convicted; in substance, therefore, it was the Legislature which was attempting to convict them, whereas in truth only the courts have the power to convict.
  3. The legislation aimed to “ensure that the judges… were deprived of their normal discretion as respects appropriate sentences” (290G).

It is this third point that, at first glance, clashes with Faizal, because Faizal says it is possible that judges have no sentencing discretion at all. But there is, in fact, no clash, as we see when we focus on the word “normal”. The problem in Liyanage was that, as a result of the legislation, the courts would have a narrower range of sentences to choose from for the alleged participants in the coup than for everyone else. Faizal itself affirms, at [45], that such legislation would be unconstitutional in Singapore as well: “no written law of general application prescribing any kind of punishment for an offence, whether such punishment be mandatory or discretionary and whether it be fixed or within a prescribed range, can trespass onto the judicial power” (emphasis added). 

I note in passing that the first and second points, taken together, make it unclear whether the crux of the problem was that the effect of the legislation was to target selected individuals, or that the motive of the legislation was to do so.  Nonetheless, it would appear that the High Court in Faizal would have agreed with both points. To my mind, we can see this from the High Court’s treatment of the Australian case of Totani. At [57], the High Court remarked that one reason why section 33A of the Misuse of Drugs Act was not unconstitutional was that it “does not involve the imposition of a sentence absent a judicial finding of guilt” and was “not directed at achieving a particular sentencing outcome”. 

I would also draw to your attention the following points made by the Supreme Court of Ceylon in Liyanage <https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/1977/12/31/the-queen-v-d-j-f-d-liyanage-and-others/>, with whose conclusion on the issue of ministers’ power to select judges the Privy Council agreed:

  1. The Supreme Court refused to allow a situation in which the executive could, by reserving the power to select the judges who would hear a particular case, “prevent a particular judge or judges from exercising any part of the strictly judicial power vested in them by the Constitution as judges of the Supreme Court” (358). This seems to suggest those who exercise judicial power must at least have the opportunity to decide cases. To my mind, this is a relatively weak point, compared to the next point:
  2. If the executive had the power to nominate judges to hear particular cases, then there would be a suspicion that the court is not independent of the executive (360). 

By the way, for an example of legislation that was even more blatant than that in Liyanage in usurping judicial power, see Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (1996) 189 CLR 51 (High Court of Australia) <http://www7.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/1996/24.html>, extracts of which are as follows:

“(3) This Act authorises the making of a detention order against Gregory Wayne Kable and does not authorise the making of a detention order against any other person.

(4)  For the purposes of this section, Gregory Wayne Kable is the person of that name who was convicted in New South Wales on 1 August 1990 of the manslaughter of his wife, Hilary Kable.”

Liyanage and Article 12(1)

Finally, a couple of you asked whether the legislation in Liyanage, if enacted in Singapore, would have fallen foul of Article 12(1) of the Constitution (on equality). I think the answer is that it would fall foul of Article 12(1) for the same reasons why it would fall foul of Article 93. In short, to pass muster under Article 12(1), legislation must be intelligible and logically linked to an aim which is not one that no reasonable person would consider to be a legitimate aim of legislation. The legislation in Liyanage was intelligible, and logically linked to the aim of punishing the persons involved in the coup. The reason why the legislation would fall foul of Article 12(1) is that no reasonable person would consider singling them out for especial punishment to be a legitimate aim of legislation; but the reason why this is so is simply that to do so would be a legislative usurpation of judicial power.

A follow-up on Liyanage

One of you asked: Suppose the legislation in Liyanage applied retrospectively, but generally — in other words, suppose it had been retrospectively deemed to come into effect on 27 January (or earlier), but would not be limited in application to only alleged coup-related activities which took place on or around 27 January. Would that legislation still be unconstitutional? In other words: what is the crux of the Privy Council’s reasoning: was it that the legislation was retrospective, or that it was not general in application?

I can’t say for sure, because the court did not make clear exactly what about the legislation made it unconstitutional. Nonetheless, my guess is that the court might still have held such legislation unconstitutional. This is because there are parts of the judgment that suggest that what made the legislation unconstitutional was not only the effect of the legislation, but also the legislature’s motive (289E: “aimed”; 290A: “true purpose”; 290F: “it was not only the likely but the intended effect… true nature and purpose”). And the Government’s White Paper made this intention clear (278A-C). So the court might have held that, even if the legislation were ostensibly general, the legislature’s motive would still render the legislation an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial power.

In addition, note that that sort of legislation, if enacted in Singapore, might fall foul of Article 11(1) of our Constitution, which provides: “No person shall be punished for an act or omission which was not punishable by law when it was done or made, and no person shall suffer greater punishment for an offence than was prescribed by law at the time it was committed.” This might well be the most straightforward argument why the legislation is unconstitutional. (I’m not sure whether the Ceylonese Constitution had such a provision.)

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