Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Thoughts on Dow Jones v AG [1989] 1 SLR(R) 637 (CA)

For the purposes of the law on procedural fairness, when does one have a right to a hearing? In Dow Jones, at [56], the Court of Appeal cited a passage from Lloyd v McMahon which used the phrase “what the requirements of fairness demand when any body… has to make a decision which will affect the rights of individuals” (emphasis added). At [59], the court then said, “The appellants have no right but simply a privilege to sell the AWSJ in Singapore”, and therefore they had no right to a hearing.

Of course, the Dow Jones company indeed did not have a right under Article 14(1)(a). But is it really true that one only has a right to a hearing if the thing that the respondent is threatening to take away is a “right”, but not if the respondent is threatening to take away a “privilege”? Bank Mellat says: no; it is enough if the applicant would be “significantly detrimentally affected”. Kioa v West says: no; it is enough if the respondent would be affecting the applicant’s “rights, interests [or] legitimate expectations”. And Kay Swee Pin did not insist that the applicant have a strict “right” at stake; at [7] of that case, the court spoke of the applicant being “directly affected by the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings”. In none of these cases did the courts say that one does not have a right to a hearing if all that is at stake is a mere “privilege”. Moreover, Dow Jones does not itself explain what a “right” means.

It is true that, at [58], the Court of Appeal in Dow Jones suggested that one has a right to be heard if one has had a legitimate expectation that one would be heard. But the Court of Appeal suggested this would only take place when one had been promised that one would be heard. This is much narrower than the approach taken in GCHQ, in which the House of Lords said that one can have a “legitimate expectation that [the respondent] would consult [one]” that arises, not from a promise that one would be heard, but rather from one’s “legitimate expectation of receiving [a] benefit or privilege” — and that is “even where [the] person claiming [the] benefit or privilege has no legal right to it”.

Dow Jones is therefore an outlier in claiming that one has no right to a hearing before being deprived of something that is not a “right” but instead “simply a privilege”. I would suggest that Dow Jones is wrong on this point (or, at least, should not be followed now), not only because it goes against the trend of authority, but also, taken to its logical conclusion, would lead to the result that hardly anybody would ever have a right to a hearing.

[Edit: Now, see Lim Siew Mui v SkillsFuture Singapore Agency [2025] SGHC 235.]

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