Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

‘Judicial review’ of decisions of social clubs, etc.

I think the neatest analysis is that we shouldn’t call Kay Swee Pin v Singapore Island Country Club a judicial review case, but rather a claim for breach of contract. (This is notwithstanding the Court of Appeal’s use of the phrase “judicial review” at [44] and the headnote in the SLR.)

This is the analysis adopted by Teo Guan Siew AR, who had to assess the damages which the Court of Appeal had ordered to be paid (note this: damages are not actually a remedy available in judicial review proceedings).

At [2008] SGHC 143, [31], Teo AR explained that “this case is not about judicial review in the sense of an application under O 53 for the review of a public body’s decision and to obtain public law remedies like certiorari and mandamus”; rather, “Mdm Kay’s claim is clearly in the form of a private law action, which in the circumstances must quite inevitably be characterised as one for breach of contract although this was not expressly stated in the originating summons”.

At [33], he went on: “The principles of administrative law that were applied by the Court of Appeal, such as the audi alteram partem principle and those relating to the irrationality of the decision-making process, can therefore be seen as being applied by analogy to a private law context for the purpose of deciphering whether there had indeed been a breach of contract. Properly conceived, the claim for damages hence arises from a contractual breach, and it is therefore to the contractual principles of damages that recourse should be had in assessing the quantum of damages that is payable in this case.”

Subsequently, Navin Anand AR applied the same analysis in Shepherdson, Terence Christopher v Singapore Recreation Club [2019] SGHCR 5, [7].

But as Calvin Liang rightly points out, this analysis only works if there is a contract between the parties in the first place. What about if, say, the plaintiff’s complaint is that the club has refused to admit him as a member in the first place?

One solution, says Liang, is that the courts can find some kind of implied contract. (E.g., if there is an application fee, then the court may say that, in consideration of the applicant’s paying the fee, the club has agreed to process the application for membership in accordance with the rules of natural justice, etc.)

But if that doesn’t work, then Liang points to Nagle v Feilden, a Lord Denning case which asserts that the court has the power to assert “supervisory jurisdiction” over the conduct of the Jockey Club. As Timothy Endicott, Administrative Law puts it (at 606), “Lord Denning excavated the ancient law on the right to work”, e.g. Tailors of Ipswich (1614) 11 Co Rep 53a, 53b, which said that “the law abhors idleness” and “the common law abhors all monopolies, which prohibit any from working in any lawful trade”. The Singapore courts have not yet explored this line of thought. Personally, I would regard it with a great deal of caution: if it is accepted, what limits will there be on the courts’ power to poke their noses into private affairs — contrary to cases like Datafin and Yeap Wai Kong, which, as you say, demand that the applicant show that the respondent’s power is of a public nature?

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