Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

The ‘would have made no difference’ argument

There are cases in which courts have stated that, even if there was something unlawful about the respondent’s decision-making process, the court will refuse to quash the decision if the unlawfulness made no difference to the decision itself. For example:

  • In Lines International, the respondents had been influenced by an irrelevant consideration; yet the High Court refused to quash the respondents’ guidelines on this ground, because that irrelevant consideration had not been the “substantial reason for the implementation of the guidelines” (at [89]). 
  • In Shell (at 951g-j), the court had to address the issue of what happens if the respondent has exercised its powers “for more than one reason or purpose”. The Court of Appeal, citing R v Broadcasting Complaints Commission, ex parte Owen [1985] QB 1153 (EWCA) 1177, stated, inter alia, that: “where the court is quite satisfied that even though one reason may be bad in law, nevertheless the statutory body would have reached precisely the same decision on the other valid reasons, then this court will not interfere by way of judicial review.”
  • And in MCST Plan No 301 v Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 998 (CA), a case which we will be studying as part of Topic 4, the Court of Appeal said at [59] that, even if a person is entitled to a fair hearing on certain matters but has not been given one, “if a hearing on those matters will not change the ultimate outcome of the case… then the hearing would be in vain and an exercise in futility. In such a situation, the court would be entitled to exercise its discretion not to grant the aggrieved party a hearing on the matters on which he was not heard…”

I would like to point out that, in these cases, it is not necessarily easy for the respondent to persuade the court that the unlawfulness in the decision-making process made no difference to the ultimate decision. In fact, the courts have suggested that the tactical (even if not the legal) burden of proof is on the respondent to prove that the unlawfulness made no difference. I draw this inference (which I stated in Tuesday’s class) from the following:

  • In Lines International, what persuaded the High Court that the irrelevant consideration had not been the “substantial reason” for the decision as to the content of the guidelines was the respondents’ evidence (see [89]). 
  • In Owen (cited in Shell), the Court of Appeal stated that it will not quash the decision if it has been “satisfied” that “precisely the same decision” would have been reached (at 1177). 
  • In MCST 301, the Court of Appeal stated that the applicant has a “prima facie right to be heard on the matters on which he has not been heard” (at [59]). 
  • And in John v Rees [1970] Ch 345 (EWHC) (cited in SSHD v AF (No 3) [2010] 2 AC 269 (UKHL) at [60]), the High Court said:

“It may be that there are some who would decry the importance which the courts attach to the observance of the rules of natural justice. ‘When something is obvious,’ they may say, ‘why force everybody to go through the tiresome waste of time involved in framing charges and giving an opportunity to be heard? The result is obvious from the start.’ Those who take this view do not, I think, do themselves justice. As everybody who has anything to do with the law well knows, the path of the law is strewn with examples of open and shut cases which, somehow, were not; of unanswerable charges which, in the event, were completely answered; of inexplicable conduct which was fully explained; of fixed and unalterable determinations that, by discussion, suffered a change…”

This suggests that the ‘made no difference’ principle exists does not necessarily place the applicant at a disadvantage, because the respondent is the one who has to prove that the unlawfulness ‘made no difference’.

Question: Does the ‘makes no difference’ principle fly in the face of the dignitarian rationale for fair hearings?

I would like to begin by pointing out that, when courts deploy the ‘make no difference’ argument, they do so in the exercise of their discretion to refuse a remedy; it is not that there is a rigid rule forcing the courts not to grant an application for judicial review once it is shown that a hearing would make no difference.

Academic literature aside, the idea that a fair hearing serves a dignitarian purpose is a relatively new idea in the (UK) case law, and has not been explicitly explored in the Singapore case law. I wonder whether, as dignitarianism is increasingly recognised as a rationale for procedural fairness, the ways in which the courts treat the ‘make no difference’ argument will change over time. (A cursory search on Lexis throws up no subsequent UK cases that explicitly cited AF (No 3) or Osborn for the proposition that upholding the dignity of the subject is a reason for upholding standards of procedural fairness.)

Finally, I leave you with this memorable passage in this regard is from Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in AF (No 3), a case concerning “closed material procedures” following which certain persons suspected of terrorism could be placed under “control orders” on the basis of evidence which was not disclosed to them. Lord Hoffmann grudgingly agreed that the particular “closed material procedures” in question violated, inter alia, the human right to a fair hearing (set out in Article 6 of the ECHR) because they provided insufficient information about the case against potential controlees to give them a fair hearing. But he could not help but remark at [73]-[74] that:

 “It is true that a case which appears, on the basis of one side’s evidence, to be incapable of rebuttal can sometimes be destroyed. The remarks of Megarry J in John v Rees [1970] Ch 345, 402 about ‘unanswerable charges which, in the event, were completely answered’ is often cited. Most lawyers will have heard or read of or even experienced such cases but most will also know how rare they are. Usually, if evidence appears to an experienced tribunal to be irrefutable, it is not refuted.

 There are practical limits to the extent to which one can devise a procedure which carries no risk of a wrong decision. It is sometimes said that it is better for ten guilty men to be acquitted than for one innocent man to be convicted. Sometimes it is a hundred guilty men. The figures matter. A system of justice which allowed a thousand guilty men to go free for fear of convicting one innocent man might not adequately protect the public. Likewise, the fact in theory there is always some chance that the applicant might have been able to contradict closed evidence is not in my opinion a sufficient reason for saying, in effect, that control orders can never be made against dangerous people if the case against them is based ‘to a decisive degree’ upon material which cannot in the public interest be disclosed. This, however, is what we are now obliged to declare to be the law.”

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