Helen Fenwick (gen ed), Supperstone, Goudie & Walker: Judicial Review, 6th ed (2017), at [7.25.1], says of the law on relevant/irrelevant considerations and improper purposes: “It is difficult to deal with these aspects of the ambit of judicial review of discretion at a level which extends beyond platitudes.” What, then, is the point of studying the case law, if it all boils down to ‘it depends on the particular statute in question’?
There are many areas of law which really boil down to ‘it depends’: the standard of care owed by one person to another; the interpretation of a particular phrase in a contract; the assessment of the credibility of a witness. Yet one does not merely learn the general principles — the “platitudes”; one studies particular examples.
The reason for this is that the examples show us how to frame our arguments before the courts. For example, Fong Thin Choo shows us how we can attempt to mount what is in substance an application for judicial on the ground of error of fact by casting the respondent’s conduct as an instance of having failed to take into account a relevant consideration; Jessie Tan shows us that ‘clashes with other areas of law’ can be a relevant consideration; and CBB demonstrates how we may infer from the statutory scheme what considerations are/aren’t relevant. This is similar to how, for example, NTUC Foodfare v SIA Engineering demonstrates to us how to deal with arguments that a claim for purely economic losses, if allowed, would open the ‘floodgates’.
Another reason to study the cases is that their facts can provide useful analogies. If, for example, you have a situation in which you wish to allege that the decision-maker has failed to investigate some evidence which has newly emerged since the time he made his decision, Fong Thin Choo would be a possible go-to authority to demonstrate to a court that it can intervene on that ground. Similarly, Venables can be a useful authority to cite when we are dealing with a situation in which the respondent, in making a decision, has been influenced by public opinion. This is similar to how the Brinkibon case is a useful case to cite when dealing with a situation involving emails sent outside office hours.
Yet another point is that the cases allow us to draw more general evaluative conclusions about the law. For example: Tesco Stores suggests that the law on irrelevant/mandatory relevant considerations, by leaving the question of the weight accorded to various considerations to the decision-maker, ensures that the court does not venture into territory that ought to be traversed by the political branches. But one could very well argue that this is not so, for the court’s very choice of what counts as a ‘consideration’ (or, in the law of improper purposes, a ‘purpose’) can itself be a smoke-screen for the court to become what is, in substance, a ‘mini-legislature’. Consider the notorious case of Roberts v Hopwood [1925] AC 578 (UKHL), in which a local authority had instituted a policy of paying all its workers of a certain grade the same wage. One might think that this is uncontroversial; but the House of Lords held that it was unlawful on the grounds that, inter alia, as Lord Atkinson put it, the local authority had “allowed themselves to be guided in preference by some eccentric principles of socialistic philanthropy, or by a feminist ambition to secure the equality of the sexes in the matter of wages in the world of labour” (at 594). Does Roberts v Hopwood illustrate that there is something unsatisfactory about the very idea of judicial review on the grounds of ‘irrelevant considerations’/improper purposes? Maybe (but what would replace it?) Maybe not (but does that mean that the outcome in that case is satisfactory?) Consider also the Westminster Corporation case, which demonstrates the difficulty of ascertaining the purpose for which the respondent has acted.
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