- It is uncontroversial that, if a statute stipulates a precedent fact requirement that has to be met before a person has the power to take some action, and that precedent fact requirement is not met, then any purported action taken under that statute is unlawful, and may be quashed by the court.
- It is controversial whether a court ought to have the power to quash executive action on the ground that the actor has, in deciding to take that action, committed an error of fact (other than an error of precedent fact). This is because:
- the court may not be institutionally competent to judge whether the respondent has in fact committed an error of fact; and
- the court may not be constitutionally competent to answer the question of fact, given that the statute often provides that it is the respondent and not the court which is to have the power to answer the question of fact.
- When, then, can a court intervene to correct an (alleged) error of fact?
- First, the court can find that the question of fact is a question of precedent fact, and therefore a question for the court to answer. Whether or not it is is a matter of statutory interpretation. So we may criticise the courts for applying what may appear to be a strained interpretation of the statute.
- For example, there are cases such as A, which say that a question of fact must be a question of precedent fact because it is the sort of question which a court is capable of answering, viz. a question with a yes/no answer which can be answered using evidence of the sort that a court is institutionaly competent to assess. Fong Thin Choo (first analysis) seems to say the same thing: see [26], [29], [33]. But then we can ask: just because the court can answer the question, does that necessarily mean that the legislative intention was to let the court be the one to answer the question?
- Second, if some other ground of review is made out that has caused the (alleged) error of fact, then the court can intervene on that ground. For example, if the respondent has allegedly ended up committing an error of fact because it has acted in a procedurally improper manner (e.g. failing to give the applicant a fair hearing), then the court can quash the respondent’s decision on the ground of procedural impropriety. We wouldn’t call this ‘judicial review on the ground of error of fact’; we could just call this ‘judicial review on the ground of procedural impropriety’.
- We see this in Coleen Properties and in the ratio of Tameside.
- This is one of the ways in which the court in Fong Thin Choo sought to justify its decision on the second analysis. The court said that the respondent had:
- Committed an error of law, by misunderstanding the word “evidence” in the statute: [54]. (It is not clear to me, however, exactly what the respondent’s misunderstanding was.)
- Committed procedural impropriety, by failing to “give a fair hearing to the applicants”: [54].
- Sometimes, the court claims that it is merely engaging in judicial review on the ground that the respondent has “failed to take into account relevant considerations”, e.g. Fong Thin Choo at [57(c)]. The court says that a certain piece of evidence is a “consideration” which the court ought to have taken into account. However:
- I think this approach is not correct. To my mind, in the law of relevant/irrelevant considerations, a “consideration” refers to a variable (e.g. wrongly taking into account the “consideration” of public anger, as in Venables; failing to take into account the “consideration” of potential clashes with other areas of law, as in Jessie Tan), not a piece of evidence.
- Even if we do say that a piece of evidence is a ‘consideration’, the prevailing orthodoxy is that the court is not entitled to review the weight which the decision-maker gave to various considerations: Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759 at 780. Fong does not follow this orthodoxy: at [53], it states that the customs officer “placed undue weight” on certain pieces of evidence.
- Third, the court can hold that there is a separate ground of judicial review known as error of fact.
- This must be what is happening in cases where the court gets to see evidence that wasn’t available to the decision-maker at the time. For example, E concerned evidence that became available after the respondent made its decision. So did Fong Thin Choo: at [50].
- Tameside contains dicta that this ground exists. But it is not clear to me whether this ground formed part of the ratio of that case, or whether the court was in substance proceeding on the basis of another ground of review (para 5 above). I am fortified in this view by Timothy H Jones, ‘Mistake of fact in administrative law’ [1990] Public Law 507 at 513-514, which states that Tameside and similar cases do not make clear “whether… ‘an incorrect basis of fact’ constitutes an independent head of challenge to an administrative decision”.
- The courts nonetheless see fit to hold that there are limits to this ground, e.g. the criteria in the E case; the criteria implicit in the Fong case. Our question is whether such limits adequately address the concerns of institutional/constitutional competence.
- As for the concern of institutional competence, it is sometimes said in response that, while the Legislature intended that (a) it be the respondent and not the court who makes the finding of fact, the Legislature also intended that (b) the respondent not make an incorrect finding of fact. However, this view may be criticised as being somewhat artificial. While (a) is readily apparent from the face of the statute, it is unlikely that the Legislature ever even directed its mind to (b). As we will see later, this relates to a broader debate over whether the grounds of judicial review exist because the Legislature impliedly intends them to exist or for some other reason.
- I think that the decision in Fong Thin Choo may be criticised for coming close to, or outrightly, crossing the line from reviewing the legality of the respondent’s decision into examining its merits. My personal view (with which you may or may not agree) is that there is nothing wrong with the court reviewing the merits of the respondent’s decision — this view of mine goes against orthodoxy, but I still hold it.
- I am not alone in this view: see Swati Jhaveri, ‘Revisiting Taxonomies and Truisms in Administrative Law in Singapore’ [2019] 351 (her analysis of Fong Thin Choo is on page 365).
- Even if we criticise Fong Thin Choo on the ground that it impermissibly intrudes into examining the merits of the respondent’s decision, I would like to suggest that we ought to consider the extent of such intrusion.
- E does not say that judicial review on the ground of error of fact is available in the event of ‘unfairness’. Rather, “unfairness… is the consequence of finding that the requirements [in E] are met” — in other words, ‘unfairness’ refers to the conclusion that the ground that is made out, not something that you need to prove in order to make out the ground: Chalfont St Peter Parish Council v Chiltern District Council [2014] EWCA Civ 1393, [100], cited in Christopher Forsyth, ‘Error of Fact Revisited: Waiting for the “Anisminic Moment”‘ (2018) 23 Judicial Review 1 at [13].
- If you are more interested in reading about E, try Paul Craig, ‘Judicial Review, Appeal and Factual Error’ [2004] Public Law 788.
Some notes on review for error of fact
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