I wrote these notes in response to questions from students on an essay question that called for students to evaluate the “traditional taxonomy of grounds of judicial review” set out in the GCHQ case.
Principles such as the rule of law, alleged legality/merits distinction, etc. are not themselves the taxonomy; they are principles that (according to Jhaveri) are supposedly “reinforce[d]” by the GCHQ grounds of review. Examples of arguments about taxonomy could be:
- It makes no sense that some of the categories within the taxonomy are defined in terms of the type of conduct that is unlawful (e.g. illegality, procedural impropriety), while others are defined in terms not only of the type of conduct but also the level of egregiousness (irrationality).
- One might say that, if proportionality is recognised as a ground of review, it ought to sit in the same category as irrationality, for both are grounds of review relating to the substance of a decision. However, that assumes that the onlydefining characteristic of irrationality as a conceptual category is that it centres on the substance of the decision. Irrationality has at least one other defining characteristic: namely, that it functions as a ‘safety net’ which courts reserve to themselves as a legal basis to strike down decisions which are unlawful but the nature of whose unlawfulness is not easy to articulate clearly. In other words, irrationality exists precisely to be deliberately vague, and so any new ground that purports to improve on this vagueness should exist alongside, not instead of, illegality.
- One would think that a taxonomy of grounds ought to distinguish between (a) grounds relating to the procedure applied by a decision-maker and (b) grounds relating to the decision itself. Given that procedural impropriety and illegality both fall into the former category, why should they be two separate categories?
- Diplock never sought to create a taxonomy; he only sought to create a list of grounds of review. Therefore, not only is it wrong to attempt to treat the GCHQ grounds of review as set in stone; it is not even necessary that new grounds be developed only by analogy with the existing ones.
- Counter-argument: if he did not mean to create a taxonomy, why did he take pains at 411A-411B to explain that “procedural rules that are expressly laid down in [a] legislative instrument” are rules of “procedural impropriety” and not “illegality”? After all, such rules could just as well be said to relate to “illegality”, as such rules form part of “the law that regulates [the decision-maker’s] decision-making power”. So Lord Diplock was aiming to do more than just create an exhaustive laundry-list of grounds of review that existed at the time…
- It is ironic that “illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety” has become a stock phrase, when it was never intended to be anything more than shorthand for…
- It is impossible to understand Diplock’s taxonomy without considering it alongside the distinction he drew between rights and legitimate expectations…
- Why did Diplock even attempt to develop any sort of taxonomy?
- It is wrong to think of Diplock’s taxonomy as prescriptive, for he meant it to be descriptive only. Therefore, even if Diplock’s taxonomy is outmoded, it is outmoded as a description; but that does not make it confusing as a guide for the future, for it was never intended as a guide for the future to begin with.
These points may or may not be correct, but the point is that they purport to be points relating to how grounds of review are taxonomised.
To build an essay around the ‘legality-merits’ divide and the GCHQ‘taxonomy’, one could begin by attempting to render an account of ‘legality’ and ‘merits’ as conceptual categories, then explain why the GCHQ taxonomy of grounds is meant to cover the entirety of the former and none of the latter. But even if one could, and even if one could show that the ‘legality-merits’ distinction is outmoded/confusing, this would not directly address the question of whether the GCHQ taxonomy is outmoded/confusing unless one could show that the GCHQ taxonomy serves no other purpose other than to give effect to the ‘legality-merits’ divide – does it? Unless one can show a direct, inextricable link between GCHQ and the ‘legality-merits’ divide, a commentary on the latter is not necessarily a commentary on the former, and it would be better for an essay on the topic assigned to focus on GCHQ itself rather than to assume that the ‘legality-merits’ divide is a perfect proxy for GCHQ.
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