Ong Ah Chuan and subsequent cases on Art 12(1) appear to use “arbitrary” to mean that there is no rational nexus between the differentia and the object of the statute. (In Ong Ah Chuan at [37], the Privy Council said that the differentia based on the mass of heroin trafficked in was “not purely arbitrary but bears a reasonable relation to the social object of the law”.) (Prabagaran, at [93], added the suggestion that, for a law not to be “arbitrary”, it must have a “clear purpose”.)
Chng Suan Tze extended what was said in Ong Ah Chuan by saying that a statute that creates discretion that could be used in a way that has no relation with the purposes of the law creates “arbitrary powers of detention”.
But arguably “arbitrary” can mean more than just exercising powers in a manner other than the purpose for which they were conferred. In Chng Suan Tze at [82], the Court of Appeal agreed that “if the discretion… is subjective, that would allow arbitrary detention…” What does “subjective” mean?
Earlier in the judgment, the Court of Appeal uses that word to refer to a type of discretionary power which can be exercised in any way, regardless of “[w]hether or not the facts on which the order of detention is to be based are sufficient or relevant”, as long as the “detaining authority” has a particular “state of mind” (namely, ‘being satisfied’): at [52], quoting Karam Singh. In the case of a “subjective” discretion, there can be no “judicial inquiry into the sufficiency of the grounds to justify the detention”: ibid. Later, at [66], the Court of Appeal suggested that the “subjective test” means that “the court cannot require [a] police officer [making an arrest] to prove to the court the sufficiency of the reason for his belief” – which suggests that a “subjective” discretion to do something means the power to do that thing even without any supporting evidence. And at [86], in rejecting the “subjective” test, the court said that it must be the judge of the “lawfulness” of executive action (citing GCHQ).
From all this, it seems to me that “subjective” doesn’t just mean “exercised for a purpose other than that conferred by the statute”; more broadly, it refers to a power not subject to legal limits (other than someone’s claiming that he/she is “satisfied” of something). And the court appears to have used “subjective” and “arbitrary” interchangeably: see [82], and also [100] (where Karam Singh – previously described as allowing for “subjective” discretion – is now said to give rise to “arbitrary” power).
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