Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Staying the execution of a sentence of death on the ground that the law has changed

Some of you asked: Suppose someone has been sentenced to death on the basis that the law was A. The courts have since changed the law, making it now B. What can that person do? (For the avoidance of doubt, the following does not constitute legal advice.)

The starting point is that, at common law, while the Court of Appeal has the power to re-open a concluded criminal appeal (Kho Jabing v PP [2016] 3 SLR 135 (CA)), it will not do so just because the law has changed (R v Jogee [2016] 2 WLR 681 (UKSC) at [100], cited in Kho Jabing at [58], and explained by Gobi a/l Avedian v PP [2020] SGCA 102 at [26]). After all, whatever arguments prompted the court to change the law in B’s case could just as well have been made in A’s case (Kho Jabing at [58]).

Now, an application to the court to re-open a concluded criminal appeal is called a “review application”: see sections 394F-394K of the CPC, which were applied in Gobi. For present purposes, the important provisions are these:

  • “The applicant in a review application must satisfy the appellate court that there is sufficient material (being evidence or legal arguments) on which the appellate court may conclude that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made”: s 394J(2).
  • Here, “legal arguments” are “sufficient” if they
    • had never been canvassed during the proceedings (s 394J(3)(a))
    • “could not have been adduced in court earlier” “even with reasonable diligence” (s 394J(3)(b))
    • are “compelling, in that [they are] reliable, substantial, powerfully probative, and capable of showing almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made” (s 394J(3)(c))
    • are “based on a change in the law that arose from any decision made by a court after the conclusion of all proceedings relating to the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made”: s 394J(4).
  • The court may only conclude that there has been a “miscarriage of justice in the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made” if that decision was “demonstrably wrong” or “tainted by fraud or a breach of the rules of natural justice, such that the integrity of the judicial process is compromised”: s 394J(5).
  • “[D]emonstrably wrong”, for present purposes, means that there must be a “powerful probability”, and not just a “real possibility”, “that the earlier decision is wrong”: s 394J(6).

A person who wishes to rely on such an argument should immediately apply for a stay of the execution of the death sentence: see generally Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v AG [2020] SGCA 122 at [80]-[84].

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