It is true that, in Singapore law, the courts have the final say on the legality of the respondent’s action. What does the doctrine of deference have to do with this?
Take, as an example, section 15(2)(a) of the Infectious Diseases Act, which provides that the Director of Medical Services “may order any person who is, or is suspected or continues to be suspected to be, a case or carrier or contact of an infectious disease, or who has recently recovered from or been treated for such disease, to remain and to be isolated and (if necessary) be treated, in his own dwelling place — for such period of time as may be necessary for the protection of the public”. In theory, that means that the Director has no power to order someone to be isolated for longer than is “necessary for the protection of the public”. If the Director did that, the Director would be acting ultra vires his powers. (Note that the statute doesn’t say that the Director has the power to order isolation for, say, ‘a period of time which he thinks necessary for the protection of the public’.)
Now, suppose someone who had been ordered to be isolated for a certain period of time sought judicial review of the decision to isolate him, on the ground that the period of isolation was longer than “necessary for the protection of the public”. This would be review for illegality. In Craig’s model, “Y” would be “to isolate for a period of time that is necessary…” and the court would simply be performing its role of determining whether what the Director did falls within “Y” or not.So the court would have to decide whether the period of isolation was indeed longer than “necessary for the protection of the public”. That would be the court’s job. But how would the court know?
The answer would probably be that, though the court’s constitutional role extends to determining whether the period of isolation ordered was longer than “necessary for the protection of the public”, the limits of its institutional competence would warrant deferring to the Director’s view as to whether the period of isolation was “necessary for the protection of the public”. This is similar to how, in other areas of law, while the court has the power to make a finding of fact, the court may see fit to make that finding using expert evidence — see any medical negligence case for an example.
That does not mean that the court would simply accept the Director’s view. The court would still retain the power to reject the Director’s view: for example, it would be open to the court to hold that the Director’s methodology was flawed, or that the Director was plain wrong in his assessment — but it would be difficult to prove this in practice.
Now, suppose the statute said that the Director had the power to order isolation for “a period of time which he thinks necessary for the protection of the public”. In this case, to use the language of Craig’s model, “Y” would be “to isolate for a period of time which he thinks necessary…”, not “to isolate for a period of time that is necessary…” So it wouldn’t be possible for the court to review the decision to isolate on the ground that it isn’t “necessary…” However, the Director’s decision to isolate could still be reviewable on other grounds.
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