Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Judicial independence: in whose hands?

Consider section 3 of the UK’s Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Section 3(1) expressly confers on various executive office-holders the duty to “uphold the continued independence of the judiciary”.

On its face, the content of the duty is that stated in s 3(5): “The Lord Chancellor and other Ministers of the Crown must not seek to influence particular judicial decisions through any special access to the judiciary.” (Note that the Lord Chancellor is also the Secretary of State for Justice, whose office is roughly equivalent to that of our Minister for Law.)

But there is a case for saying that the duty extends to a duty to speak up against attacks on the judiciary’s independence. Graham Gee and Mark Elliott have written useful blog posts on this point.

There is no similar express duty on Ministers in Singapore law, but one is nonetheless prompted to wonder: Who is responsible for safeguarding judicial independence, and how? Is judicial independence safeguarded only by a series of legal rules? I think not. As the UK’s experience shows, the conduct of politicians, and, more generally, certain persons outside the judiciary, can itself have a bearing on judicial independence as well as public perceptions thereof.

That said, there is at least one situation in which an executive officer has a power to do something that has a direct bearing on the safeguarding of public confidence of the judiciary: the Attorney-General has always had the power to commence proceedings for contempt of court, and, from January 2021, has had the power to apply to court for eave to issue a non-publication direction under s 13 of the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016.

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