Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Miscellaneous notes on irrationality and proportionality

The facts in Wednesbury

My apologies: I had slightly mis-stated the background to Wednesbury in class. In particular, the condition imposed on the cinema was that children under 15 would not be admitted at all – even if their parents were with them. 

For a more complete account of the background to the case, see Stephen Sedley, Lions under the Throne: Essays on the History of English Public Law (2015) at 23-24, which cites Michael Taggart, ‘Reinventing Administrative Law’, in Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (eds), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (2003) at 313ff.  Sedley writes that there was originally a ban on entertainment on Sundays, but:

“by the 1930s cinema had become a mass entertainment medium. To enable picture houses to open on a Sunday, the one day when most working people were able to go, Parliament in 1932 passed the Sunday Entertainments Act, allowing local authorities to lift the ban on Sunday entertainments on such conditions as each authority thought fit to impose”.

In the town of Wednesbury:

“a Sabbatarian group secured a majority of seats on the local council. One of their aims was to halt the growing disregard of Sunday as a day of rest and prayer and the use of the Sabbath for secular entertainment. So, when the chain which owned the local Gaumont cinema applied to the council for permission to open on Sundays, the councilors granted the application (probably because they had been advised that they could not adopt a blanket policy of refusal), but made it a condition that the permission was not to include the admission of children under fifteen. For the sabbatarians this was a very satisfactory condition because it meant, in the days before universal television, that parents would not be able to go to the cinema on Sundays either, unless they were prepared to leave their children unsupervised in the house. Effectively the councilors had succeeded in keeping the Gaumont closed on Sundays.”


Over the past couple of weeks [some time in 2019], we had some interesting discussions about irrationality (and proportionality) as a ground of review. I write to summarise some interesting points that emerged from the discussion.

  1. For short, we can use the phrase ‘Wednesbury principles’ (or, as Paul Craig puts it, Wednesbury in the ‘umbrella sense’) to refer to all the grounds of judicial review listed in Wednesbury itself, which include irrelevant considerations etc.; and we use the phrase ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ (which Paul Craig calls Wednesbury in the ‘substantive sense’) to refer to the specific concept of irrationality.
  2. One might think that purported examples of Wednesbury unreasonableness, such as the ‘red-haired teacher’ example, can be explained as examples of illegality (e.g. irrelevant considerations; an irresistible inference of improper purposes). This would reduce ‘irrationality’ to nothing more than a synonym for illegality, or a label applied to decisions which have been found to be illegal. But the courts have rejected this view: see the ‘one sense’ referred to in Wednesbury, and the pronouncement in Tan Seet Eng that irrationality is conceptually different from illegality.
  3. The difference between illegality and irrationality is summed up well in Daniel Tan’s article and Tan Seet Eng.
  4. Irrationality is a species of substantive review, which is, by definition, review of a decision for its substance. Does this go against the idea that judicial review is not supposed to be about the “merits” of a decision/about the “decision itself”? Or is this idea not correct — or, as Garreth Wong and Paul Craig argue, must it be seen with more nuance?
  5. Jowell and Lester argue that ‘unreasonable’ is not, in and of itself, a useful description: exactly what about a decision makes it ‘unreasonable’? Some of you thought that this is not a problem: it is right that Wednesbury exists as a ‘second safety net’, a ‘secret weapon’, or a ‘reserve’ that the court can tap onto to strike down executive actions. This sounds useful, but one could easily retort: exactly when is the court supposed to be able to pull out this secret weapon? etc.
  6. One argument against the proportionality test is that the court might end up substituting its decision for that of the executive. But, as Garreth Wong points out, this is not necessarily true. For example, the court could say ‘X is disproportionate’ rather than ‘X is disproportionate, so you should do Y instead’. The latter is substitution; the former is not.
  7. The proportionality test as applied in ECHR law (and summarised in Bank Mellat) requires that state action, among other things, (a) go no further than is necessary to achieve its aim; and (b) not outweigh the rights of those affected.
    1. This is different from what was applied in Hook, where the Court of Appeal seemed to pay little attention to the aim of the ban.
    2. What if the state action seeks to strike a balance between achieving multiple aims? This was the problem in Keyu. One might think that, in such cases, proportionality analysis should be done with reference to the fundamental rights of the persons affected. The problem in Keyu was that no such right was at stake.
    3. This does not mean that the courts thereby arrogate to themselves the power to replace executive/legislative decisions for any reason whatsoever. To the contrary, the courts apply a measure of deference to the elected branches of the state when applying the proportionality test. See Kavanagh’s article, as well as International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] QB 728 (EWCA) [80], citing R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebiline [2000] 2 AC 326 (UKHL) 380-381: “In some circumstances it will be appropriate for the courts to recognize that there is an area of judgment within which the judiciary will defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body or person whose act or decision is said to be incompatible with the Convention… It will be easier for such an area of judgment to be recognised where the Convention itself requires a balance to be struck, much less so where the right is stated in terms which are unqualified.”
    4. Some would say that proportionality review and irrationality review are, in substance, similar/the same thing: Paul Craig; Lord Sumption and Lord Carnwath in Pham; Lord Kerr in Keyu.
    5. For all these reasons, it would be wrong to think of proportionality analysis as a ‘silver bullet’ that would greatly improve administrative law in Singapore. Maybe we already have it in practice. Maybe there are good reasons not to have it. Maybe its advantages are greatly exaggerated. etc.
  8. Thio Li-ann argues that the Singapore courts have not conclusively ruled out the concept of proportionality analysis in administrative law altogether, and that it is open to the Singapore courts to develop a proportionality test. I say “a” and not “the” because there are multiple possible flavours of proportionality – look, for example, at the difference between the EU law and ECHR tests. 
  9. David Mead critiques UK case law on substantive review on human rights grounds (i.e. examining the substance of executive action for compliance with human rights), and suggests that human rights be protected through review on grounds such as irrelevant considerations (i.e. asking whether the executive took human rights into account in the course of deciding to take such action). Consider the case of Vijaya Kumar in this light.

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