The courts do not defer at all to the Executive’s views on the legality of what the Executive does. However, the courts are themselves the ones who pronounce on the legal boundaries of executive power. When the courts decide where those boundaries are to be set, they do so having regard to whether they can police these boundaries in a manner that pays heed to the need for deference in appropriate cases.
Take, for example, the law on irrationality. The courts insist (so they say) that they set the threshold of irrationality very high because, if it were lower, then the act of applying the test would in substance amount to the courts second-guessing the executive decision-maker on matters on which the court is not competent to rule. So even if you would not describe the application of the test as deferential, the formulation of the test is based on the idea of deference.
Perhaps the same may be said of some aspects of illegality, such as: refusing to hold that certain questions of fact are questions of precedent fact, on the ground that the executive decision-maker is better suited to answer them (R (A) v Croydon London Borough Council); and holding that certain considerations are neither necessarily relevant nor necessarily irrelevant, but rather that their relevance (if any) is itself a matter for the decision-maker.
That said, it is true that the concept of deference did develop in the context of debates about proportionality, and, by extension, substantive review generally. (In short, while the proportionality test allows the court to strike down legislation/executive action on the ground that it goes further than is necessary to achieve a certain aim, the court will defer to the legislature/executive on what is necessary to achieve that aim.) So we should not be surprised if deference comes into play more prominently in cases involving substantive review.
As for Zamir, I take your point that the House of Lords was convinced (albeit wrongly) that its approach was compelled by the legislation, such that all it was doing was to put the statute into action. (You have rightly suggested that the act of implementing a statute is not, strictly speaking, deference; after all, a court has no power to depart from what a constitutionally valid statute, properly interpreted, says; whereas deference is about having power but choosing not to exercise it.) The reason why I described Zamir as a case involving deference to the Executive is this: when the court chose to take the interpretation that it did, it did so for reasons relating to the immigration officers’ institutional competence. (See 949B:
“The immigration officer… has to act upon documentary evidence and such other evidence as inquiries may provide. Often there will be documents whose genuineness is doubtful, statements which cannot be verified, misunderstandings as to what was said, practices and attitudes in a foreign state which have to be estimated. There is room for appreciation, even for discretion.
The Divisional Court, on the other hand… is… not in a position to find out the truth between conflicting statements… It cannot possibly act as, in effect, a court of appeal as to the facts on which the immigration officer decided.”)
So the court thought that a measure of deference to the Executive was called for, and hence chose an interpretation of the legislation that would facilitate such deference to the Executive.
What exactly does the doctrine of deference do? We don’t have a direct answer because the Singapore courts only started using the language of ‘deference’ in Tan Seet Eng in 2015. But that doesn’t mean that the concept of deference never existed; it always did. To my mind, the concept of deference, in the sense of the court recognising its limitations vis-a-vis the other branches, can have the following consequences — a greater degree of deference could mean:
- more “hesitan[cy]” in “holding a decision to be irrational” (Smith, cited in Tan Seet Eng at [92]) — this can mean that the threshold for irrationality is raised, or that the courts will require more by way of evidence in order to be persuaded that that threshold has been met
- a greater readiness to hold that a question of fact is not a question of precedent fact
- a greater reluctance to hold that certain considerations are irrelevant / must be taken into account
- (when applying a proportionality test — not explicitly in Singapore) a greater willingness to accept the executive’s/legislature’s assertion that it would not have been possible to achieve the aim while restricting rights to a smaller extent
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