When a court says that an executive decision was “irrational”, is this a comment about the decision-making process?
One might think that a statement that the ‘output’ of a reasoning process is irrational is merely an implied statement that the reasoning process itself is defective. The courts used to suggest this, as in Edwards v Bairstow [1955] AC 14 (UKHL) at 36 (“it may be that the facts found are such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have come to the determination under appeal”; emphasis added). But the courts have since turned away from this analysis – GCHQ at 410H-411A:
“resort I think is today no longer needed to H Viscount Radcliffe’s ingenious explanation in Edwards v Bairstow… of irrationality as a ground for a court’s reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though unidentifiable mistake of law by the decision-maker. ‘Irrationality’ by now can stand upon its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by judicial review.”
Taxonomy
I take your point that review for error of fact can be described as “substantive review”, in the sense that a decision tainted by an error of fact is void on the ground that it may be wrong in substance. Indeed, several writers take this approach. For example, De Smith’s Judicial Review describes review for error of fact and irrelevant/mandatory relevant considerations as “substantive review” (see 8th ed, [11-022] onwards).
I also take your point that, taking the idea of “ultra vires” to its logical conclusion, every ground of review is part of review for ultra vires-ness. (This is what I was trying to allude to when I said that “illegality” is something of an arbitrary label, in that all judicial review is review to determine whether something is legal or illegal.)
It appears to me that the problem arises from the meaning of the phrase “ultra vires”. If we take “vires” to mean the set of all legal limits to someone’s powers, then judicial review on any ground is judicial review for ultra vires-ness. On the other hand, if we take “vires” to refer only to some legal limits (as you suggest), then it makes sense to say that ultra vires-ness definitely includes Tan Seet Eng-type illegality; might include illegality in the sense of taking into account irrelevant considerations (given the fiction that it is the statute that impliedly specifies what considerations are relevant/irrelevant); and cannot include review for error of fact.
I cannot say that one use of the word “vires”, and hence the phrase “ultra vires”, is correct and the other wrong. This is because the case law does not disclose clear use of those terms one way or another. A similar debate has arisen involving the word “jurisdiction”. Some cases use that word to refer to “entitle[ment] to enter on [an] inquiry”, and hence say that, once a decision-maker has “jurisdiction”, it is “as much entitled to decide [a] question wrongly as it is to decide it rightly”: see the discussion in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] AC 147 (UKHL) at 171C-E. Other cases, such as Anisminic itself, suggest that a decision that breaches any of the legal limits to the decision-maker’s powers is a decision made outside the decision-maker’s “jurisdiction”.
So, if we take as our starting point the model of “ultra vires” vs. “intra vires”, then the question of taxonomy is something of a question of semantics.
That’s why I like the model which Daniel Tan alludes to (in ‘An Analysis of Substantive Review in Singapore Administrative Law‘), of input/process/output. Within each of these categories, some things are permissible (or, if you insist on speaking in Latin, “intra vires”) and others not (“ultra vires”).
Applying this model, the difference between error of fact and irrationality becomes apparent. A statement that the decision-maker has committed an error of fact is a statement about the decision-making process. In fact, strictly speaking, we need not know what the eventual decision is in order to judge whether an error of fact has taken place in the course of decision-making. By contrast, a statement that a decision is irrational is a statement about the decision itself; and, if the decision is irrational, it is no defence to say that the decision-making process has been perfect. It may be that, more often than not, the reason why a decision is irrational is because the decision-making process is problematic in some way. But the following: difference remains: in order to pronounce a decision irrational, we need not identify any particular aspect of the decision-making process that was problematic.
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