I do not think that the criteria in E are relevant to errors of jurisdictional fact (precedent fact).
What E purports to do is to describe a situation in which a decision may be “set aside on grounds of mistake of fact” (at [64]) — but this will not always be possible; it will only be possible when certain criteria are met (at [66]). These criteria are meant to explain the law in a rational way that avoids two possible extreme views of the law. The first view is that the only errors of fact which the court can correct are errors of precedent fact (at [53]: “where the fact is a condition precedent to an exercise of jurisdiction”). The second view is the view in Tameside, which we have argued in class would, taken to its logical conclusion, give the court very wide powers to intervene on the grounds of all kinds of alleged errors of fact (at [54]). What the criteria in E aim to do is to provide an account of the law that explains why the courts’ powers to correct errors of fact are wider than the first view seems to suggest, but not as wide as the second view (taken at face value) seems to suggest.
So E does not change the principle which is common to both extreme views, namely, that the courts can always intervene to correct an error of jurisdictional fact (precedent fact).
Indeed, it has long been the law in England and Singapore — long before E was decided — that “where the exercise of executive power depends upon the precedent establishment of an objective fact, the courts will decide whether the requirement has been satisfied” (Khawaja at 110F). In other words, the court can always intervene to correct an error of jurisdictional fact (precedent fact) — it is not the case that the court can only do so in cases where the criteria in E are made out. What E does is to state a framework to determine when the court can intervene on the ground of an error of non-jurisdictional fact (error of fact other than error of precedent fact).
Of course, this leaves the question of how to tell whether a question of fact is a question of jurisdictional fact (precedent fact) or not. This is a question of statutory interpretation; the case law, such as Khawaja (importance of fundamental liberties) and A (whether the question of fact is an “objective” one, as opposed to a matter of judgment) provides us with some guidance.
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