Some institutions derive their legitimacy from their having been popularly elected. Examples include Parliament and the Cabinet. However, other institutions derive their legitimacy through other means. NMPs, for example, are representative of various communities, though not elected. The same can be said of certain members of the House of Lords in the UK. The Judiciary derives its legitimacy partly through its expertise and the soundness of its logical reasoning. The same may be said of the public servants who assist the Cabinet.
Moreover, some institutions derive their legitimacy from their not having been popularly elected. An example is the Judiciary. If the Judiciary were popularly elected, there would be a risk that it would make decisions motivated by populism instead of showing strict fidelity to the law, rather than providing a counter-majoritarian check on the elected branches of the state.
Can it then be said that the Judiciary, and judicial review, are non-democratic? No. The classic counter-argument is that Judiciary applies the law, which is made by the democratically-elected Legislature. Of course, that is not entirely true. Some of the law is common law made by the Judiciary. But the democratically-elected Legislature could overrule that law if it wished to. Moreover, in choosing what areas in which to make law and how extensively to do so, the Judiciary exercises a sense of responsibility and sensitivity to the limitations of its own role, such as its lack of expertise in certain specialised areas and its lack of democratic mandate (which is especially significant when it comes to potentially contentious issues of public policy).
Could we next argue that, because of the possibility of such a legislative override, the Judiciary’s efforts are ultimately futile? More generally, can we argue that all checks and balances are ultimately useless because they can be overridden?
As a preliminary point, the mere fact that the Legislature has reversed the effect of a judicial decision does not mean that the separation of powers is being violated, or that the Judiciary is unable to serve as an effective check on the elected branches of the state. Take, for example, the case of Lam Leng Hung. The Court of Appeal held that directors of a company are not subject to a more onerous punishment than others who commit criminal breach of trust. The Government has suggested that it intends to get Parliament to change this. Does this render the Court of Appeal’s decision useless? Far from it: the judicial system is working as it should. The Court of Appeal has pointed to a lacuna in the law and recognised that the Legislature should do something about it, given that the law which the courts are currently bound to apply is deficient.
But suppose that the Legislature passed a law to override a court’s decision for some improper motive, such as greed. It is, in theory, possible for the Legislature to do so while not falling foul of the fundamental liberties defined in the Constitution or breaching the separation of powers. In fact, the Legislature might theoretically even be able to, using the power in Article 5 of the Constitution, modify the Constitution so as to abolish the Supreme Court, transforming Singapore into a dictatorship!* But this does not mean that nothing stops the Legislature from doing so. Let us put aside the fact that the Legislature (and Executive) presently consist of persons who would not countenance doing such things, for a future Legislature might well not. The more important point is that, in doing these things, the Legislature would face the glare of the public eye, which watches the news on TV, the newspapers, and Hansard. The public would then make its ire known through the ballot-box. One may retort that the Legislature could abolish voting too. That would bring us from the realm of law to the realm of political science, for, while I sincerely hope and trust that nothing of the sort will ever happen in Singapore, historical examples have shown that an extreme case of legislative tyranny can lead to the public making its ire known in other ways as the legal system fails to fulfil its functions. To put the point another way, it is in the interests of the legislature and executive to comply with the checks and balances which our legal system imposes upon it; for if they do not, they may face threats far greater than those posed by any court.
But nothing of the sort is at all likely in Singapore, for the Singaporean legislature and executive have proven not to come into open defiance of the Judiciary. To the contrary, consider Tan Seet Eng, in which the Court of Appeal declared that Tan’s detention had been unlawful. The Legislature and Executive did not respond in a combative manner. To the contrary, the Ministry of Home Affairs explicitly stated that it “respects and accepts the Court of Appeal’s judgment”. While the Ministry issued a fresh detention order against Tan, it did so in accordance with the law as pronounced by the Court of Appeal; and it – on its own motion – freed three other detainees on the grounds that, according to the law as pronounced by the Court of Appeal, it would be unlawful to continue to detain them. (For more details and commentary, see Swati Jhaveri, ‘Localising Administrative Law in Singapore: Embracing Inter-branch Equality’ (2017) 29 SAcLJ 828, [16].)
We have seen the theme of publicity as a check and balance from Professor Kevin Tan’s study chronicling the steps that President Nathan took to publicly justify his decision to allow the Government to draw down on past reserves in 2009. We will return to the theme of publicity as a check and balance as we continue the course. We will, for example, be exploring the view that judicial review has the effect of calling upon the executive to justify its actions. Whether those actions are lawful or not, the executive’s actions will be cast in the light of publicity and shown for what they are: patently unlawful; patently lawful; ostensibly arguably questionable but, on closer inspection, patently desirable; or lawful but highly undesirable.
We began the course by asking what ‘the state’ is. Some of you said that the people are part of ‘the state’. I stated that we typically think of the people as being subject to the power of ‘the state’, rather than themselves being ‘the state’. But when legal checks and balances fail, political checks and balances wielded by the people – the ballot box; the press – kick in; and ‘the state’, if found wanting, must pay the political price.
* It is not a foregone conclusion that this would be legally possible, as we will see when we study the ‘basic structure’ doctrine. But if a Legislature were hell-bent on doing something drastic as abolishing the Judiciary, surely they would not consider that a judicial decision would stop them.
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