- There are various possible definitions of the rule of law. This should prompt us to wonder whether the rule of law is (or risks becoming) a stand-in, label, or cloak for some underlying principles which deserve to be specified in more detail. (Thio, A Treatise on Singapore Constitutional Law, at [03.027]-[03.028], describes the rule of law as “both a fundamental legal concept and a political slogan”, whose “content remains elusive”. This gives rise to the case for adopting a ‘thin’ definition of the rule of law: the rule of law would then serve the useful purpose of providing at least some minimum standards to which the law is to adhere. (See Thio at [03.042].)
- That said, there are degrees of ‘thickness’ which a definition of the rule of law may have. Consider, for instance, Bingham’s building on Raz’s definition of the rule of law; and Barber’s statement that, for the ‘thin’ definition to be of any use, there must be a minimum standard of living in society.
- One might also argue that the rule of law requires not just that the law and institutions have certain features, but also that society has certain features, such as an acceptance of the authority of the law. Indeed, one may argue that law whose authority is not accepted by either legal subjects or power-holders is not law at all: see my ridiculous example [presented in class], adapted from Frederick Schauer, ‘Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution’, ch. 7 in Sanford Levinson (ed), Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment (Princeton University Press, 1995), at pp 152-154, of the [fictitious] ‘Constitution of the Republic of Singapore’ that declares me the “Supreme Leader”.
- If we start from the idea that the ‘rule of law’ is a good thing that the courts should uphold, then one’s views on what the rule of law is (which, in turn, have an impact on one’s views on what law is) have an impact on the content of case law. Consider, for example, Ong Ah Chuan. The Privy Council was unwilling to say that ‘law’ simply means something passed by the Legislature. But the Privy Council also did not say that, to be truly ‘law’, an enactment must be (for example) rational or based on relevant considerations; it only singled out the rules of “natural justice”, and not any other rules, to be built into the definition of “law”.
- Tan Eng Hong held that even laws which predate the commencement of the Constitution may be held void if they are inconsistent with the Constitution. The view I offered was that this derives from the first half of Art 4: “This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic of Singapore”. Some of you disagreed with this reading, considering that such a reading would render the second half of Art 4 otiose. Such a view is fascinating, because it would mean that the Court of Appeal located its doctrine of constitutional supremacy in a source outside Art 4.
- In considering the issue of implied constitutional rules, I would suggest that you consider what you have learned in other courses about implication generally. For example, does the Constitution contain what the Court of Appeal in Sembcorp called a ‘true gap’ with regard to the issue of voting?
- The idea that the authority of the Constitution ultimately rests on the political fact of its acceptance would explain why our Constitution is considered to have the authority of a constitutional document even if part of it (the RSIA and Constitution (Amendment) Act 1965)) was passed by a body which had no legal power to pass it. (But cf. Chan’s views at (2017) 29 SAcLJ 619, [68], that the Legislative Assembly of Singapore did have the power to pass the RSIA.)
- “All powers have legal limits.” What is a limit? Consider, for example, a hypothetical constitutional provision that says “X has supreme executive power without limitation, and his decisions shall not be called into question in any court.” This seems to say that there are no limits to X’s powers. But it does tell us, for example, that the executive powers (if any) wielded by people other than X are limited. True, this is an instance of what Thio calls a “[c]onstitutio[n] without constitutionalism” (at [01.100]ff); but even then, as Thio says, such a constitution would at least “guid[e] political action through established procedural channels” (at [01.101]), and thereby constrain X to make his acts (no matter how despotic they are) take certain forms.
Leave a Reply