Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Note on the tort of harassment as a case study in the limits to judicial law-making

In class, I mentioned the issue of whether a tort of harassment exists as a case study in the nature of (and limits to) judicial law-making. AXA Insurance Singapore Pte Ltd v Chandran s/o Natesan [2013] 4 SLR 545 (HC) sums up the issues at stake.

In that case, Chandran repeatedly contacted AXA’s staff and used “vulgar and abusive language” against them [3]. AXA sued Chandran for the alleged “tort of harassment” [6]. Choo Han Teck J held that such a tort did not exist at common law [7], and refused to create such a tort. He said that, even if one thought that developing such a tort would be a “necessary step in the development of the law”, 

“we are missing some steps which, even if I were to attempt to cover them, there would be too many, and beyond the scope of the court. I am of the view that a law against harassment must be delineated and legislated by Parliament… Having made reference to acts of harassment through legislation, it is up to the legislature to determine whether the law should be used to govern annoyance caused by means of letters, emails, and telephone messages, and whether the present public order law ought to be expanded to allow a claim for civil remedies. And it is for Parliament to determine what the nature and extent of such remedies should be.” [8]

One reason for this was that law made by the Legislature has “gone through the legislative process of deliberation and debate by members of the legislature accountable to the public” [9]. By contrast, “[t]he court is not subject to that process of accountability and must therefore be restrained in the law-making process” [9]. If the court developed a tort of harassment in an incremental manner, that tort would not necessarily be fit for purpose — at [9] (hyperlink added): 

“In this case, the defendant was described by counsel as harassing the plaintiff’s staff, but from the point of the defendant, he was pressing for his rights as a policy holder. We do not know who was right because that issue was not before the court. The plaintiff may be right, but there may be other employers unlike this plaintiff, who might rely on a loosely proclaimed law of harassment to oppress its weaker and poorer opponent. If the defendant in Malcomson did not send the baby rattle, and if the defendant in this case did not use abusive language, would their conduct still be regarded as harassment? Would a loosely recognised law of harassment be used to oppress others and avoid one’s legal obligations?” 

Therefore (at [10]):

“Expanding the current boundaries of torts against the person… should be done only where the rule can be formulated clearly, comprehensively, and concisely (such as the ‘neighbour principle’ in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562). I doubt that a clear and comprehensive law on harassment as a civil cause of action can be effectively formulated in a judicial pronouncement, more so because there are, in modern times, calls for laws relating to privacy. Civil action in harassment and laws relating to privacy are complex and connected and must be considered together. Finally, by allowing litigants to sue when they feel harassed when there is no direct contact nor proof of damage, the court may be creating a blockbuster tort which will have unpredictable consequences, some of which may not be desirable. These are matters that need public debate to have the social, moral, and legal dimensions brought into the open. The forum for that is in the well of Parliament.”

Eventually, the Legislature enacted the Protection from Harassment Act in 2014. Note that, in his second reading speech, the Minister for Law cited (at [59]-[60]) AXA v Chandran as one of the cases which highlighted the need for legislation to tackle the problem of harassment in society. Note also that, in 2019, the Legislature amended the Act following a process of consultation by the Ministry of Law (see MinLaw’s press release dated 1 April 2019). A court would not only have been unable to come up with such a comprehensive law; it would not have been able to take it upon itself to review how that law had operated and refine it, as the Legislature did.

I note also the views of Paul Yowell, ‘Legislation, common law, and the virtue of clarity’, in Richard Ekins (ed), Modern Challenges to the Rule of Law (2011) 101, especially at part VI. This piece is challenging to read, but, in essence, Yowell argues that legislation can be clearer and more stable than case law because, inter alia:

  1. Legislation consists of “canonically formulated general rules of the kind produced by Western [sic] legislatures in codes and statute books” (121), whereas a common-law rule does not necessarily have a single authoritative formulation.
  2. The legislature has the power to “act on its own initiative and to change more than one law at a time”, which is useful given that “[m]any topics in the law are interconnected in complex, subtle ways, and desirable reform of the law often depends upon changing several laws simultaneously, sometimes in disparate areas… The legislature has the capacity for reforming the law in this way, but courts can introduce only incremental, piecemeal legal change, one law at a time. And because courts can act only in response to the initiative of others, their ability to change the law is dependent on the particular issues and subjects raised by the cases and fact patterns that happen to come before them.” (125)

I get the sense that these issues are what Choo J had had in mind.

This is not to say that the Judiciary’s proper role in law-making is uncontentious. For instance, Professor Goh Yihan, in ‘The Case for Legislating Harassment in Singapore‘ (2014) 26 SAcLJ 68 at [35], criticised Choo J’s decision on the ground that, “if one were to take [it] to its logical conclusion, then it would render the courts powerless in the face of changed social conditions”. With respect to Professor Goh, perhaps one could defend Choo J’s decision that it did not mean to say that the courts cannot take into account changes in social conditions, but rather that the courts cannot respond to such changes in a manner other than one which is incremental — and piecemeal — in nature. Indeed, as Professor Goh recognised, the case law, taken together, furnished a definition of harassment that was not “precise” [37] and was not clear as to what the remedies for harassment would be [40]. Moreover, if the law of harassment were left to case law, then it would not necessarily be clear to victims that they had a right to sue in tort and how to go about exercising this right [41]-[42]. These points explain why, despite Professor Goh’s criticisms of the court, he ultimately concluded that “the time has come to legislate against harassment in Singapore” [71].

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